Europatag
Global Europe – Global Expectations
Today, we are experiencing that the European Union and its model of democratic societies are losing their worldwide popularity. The growing global influence of actors with values, political systems, and worldviews that are diametrically opposing to those of the EU, as well as the renaissance of geopolitical blocs (as evidenced by the abstention of some states in the UN in condemning Russia's war of aggression), further reinforce this trend. In the new era of geopolitics, characterized by strategic rivalry between authoritarian states on the one hand and liberal democracies on the other, these are alarming signs. In order to prevail against authoritarian regimes, the liberal model of EU democratic societies must regain its attractiveness in the world.
Nearly three decades have passed since the European Union launched its cooperation with the countries of Southeast and Eastern Europe. Over the years, the EU has developed numerous bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms to better accommodate the aspirations of individual countries, while also promoting regional cooperation. While all six Western Balkan countries are part of the Stabilization and Association Process – a framework that defines EU financial assistance, political dialogue, trade relations and cooperation with the region – each country has a bilateral track and is at a different stage of the EU accession process. Thus, Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia have membership candidate status, while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo remain potential candidates for membership.
The EU’s relations with Turkey, one of the earliest bidders for EU membership, long ago reached a stalemate and this is unlikely to change in the near future. The EU has made it clear that no further progress will be made until the country agrees to apply the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement to Cyprus.
The EU’s relations with the East European countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia) have their own multidimensional aspects and challenges. In order to deepen its cooperation with the East European states, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership initiative in 2009. Throughout the following years, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, with their clear membership aspirations, developed parallel bilateral cooperation tracks. This meant stronger economic, but also political cooperation in support of reform projects. For example, the EU, together with other European states, provided financial support for the Ukrainian decentralization reform and advisory services to the Ukrainian government. In 2022, following the war in Ukraine and subsequent strategic decisions made by the EU, they resulted in the decision by the European Council to grant Ukraine and Moldova EU membership candidacy status. Georgia will be given a similar status once the country fulfils set criteria. The EU’s bilateral cooperation with Armenia is based on the ‘Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement’. With regard to the EU’s relations with Azerbaijan, its bilateral cooperation agenda is set by the partnership priorities agreed in 2018.
However, relations are complicated, especially because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia is dependent on Russian security guarantees and disappointed by the lack of support from the EU. Azerbaijan is considered as an economically reliable partner by the EU, while political cooperation leaves little room for democratic change or concessions in the military conflict with Armenia.
Before 2020, the EU's relations with Belarus were ambivalent and characterized by a mixture of sanctions and attempts to cooperate. As a reaction to the serious violations of human rights, rule of law and overall democratic situation in the country, relations with Belarus deteriorated significantly after the presidential elections in 2020. This process resulted in the ‘European Council Conclusions on Belarus’, launching an in-depth review of the cooperation and financial assistance. Belarus eventually suspended its participation in the Eastern Partnerhip process in June 2021. After Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war against Ukraine, the EU also adopted sanctions against Belarus, in response to its involvement in the invasion of Ukraine.
The EU’s relations with Russia, that is not part of the Eastern Partnership and traditionally suspicious about further enlargement, have always been rocky. After Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU was forced to take unprecedented measures that affected not only the bilateral EU-Russia relations, but also the entire region. Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU increased the sanctions that had been imposed in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. These now include individual and economic sanctions, as well as diplomatic measures.
The people of East and Southeast Europe, regardless of their country’s membership aspirations, largely perceive the European Union as their main ally in pursuing a democratic dream. While these countries heavily rely on the EU’s support in fighting for the rule of law, human rights, security and economic prosperity, the lack of clarity about their membership prospects undermines the EU’s credibility and hence plays into the hands of undemocratic and illiberal forces.
The first African-EU summit took place in Cairo, Egypt, back in 2001. It sought to redefine the relationship between Africa and Europe in strategic partnership terms, founded on equality, mutual respect and co-operation for the benefit of the peoples of the two continents. That summit set up the Africa-EU Partnership as a formal political channel for the two continents to work together. Through successive summits culminating in the sixth summit in Brussels in February 2022, the EU and the African Union have sought to recast their relationship away from the historical donor-recipient relationship towards an enduring partnership based on respectful co-operation.
While this development in the relationship between the EU and Africa must be seen as a step forward, it is necessary to be aware that EU-African relations have been put to the test in the past due to unfulfilled promises, which erode the trust needed for building a strong partnership. Considering the shared history of the two continents, building trust and investing in it is a crucial pillar for future cooperation. The partnership between the EU and Africa ought to be nurtured and developed; not just for its own sake in order to advance economic, social and cultural development, as well as the good governance of peoples.
EU-Africa relations must also be viewed in a wider, geopolitical context. The EU must pay attention to the growing influence of Russia, the Middle East and in particular China on the African continent. These countries are not just global competitors of the EU, but advance different and often diametrically opposed values, political systems, cultures and world views. Therefore, the failure of the EU to deepen, expand and consolidate its partnership with Africa opens up opportunities for these countries, which in practice are inimical to the EU’s global political, diplomatic and economic interests. In order for the EU to (re)gain its appeal on the African continent, the EU-Africa partnership must deliver tangible results in advancing representative democracy, freedom and liberty in politics, economics and culture for the African people.
The EU is a vital player in the Middle East due to its large economic footprint and vested political stakes in the region. After the United States, the EU is the largest aid provider to the region. Between 2014 and 2017, the European Commission contributed an average of 8.2 billion US dollars in development assistance and humanitarian aid per year to the region, approximately 26 per cent of the EC’s total international aid. The EU is a substantial trade partner of its Southern Neighbourhood, participating in approximately 152 billion US dollars worth of trade with the Southern Neighbourhood in 2020. The EU also trades extensively with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. After China, the EU is the largest trade partner of the GCC, representing 12 per cent of the GCC total world trade in 2020.
Much of this economic relationship is associated with energy. In 2020, MENA countries together accounted for 18 and 12 per cent of, respectively, the EU’s crude oil and natural gas imports. Specifically, Saudi Arabia accounts for 8 per cent of the EU’s crude oil imports, followed by Iraq at 7 per cent. Algeria accounts for 7 per cent of the EU’s natural gas imports, followed by Qatar at 4 per cent. These numbers are likely to increase as the EU pursues its plan to disentangle itself from Russian energy imports56. EU companies have already inked deals with MENA countries in line with this initiative, such as the French TotalEnergies and the Italian Eni with Qatar’s LNG Northfield expansion.
The EU also plays important diplomatic roles in the Middle East. The EU is negotiating a new agreement to discourage Iranian nuclear activity. Additionally, the EU participates in various forums and dialogues across the region, such as the Union for the Mediterranean to manage trade relationships between the EU and its southern neighbours.
Nevertheless, compared with the United States and Russia, the EU does not have an assertive policy in the Middle East and North Africa. It has been unable to substantively weigh in on Israel and Palestine, and has been relatively inactive in Syria. However, the EU hopes to deepen its strategic engagement with the GCC. In May 2022, the EU introduced its plan for a ‘Strategic Partnership with the Gulf’. Central elements of this strategy include bolstering the EU’s diplomatic presence, enhancing its security partnerships and forging closer people-to-people ties.
The European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are set to resume negotiations aiming at an inter-regional Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Prior efforts to formalize interregional trade have been paused since 2009 (Arunmas, 2021). The currently revived process is taking place against the backdrop of emerging geopolitical and geo-economic tensions in the Indo-Pacific. For the EU, aspiring to become a global geopolitical player, this trade partnership with ASEAN will grant access to the fifth largest economic bloc in the world with more than 3 trillion US dollars in GDP and 660 million potential customers (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021). For ASEAN, a deeper trade engagement with the EU as its third largest trading partner and external source of Foreign Direct Investment (ASEAN Secretariat, 2022) would significantly boost its economy. The agreement would also strengthen the partnership between the two regions following their long history of engagement, which dates back to their dialogue partnership in 1977, the establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996 and a ‘Strategic Partnership’ between the two in 2020.
Nevertheless, the pathway to greater cooperation between the two regions is constrained by numerous obstacles. These centre around standards and values, and involve matters of geopolitics, regionalism, technical trade issues and human rights considerations. In addition, limited political will and commitment on the part of some EU members that do not see the strategic importance of Southeast Asia, as well as the EU’s limited military power projection in the region, pose further challenges to cooperation. Moreover, fixating on the war in Ukraine, EU leaders will inevitably divert their attention and resources to Europe. These could potentially impact on greater collaboration and stall further negotiations. Despite the slow progress on increased cooperation, there is a strong desire from partners in the region to work together with the European Union on security and economic development.
South Asia is by far the largest beneficiary of the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); that is, the EU’s policy that provides low and lower-middle income countries with low-tariff access to the EU market. The extended GSP+ scheme provides for no-tariff access for most goods exported to the EU. As of 1 January 2022, the rules of the GSP were applicable to imports from India, while Pakistan and Sri Lanka were subject to the rules of the GSP+. The most generous terms of the so-called ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) initiative were applicable to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal.
As countries become more prosperous, they will rise above the strata they currently occupy, such as least developed countries (LCDs), low income countries, and lower-middle income countries. It is at this point that their eligibility for market access under the rules of GSP will cease and a free-trade agreement (FTA) will typically replace the GSP regime. Nevertheless, navigating the FTA negotiations is a time-consuming process, with the EU having to reconcile the interests of 27 member countries. In addition, the process can be politically fraught, as the negotiations between the EU and Canada, a close partner, have shown. It should therefore not be surprising that FTA negotiations between the EU and India that started in 2007 have yet to reach a conclusion. With more South Asian countries certain to graduate in future, this experience does not augur well for EU-South Asian trade relations.
Of particular concern is the fact that the EU relies on its GSP+ regime to push its human rights agenda. Countries found lacking in these criteria during regular reviews and monitoring missions (such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka, currently) risk losing access to the EU market under the rules of GSP+.
In addition to the flow of goods, services and capital, the flow of people – especially of highly-skilled professionals – has become a defining feature of the relationship between the EU and countries in South Asia. While the UK remains by far the most popular destination for migrants from South Asia, accounting for a larger number of residents of South Asian heritage than all the EU member countries combined, there are now more than a million residents of South Asian heritage living in the EU. With high-quality, low-cost public universities open to international admissions in the EU, the number of South Asian students in the EU has gown particularly rapidly. Every year, about 50,000 students from India alone begin studying at a university in the EU.
Cognizant of this vast talent pool, in 2008 the EU introduced the Blue Card, a type of work permit aimed at easing skilled labour migration into the EU. Many details of the implementation, however, were left to individual member states, and this explains why uptake has been uneven across the Union, with Germany consistently issuing around half of all Blue Cards every year (and a record 84.5 % in 2017). Though the scheme never lived up to expectations, uptake from skilled professionals form South Asia was formidable, with India consistently being the largest source of professionals granted a Blue Card. In 2019, there was a total of 36,806 Blue Card holders in the European Union. The most popular destination country was Germany, with a total of 28,858. The most important source country was India with 9,326 Blue Card holders. 723 Blue Card holders were Pakistani citizens, 208 were from Bangladesh and 152 were citizens of other South Asian countries.
Apart from the Blue Card, all long-term visa (visas for more than 90 days, which is the limit for a Schengen visa) and residence permits are still governed by the national legislation of EU member countries. There are numerous examples of countries streamlining recognition procedures, concluding bilateral recruitment agreements or easing visa procedures. However, these efforts, so far, lack a coordination at the level of EU institutions.
Apart from the stronger economic ties, the EU’s diplomatic efforts in the region are somewhat scattered. The EU has been an observer to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) since 2006. Nevertheless, there are no relations beyond this observer status, largely owing to the fact that SAARC is (near-)dormant because of conflicts in the region and a reorientation of foreign policy – in particular that of India – towards forums such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMS-TEC), and the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) Initiative. The EU maintains an approximation of formalized ties with individual SAARC member countries.
Among the countries in South Asia, India’s diplomatic relationship with the EU is the most mature, covering areas including sustainable urbanization, renewable energy production, transparent and sustainable trade, and innovative techniques to support talent mobility in the region. In an effort to strategically build a security partnership, India and the EU have shown increasing cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, maritime and cyber security, and non-proliferation. A growing number of personnel exchanges underpin this effort.
In its cooperation with all South Asian countries, the EU focuses on promoting human rights, the rule of law and sustainable development. It is a significant donor to most countries and has delegations to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives. It is, furthermore, present in Afghanistan without having established formal ties with the current government. A very recent challenge to the EU’s diplomatic efforts is Putin’s war in Ukraine. While small South Asian countries such as Bhutan, Nepal and the Maldives steadfastly voted with the US and EU in the UN General Assembly in condemning the war, the large countries have attempted to ’sit on the fence’. India is a case in point. Its view of the war is pragmatic and not guided by values. The Indian government is keenly aware of its dependence on Russia for arms and ammunition supplies – around two thirds of India’s defence imports are from Russia – making the country dependent on Russian expertise for the maintenance of equipment as well as the supply of spare parts and ammunition. At the same time, the sanctions of the EU and other Western countries have created space for a hugely beneficial oil supply agreement with Russia (India buys each barrel of oil at a 35 US dollar discount from the global price). It would be an illusion to believe that the EU or its Western partners could break this Indo-Russian bond. In fact, as one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, India managed to sit on the fence throughout the cold war.
The European Union and Latin America have a long-standing relationship. A comprehensive political dialogue between the European Community and Latin America was first initiated in the mid-1980s and has developed ever since. In addition, more intensive political relations have developed between the EU and the regional groupings in Central and South America: Mercosur, the Andean Community and the South American Community of States. In 1999, it was decided to establish the so-called EU-LAC summits in order to intensify cooperation. These summits are held at the level of heads of state and governments from the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean that meet every two years. Despite various summits and meetings, it was not until 2016 that the EU published its Global Strategy, stating the need for ‘stronger partnerships’ with Latin American and Caribbean countries. The EU’s Global Strategy publication was followed by a Joint Communication that called for an ‘ambitious and innovative approach beyond the donor-recipient logic and in the spirit of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’.
Nevertheless, a practical and realistic strategy for the EU regarding relations with Latin America still needs to be included. Political dialogue and economic cooperation are not in harmony with each other, as a genuine expansion and deepening of economic and political relations have not yet taken place. To date, the EU has not been able to ratify its 2019 trade agreement with Mercosur, representing a combined market of 284 million people. Furthermore, there is actually a decrease of 14 per cent in the EU’s budget for the years 2021–2027 for Latin America and the Caribbean. This is of particular concern, considering that Beijing had increased its investments in Latin America in 2020 by 26 times the amount in 2000.
Against the backdrop of an increasingly influential China and an imperialist Russia, the EU needs to push for increased engagement in Latin America in order to forge closer partnerships with democracies across the globe. The recent meeting between European foreign ministers and their Latin America counterparts in October 2022 is a positive sign that after years of relative absence, relations with Latin America and the Caribbean are to return to the EU’s agenda.
The US and the EU enjoy a long-standing partnership that is based on shared values and strong cultural, political, economic, social and scientific ties. Indispensable for the post-World War II international rules-based order and the reconstruction of Western European economies after 1945, the US remains Europe’s most important security ally to date. Similarly, the EU represents a strategic and like-minded partner for the US on the international stage. The US and the EU member states work closely together in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the early 2000s, the EU and NATO formally established a cooperation that has led to the development of a broad range of tools to provide greater security in the world. Following the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 – which has emerged as a core element of the transatlantic relationship by promoting, inter alia, peace and stability and a transatlantic response to global challenges – the EU and NATO signed a joint declaration in 2018 to act together against common security threats. In May 2021, the US and Canada were invited to join the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to improve military mobility and increase the EU’s capacity for fairer burden sharing in security endeavours.
The US and Europe also enjoy the strongest and most integrated economic relationship in the world. Transatlantic trade reached an all-time high of 1.2 trillion euros in 2021. In 2020, 18.3 per cent of exports from the EU went to the US. Similarly, the EU represents a prime destination for US goods: 11.8 per cent of exported US goods were imported by the EU in 2020. Mutual investments are the largest in the world, surpassing that of the US or the EU in Asia by far. In 2021, foreign direct investments from Europe in the US were valued at approximately 3.19 trillion US dollars, whereas the total foreign direct investments in the US amounted to approximately 4.98 trillion US dollars. Furthermore, the transatlantic relationship is key for the global economy. Accounting for half of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), roughly a third of global trade and 60 per cent of direct investment worldwide, Europe and the US have long been considered the drivers of global prosperity.
Beyond the close political and economic ties, cooperation in science and research as well as cultural linkages – such as several academic exchange programs show – form a strong bond between the democracies on both sides of the Atlantic.
Following the tense transatlantic relations of the Trump era, attempts to renew EU-US relations have led to a revitalization of EU-US summits. The summit on 15 June 2021 was the first to be held since 2014.