South Korea

South Korea's Sunshine Policy: A Fresh Start in Moscow's Shadow

The new South Korean president, Lee Jae-myung, sent the first sign of rapprochement just a few days after his inauguration in early June 2025: he ordered his army to stop the continuous loudspeaker broadcasts to the North.

For around a year, K-pop songs and South Korean propaganda had been blaring from huge loudspeakers along the border. The gesture had an effect. The North Koreans also stopped their loudspeaker broadcasts and no longer proclaim the superiority of their system at the border. The battle of the loudspeakers has always been a barometer of tensions on the Korean peninsula.

With the new calm on the border, Lee has come a small step closer to his major goal of rapprochement with the North. “We will heal the wounds of division and war and build a future of peace and prosperity,” he said in his inaugural speech. He also called for open “channels of communication to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula.” But there is still a long way to go.

Lee wants to continue the traditional dialogue- and compromise-oriented North Korea policy of his progressive Minju Party. Its presidents, such as Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, received international recognition for initiating the so-called Sunshine Policy between 1998 and 2008 – Kim even won the Nobel Peace Prize. The previous progressive president, Moon Jae-in, also reached out to the North. He used the 2018 Winter Olympics for a diplomatic offensive, supported the historic meetings between Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump in Singapore and Hanoi in 2018 and 2019, and met with Kim Jong-un in the Demilitarized Zone and in Pyongyang.

Lee's intention to continue this tradition is also evident in his personnel policy. He nominated Chung Dong-young, a former architect of the Sunshine Policy, as Minister of Unification; Chung already held this office in the mid-2000s. Under him, the joint Kaesong industrial zone was established, but it was shut down and partially dismantled in 2016 due to growing tensions.

Initial attempts to establish contact are underway. Lee's Ministry of Unification has allowed six South Korean non-governmental organizations to establish contact with North Korea and launch joint humanitarian and cultural projects. Under Lee's predecessor, Yoon Suk-yeol, there was virtually no contact between South Korean NGOs and the North, with the exception of aid during a flood disaster last year.

Russia as a key player

However, inter-Korean relations have always been dependent on the dynamics between the major powers and the respective relationship of the two Koreas to them. Since Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the geopolitical landscape has changed dramatically, with significant implications for the Korean Peninsula.

Russia has become an influential player in the region through its close political, military, and economic cooperation with North Korea. The new socially liberal President Lee could find different answers to this than his conservative predecessor Yoon and move closer to Russia again. That is why Lee's election victory has caused nervousness in Western capitals.

Lee emphasizes the importance of the South Korean-American alliance and trilateral cooperation with Japan, especially in view of the threat posed by North Korea. At the same time, however, he promised diplomacy with neighboring countries based on “national interest and pragmatism.” This refers not only to North Korea, but also to China and Russia.

During his election campaign, Lee had already announced his intention to improve relations with Russia and China. He referred to the “Northern Policy” of conservative President Roh Tae-woo in the 1990s, who also wanted to facilitate dialogue with North Korea by establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow and Beijing. The term “Northern Policy” is based on Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, which sought to improve German-German relations by reaching out to the Soviet Union.

In closed-door talks, European diplomats have already warned that Lee could be a “friend of Russia.” Lee's statement during the election campaign that the Taiwan conflict was irrelevant to South Korea and that South Korea should therefore not jeopardize its relations with China also caused concern—a position that caused irritation in Washington.

Such a policy change would be a clear break with Yoon's line, which had further deepened the alliance with the US, brought South Korea closer to Japan and NATO, and also strengthened relations with the European Union. Last year, the EU and South Korea signed a defense and security partnership that includes closer cooperation on armaments.

Germany also deepened its partnership with South Korea. Since 2024, the Federal Republic has been part of the United Nations Command (UNC), a US-led structure for maintaining the armistice. The countries are also working ever more closely together in the field of cyber security.

Above all, Yoon's Western orientation was evident in his consistent support for Ukraine through loans, non-lethal weapons, and indirectly even through artillery ammunition that South Korea supplied to the US so that it could give its own stocks to Kyiv. This made South Korea, at least for a time, Ukraine's most important supplier of ammunition. Seoul also joined Western sanctions against Russia – not an easy decision for a country that sourced around 10 percent of its fossil fuels from Russia before the war of aggression.

A stronger North Korea

While Yoon focused on the West, North Korea underwent a strategic realignment. Russia's war against Ukraine fundamentally changed Pyongyang's starting position. Kim Jong-un offered himself as a partner to Moscow. The isolated country suddenly had something to offer that Russia desperately needs: ammunition and troops.

The consequences of this rapprochement are far-reaching in geopolitical and military terms. North Korea's long-standing isolation has been largely lifted. The sanctions regime imposed on North Korea because of its nuclear program has been eroded. Russia is not only ignoring the UN sanctions it once helped to formulate, but is now sabotaging their implementation. For example, Moscow vetoed the extension of the mandate of the UN panel of experts that documented sanctions violations. Control now rests with a Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), in which Germany is also involved. Since China and Russia are not part of this team, its political impact is reduced.

Even more serious is the military cooperation between North Korea and Russia. In June 2024, both sides signed a partnership agreement with a mutual assistance clause. North Korea had already supplied Russia with weapons. Intelligence services estimate that more than 20,000 containers of artillery ammunition have now reached Russia. Kim also sent KN-23 short-range missiles and powerful Koksan howitzers. North Korean soldiers helped Russia repel the Ukrainian attack in the Kursk region.

It is unclear what Moscow is offering in return. There are many indications that it will be foreign currency and technological assistance, including in the arms sector. Two new destroyers, built in record time, are strikingly reminiscent of Russian models. In addition, train and postal connections between the two countries have been resumed for the first time since 2020. Russian guests are soon to vacation at a planned tourist resort, bringing foreign currency into the country.

In this new constellation, North Korea has significantly strengthened its position vis-à-vis South Korea. It seems questionable whether Pyongyang is still interested in inter-Korean dialogue at all. In January 2024, Kim Jong-un declared that North Korea no longer had any ambitions for peaceful reunification and described the South as its “main enemy.” The regime subsequently blew up reunification monuments and changed its propaganda. Official maps, for example in the background behind news anchors, now show only North Korea and no longer the entire peninsula.

Pyongyang has left Donald Trump's attempts at rapprochement unanswered. Trump is seeking de-escalation on the peninsula – partly to bolster his image as a peacemaker, but also because he views the Korean conflict as a sideshow. His focus is on containing China. His advisors and military officials emphasize that the nearly 30,000 American troops stationed in South Korea should be strategically aligned with China. Trump would probably be willing to make significant concessions to ensure peace on the peninsula. He and his advisors have already spoken of North Korea as a “nuclear power,” which suggests the possibility of recognition.

Continuity in foreign policy for the time being

During the election campaign, South Korea's new president Lee blamed Seoul's pro-Ukrainian policy for the escalation of the situation on the peninsula. However, Lee has not shown any change of course since taking office. At the G7 summit in Canada, Lee did not criticize the West's policy toward Russia. Although he did not accept an invitation to the NATO summit, he sent his top adviser, Wi Sung-lac. In initial talks between Lee and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, both reaffirmed their desire to further expand cooperation, particularly in the area of defense.

Lee Jae-myung is also continuing his predecessor's policy toward Japan. The colonial past (1910–1945) continues to strain relations between the two countries to this day. While in opposition, Lee criticized his predecessor Yoon's conciliatory course as “ahistorical.” Now he himself emphasizes the need for stable relations with Japan, with which South Korea shares a “common backyard.”

There are two reasons for this fundamental continuation of Yoon's policy. First, it remains unclear how Trump's policy toward Ukraine and Russia will develop—South Korea is strongly aligned with the US. Second, continuing a conservative foreign policy is in line with the mood of the population. This gives Lee a strong argument against the left wing of his party, which is skeptical of the US and warns against increasing alienation from Russia and China.

According to a survey by the East Asia Institute think tank, 80 percent of South Koreans see the US as their most important partner, less than 10 percent see China as their most important partner, and less than 1 percent see Russia as their most important partner. In addition, just under two-thirds of South Koreans today have a positive image of Japan, while only one-third have a negative image. Five years ago, the opposite was true.

After Russia's war of aggression

A new dynamic could emerge when the war of aggression against Ukraine ends. At the latest when the US lifts its sanctions against Russia, there is a high probability that Lee will again seek to improve relations with Russia.

In Europe, it may be assumed that relations with Russia will hardly normalize even after the war. In the South Korean Foreign Ministry, however, diplomats in Seoul report that a rapid return to a situation similar to that before the Russian invasion is expected. According to South Korean newspapers, domestic companies are already preparing to resume business with Russia.

Russia is also likely to quickly seek to normalize its relations with South Korea once the war in Ukraine is over. Vladimir Putin is likely to quickly lose interest in North Korea and scale back cooperation with Pyongyang. Instead of arms deliveries from the North, Moscow will then hope for investments from South Korea and sales opportunities in the South Korean energy market. Kim Jong-un would once again be solely dependent on China. The North Korean leader would then likely be much more interested in dialogue with South Korea and the US. Lee Jae-myung and Donald Trump are ready.

This article first appeared on August 18, 2025, at Internationale Politik.