BRICS
The relevance of the BRICS in Trump’s new world order and its impact on Middle Eastern multi-alignment strategies
The election of Donald Trump to a second non-consecutive term has accelerated major shifts in American foreign policy and disrupted long-standing assumptions about the international system. Central to Trump’s “America First” agenda is the claim that the U.S.-led global order has ultimately disadvantaged the United States, undermined by de-industrialization and the dislocating effects of globalization. In response, Trump seeks to restore what he views as America’s eroded economic primacy, arguing that both competitors such as China and longstanding American allies have exploited the open system Washington built. His foreign policy is defined by unilateral action, a business-driven orientation, and a desire to recalibrate U.S. relations with allies and challengers alike, including groupings such as the BRICS that he perceives as vehicles for undermining U.S. economic interests.
Trump’s stance towards the BRICS
Even before returning to office, Trump signaled a confrontational stance toward the BRICS. In December 2024, he warned that efforts by BRICS states to reduce reliance on the dollar “are OVER,” insisting that any move toward a new currency or alternative reserve system would trigger sweeping tariffs and restrictions on access to the U.S. market. By early 2025, the BRICS - originally composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa - had expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia. Although the grouping’s appeal reflects broad, long-term trends among emerging powers, the Trump administration views its growth primarily through the lens of competition and the preservation of American economic hegemony.
Trump’s emphasis on domestic investment, bilateral dealmaking, and personalized diplomacy has been particularly well received in the Persian Gulf. States with significant financial resources saw, and continue to see in Trump an opportunity for direct engagement and strategic investment in the U.S. economy, bolstered by close relationships with the president, his family, and his political allies. It is therefore unsurprising that Trump’s first foreign trip brought him to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE - the latter newly positioned as both a BRICS member and a close American security partner. The presence of Egypt, the UAE, and Iran within the expanded BRICS raises important questions about why Middle Eastern states, including longstanding U.S. partners, are joining the grouping. These questions take on added significance in light of Trump’s approach, which prioritizes narrow American political and economic interests while de-emphasizing traditional pillars of U.S. global leadership such as alliance maintenance, multilateral cooperation, collective security, and liberal economic norms.
The BRICS as a coalition of convenience
For rising powers across the “Global South,” the BRICS has become an important platform for advancing economic, political, and institutional goals. Some members seek to challenge the dominance of U.S.-led financial institutions, promote gradual de-dollarization, and secure greater representation within global governance structures. At the same time, many BRICS states maintain complex and overlapping ties with Western institutions, treating membership not as a break from the existing order but as a form of strategic diversification. This dynamic is especially visible in the Middle East, where states increasingly use BRICS participation to supplement their relationships with the United States.
Trump’s foreign-policy reorientation has intensified a broader global shift away from the traditional assumptions of U.S. stewardship over the liberal international order. In its place is a more openly transactional and interest-driven framework. Within this environment, the BRICS does not function as a coherent geopolitical challenger, but rather as a flexible arena that mirrors the pragmatic, self-interested outlook shaping contemporary global politics. Despite rhetorical positioning as a counterweight to Western dominance, the grouping lacks ideological cohesion, institutional depth, and strategic unity. Its appeal lies largely in its ambiguity, which provides states space to hedge, diversify partnerships, and experiment with alternatives to Western-led mechanisms without embracing a fully oppositional stance.
The BRICS therefore functions as a coalition of convenience. Its members have broad objectives - challenging Western strategic dominance, reducing reliance on the U.S. dollar, and creating a permissive space for experimentation - but national priorities consistently outweigh collective ideology. Internal rivalries, such as tensions between India and China, underscore the grouping’s structural looseness.
Middle Eastern multi-alignment and its implications
The Middle East has become one of the arenas in which the logic of multi-alignment and strategic hedging is being tested. A decade of evolving U.S.-regional relations - marked by reduced American security commitments, a preference for burden-sharing, and Washington’s shift in attention toward the Indo-Pacific - has coincided with China’s rising economic presence and Russia’s renewed assertiveness. This convergence has encouraged regional states to adopt a foreign-policy posture rooted in diversification rather than alignment.
Within this context, BRICS membership offers Middle Eastern states an attractive vehicle for expressing this recalibrated outlook. For longstanding U.S. partners such as Egypt and the UAE, participation in the BRICS is understood, not as a challenge to Washington, but as a complement to their existing relationships. They do not perceive ties with the United States and engagement with BRICS as mutually exclusive. Iran, by contrast, approaches BRICS through an explicitly anti-Western ideological lens, illustrating the grouping’s political heterogeneity and further reinforcing the conclusion that BRICS is not a unified geopolitical bloc.
This reality necessitates a recalibration of Western strategy. While the BRICS will continue to serve as a platform for coordination, experimentation, and symbolic resistance to Western dominance, its evolution will remain constrained by the primacy of national interests over collective identity. Treating the BRICS as a cohesive adversarial bloc risks reinforcing the perception of unity where little exists and inadvertently strengthens its political narrative. A more effective approach requires differentiated diplomacy that accounts for the divergent interests and strategic calculations of its member states.