Middle East

Israel-Iran war: Is the regime in Tehran about to fall?

On the 13th of June, 2025, The Israel-Iran proxy war escalated into an all-out war. Over the past week Israel has carried out wide-ranging air strikes on Iranian nuclear and missile sites, while Iran launched waves of drones and missiles into Israel. Israeli officials say they have achieved air superiority, yet it remains unclear if Israel is capable of destroying deeply buried facilities such as Fordow, a necessary step in eliminating the Iranian nuclear program.

We invited Lt. Col. (res.) Danny Citrinovitch, a former head of the Iran branch in the Israeli Defense Intelligence and now a senior researcher on the Iran and Shiʿite Axis Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), to share his insights in a one-on-one discussion with FNF Jerusalem Director Kristof Kleemann. Kleemann, who has led the Foundation’s Jerusalem office since 2023, engaged Citrinovitchon Tehran’s strategic calculus, Israel’s response options, and the wider regional stakes of the current confrontation.

Kleemann: Analysts have repeatedly anticipated the collapse of the Islamic Republic. In your view, could the present Israel-Iran war finally bring the regime in Tehran to an end?

Citrinovitch: That is, quite literally, the million-dollar question. Ultimately, everything hinges on the United States. Israel may enjoy air superiority and has demonstrated it can strike targets across Iran, yet airpower alone is insufficient to topple the regime.

Despite its legitimacy crisis, the Islamic Republic still commands considerable strength inside the country. Crucially, most Iranians interpret the current campaign as a war against Iran itself, not merely against its rulers. Thus, removing the regime solely through Israeli airstrikes would be an extraordinarily tall order.

If the United States were to join, its firepower could fundamentally change the equation and place the regime in genuine jeopardy, though even that is not certain. I am convinced Prime Minister Netanyahu regards this moment as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for regime change, even if that objective is not publicly listed among Israel’s war aims. The choice of targets, many linked to the regime’s power base, reveals where Jerusalem hopes to go.

However, if Washington stays out, the conflict could slide into a prolonged war of attrition. In such a contest, the question becomes which side can sustain the fight longer. As for U.S. policy under this administration, no one, perhaps not even President Trump himself, knows what course would be taken.

One more point: some of Iran’s most sensitive nuclear facilities, Fordow chief among them, are beyond Israel’s reach. Neutralizing them would require American involvement. That, too, underscores how pivotal U.S. participation would be in any scenario aiming for decisive strategic outcomes inside Iran.

Kleemann: Some analysts argue that even without large-scale U.S. help Israel might still find other ways to cripple Iran’s nuclear program. What are your thoughts on the matter?

Citrinovitch: Israel has already chalked up major successes against Iran’s program: assassinating key nuclear scientists, sabotaging conversion lines at Esfahan, and, according to what we now know, causing the destruction of roughly 14,000 centrifuges by cutting power while they were spinning. Those are significant achievements.

The main problem is Fordow. No one outside Iran really knows its current enrichment level because international inspectors are no longer present, and in theory Tehran could now be producing weapons-grade material. Fordow is the bedrock on which Iran can rebuild; it houses advanced centrifuges and is buried deep.

Israel’s Air Force lacks both the ultra-heavy bunker-buster bombs needed to penetrate Fordow and the long-range bombers, such as the American B-52s, required to deliver them. Unless Israel surprises everyone with an unprecedented alternative, dismantling Fordow is beyond its capabilities.

That is why American involvement is indispensable. Under the Trump administration three scenarios come to mind. First, Washington could reach a deal with Tehran and compel Jerusalem to stand down. Second, it could join Israel in a limited strike aimed solely at eliminating Fordow, then push Iran back to the negotiating table from a weaker position. Third, the U.S. might go further, aligning with Israel in an attempt at full regime change. Which path President Trump would choose is impossible to predict.

Unless Israel manages to do the impossible, neutralizing Fordow, and thus the heart of Iran’s nuclear effort, will require at least some level of U.S. participation.

Kleemann: You suggest that one of Israel’s undeclared objectives may be regime change in Tehran. Do you believe that toppling the Islamic Republic is part of the Israeli war plan?

Citrinovitch: For Prime Minister Netanyahu, this has been a lifelong ambition. His visible optimism stems from the sense that he now has a once-in-a-generation chance to confront the regime. Whether and how closely he has coordinated with President Trump, I cannot say. But the rhetoric, from hints about targeting Khamenei to the choice of strikes on regime power centers, reveals where he aims to go.

The challenge is what happens if that objective is not achieved. Setting an implicit goal of regime change raises the risk of a protracted war of attrition. Israel may hold the upper hand, but sustaining long-range sorties into Iran is expensive. Ultimately, the outcome could hinge on which side is willing to pay the price of perseverance.

That is why an exit strategy is essential. Operationally, the opening Israeli strike was masterful, but strategy cannot end there. In Netanyahu’s view the only viable option is to draw the United States fully into the conflict and, with American power, force the collapse of the regime. He does not trust any U.S.–Iran agreement; instead, he is using everything, including his public messaging aimed at President Trump, to nudge Washington toward direct involvement. Without the U.S., an open-ended duel of endurance with Iran becomes a real possibility.

Kleemann: Pursuing regime change in Tehran is an exceptionally high-risk strategy. Is it supported by the Israeli Military? Is it supported by both Coalition and the Opposition? How about the wider public?

Citrinovitch: I have just published an op-ed arguing that if the government is adding “topple the regime” to its list of war aims, it must level with the Israeli public, because every Israeli will bear the cost. Since the 7th of October, the IDF’s room to push back against political orders has shrunk dramatically; the military feels a keen obligation to restore deterrence, and many officers regard striking Iran, “anywhere, any time”, as the culmination of long-held professional ambitions. They understand that removing Khamenei would transform the Middle East, even if they may underestimate the odds of success.

On the home front, Israeli society tends to close ranks in wartime. Anyone who questions the campaign risks being branded unpatriotic or a “leftist.” Serious public debate over an undeclared goal of regime change is therefore muted. A sense of euphoria, dampens what criticism does exist.

Kleemann: Yesterday several Gulf mediators reportedly conveyed Tehran’s request to reopen nuclear talks. Does that signal desperation on the Iranian side?

Citrinovitch: It certainly points to a desire in Tehran to find an off-ramp. The regime would like the war to end and is signalling readiness to resume negotiations, yet at the same time it is preparing for escalation, drawing up contingency plans to fire on U.S. bases in the region or even threaten closure of the Strait of Hormuz should American forces intervene.

Politically, the leadership faces a stark dilemma. Agreeing to suspend enrichment might preserve the regime but would strip away a central pillar of its power. Refusing, on the other hand, raises the likelihood of direct U.S. involvement in the conflict. We simply don’t know how those trade-offs are being weighed inside the decision-making circle around Khamenei, nor how recent reshuffles in the IRGC and General Staff are shaping the debate. What is clear is that Tehran would prefer a cease-fire, but only on terms that do not fatally compromise its nuclear ambitions.

Kleemann: Finally, how are other regional actors reacting to this confrontation?

Citrinovitch: Most Arab governments have issued statements condemning Israel’s strikes, but their posture is driven more by diplomatic obligation than genuine solidarity with Tehran. Notice, for example, how muted the so-called “axis of resistance” has been. Iraqi militias thunder about Iran’s strength yet do nothing; Hizbullah pledges support but quietly sits on the sidelines. In practical terms, no one is rushing to Iran’s aid, and that is strategically significant.

The Gulf states are an instructive case. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi publicly distance themselves from Israel’s campaign and assure Tehran they are uninvolved, largely because they fear spill-over that could threaten their stability and economic interests. Privately, however, both would welcome a weakened, or even replaced, Iranian regime; such an outcome would transform their security environment for the better. Their dilemma is that over the past few years they have pursued cautious rapprochement with Tehran and have explicitly promised not to facilitate Israeli operations. Hence the delicate balance: intercept Iranian drones that endanger Gulf airspace, signal neutrality in public, yet quietly hope that the current crisis ends with a dramatically diminished Islamic Republic.