Middle East

Exchange of Blows between Israel and Iran: Perspectives from the Region

The tensions in the Middle East reached a new level in June. Between June 13 and June 24, the most dangerous escalation that the Middle East has seen in decades occurred – 12 long days during which the world seemed to hold its breath.

A flashback: On June 13, Israel – before the completion of advanced negotiations between Iran and the U.S. – launched a surprise attack (“Operation Rising Lion”) on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and on other Iranian state and regime targets.

A seemingly surprised Iran immediately retaliated, bombarding Israel with missiles and drones, causing destruction primarily in urban areas and bringing public life in Israel largely to a halt. Across the region of the Middle East, aviation restrictions were imposed, and various countries evacuated their citizens as a precaution.

In the night of June 22, the U.S. also entered the war for the first time, attacking the country’s nuclear facilities with bunker‑busting bombs to disable them or at least prevent further uranium enrichment.

Just two days later, U.S. President Donald Trump announced on social media the – seemingly U.S.-forced – ceasefire following what was deemed a symbolic and inconsequential “retaliatory strike” by Iran on a U.S. military base in Qatar. The military confrontation, which President Trump dubbed the “12‑Day War,” had thus ended.

Doubts about the viability of the ceasefire are widespread, not least because its terms – at least publicly – are unclear and may even be undocumented.

The military success of Israel and the U.S. is also unclear: contradictory information about whether the underground nuclear facility in Fordow was completely destroyed, and whether enriched uranium was destroyed or removed by Iran beforehand, continues to fuel heated debate.

Critics of the pre‑emptive war point out that the military outcome is likely inferior to the diplomatic result achieved under President Obama and later abandoned by President Trump.

Fear of an ill-considered reaction by the Iranian regime and the potential for sprawling escalation put surrounding countries into a kind of shock paralysis, since a direct military conflict between the U.S. and Iran could have far‑reaching consequences for the region and the rest of the world.

A déjà-vu from the Bush era: People in Arab states of the Levant were briefly reminded of the scenes just before the unlawful U.S. invasion of Iraq, especially after U.S. social‑media statements suggested that regime change in Tehran was also conceivable. Tension was palpable, and for around 48 hours people feared a total, uncontrollable escalation that could have changed security, economy, and the global order for decades. Israel, which had been in direct war with proxies of the Iran-aligned terror axis for roughly 20 months, saw the operation as a necessary support for a long‑term peace with hostile Iran.

But how is the complex situation assessed in the countries of the region? How do people assess the long-term and geopolitical role of the U.S.? Further, is a sustainable peace possible?

Israel and the transatlantic perspective

Israel’s war aim was the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program and the weakening of Iran’s military threat. It remained unclear until the end, however, whether a “regime change” in Tehran was also defined as a war objective.

A snap poll by the Israel Democracy Institute, conducted before the ceasefire came into effect, showed that around 70 percent of the Israeli population supported the attack on Iran – a sentiment that continues to shape public discussion. Among Jewish Israelis, approval was as high as 82 percent, while 65 percent of Arab Israelis opposed the attack. The latter partly justified this by saying Prime Minister Netanyahu was driven primarily by personal motives rather than security considerations.

Netanyahu continues to frame the war as a historic turning point – with the goal of both expanding the Abraham Accords and resolving the Gaza conflict. He stated: “I can imagine a massive expansion of peace accords. I see co-operations that at the moment still seem like fantasy.”

Others currently share this optimistic assessment. Liberal opposition leader Yair Lapid also spoke positively, but added a word of caution: “The State of Israel and indeed the whole world is in a much better position today than two days ago (after the U.S. operation) and certainly better than one and a half weeks ago. At the same time, such a war brings the economy to a halt and causes countless individual hardships.”

However, skepticism among the Israeli public toward Benjamin Netanyahu is increasing, and the success against the arch-foe Iran is more perceived as an American victory than Netanyahu’s.

The role of the U.S. is being evaluated by voices across the Middle East. It was U.S. President Trump who, in his erratic style, first demanded unconditional surrender from Iran, only days later to announce the ceasefire with praise towards Tehran. In any case, Trump was the one to claim both military victory and, subsequently, “peace” for himself. His message: peace achieved through strength.

Arkady Mil‑Man from the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) emphasizes: “We are in the midst of a watershed event that will reshape the geopolitical and security architecture of the Middle East. Trump’s decision to participate in Israel’s operation shows that the U.S. wants to maintain its international role. At this stage, there is considerable uncertainty about the actual extent of the damage and the stability of the Iranian regime.”

The Gulf States and Arab Levant: between de escalation and the danger of a regional conflagration

The Gulf States have a clear interest in avoiding military escalation between Israel and Iran, primarily for economic reasons. Countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are undergoing a profound structural transformation: shifting from oil toward diversified economies with an emphasis on tourism, finance, and technology. A large‑scale conflict would jeopardise these ambitious plans; investors could be deterred, supply chains and key sectors like aviation, real estate, or logistics could be seriously jeopardised. Added to this is the concrete threat to critical infrastructure. Missile strikes on U.S. bases in Qatar or the protection of sensitive oil facilities across the Gulf highlight how vulnerable the region is. A regional escalation would also threaten the painstakingly built mediator role of Gulf States – for example, in the tension between Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv. Stability, on the other hand, opens economic opportunities: more trade, more cooperation, less military spending. For the Gulf monarchies, stability is not idealism – it is a hard location interest.

The small and politically manageable Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan likewise tried immediately to work towards an end to the conflict, since a greater escalation and another war in the region would be economically and politically untenable. In an official statement, Jordan’s king underscored his country’s solid support for Qatar in the event of external threats or attempts to undermine regional stability. He also emphasized the importance of joint efforts and close cooperation among Arab states to ensure security and peace in the Gulf. Although the Muslim Brotherhood – which was banned in the country just a few months ago and is an ideological rival of Iran’s Shiite regime – differs from Tehran, it would likely still benefit from regional unrest and the destabilisation of pro-Western states such as Jordan.

Lebanon, which has been a "sideshow" in this conflict since the ceasefire with Israel in November 2024 following Hezbollah’s military defeat, would – like Jordan and the Gulf States – be heavily affected by the consequences of an escalating conflict. In concern over looming disaster, Lebanon’s still-young government – hoped for after years of political and economic disasters – issued de‑escalating statements immediately.

President Joseph Aoun, in coordination with Prime Minister Salam, reaffirmed Lebanon’s commitment to distancing itself and non‑intervention, warning at the same time: “Involvement in the conflict would be devastating for a country already suffering economic collapse and political paralysis.”

While official Beirut sought to avert danger, the course of the war was closely monitored in polarised Lebanon, and the ceasefire was hailed by Hezbollah supporters as a sign of Iranian victory.

Lebanese MP Michel Helou of the National Bloc illustrates why Iran’s scattered proxies in the region remain so dangerous despite being weakened: “The Islamic Republic acts in its own interest, while Hezbollah operates against Lebanon’s interests. Khamenei’s top priority is preserving the Iranian regime — while Hezbollah’s leadership is prepared to sacrifice itself, its fighters, and all of Lebanon for Iran.”

Although Hezbollah emerges massively weakened from the war with Israel, other players like the Muslim Brotherhood still pose the danger of teaching hatred against the West and Israel underground and erasing more stable systems in the region. The threat from jihadist cells to the stability of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Western interests remains present. Overall, the leaderships of the Arab Levant and the Gulf States – as well as the West – do not aspire an Iran in possession of nuclear weapons or an Iran threatening the region through proxies strengthened underground.

The deep systemic problem remains

The escalation between Israel, Iran, and the U.S. has temporarily overshadowed the Gaza war in public perception. Yet the scale of destruction and immense human suffering in Gaza – the civilian population and hostages – has reached its lowest point after 20 months.

Nisaa FM, the first Arab female-led radio station in the Middle East based in Ramallah, assesses the situation as follows: “The escalation between Iran and Israel threatens to erase our voices and our suffering from the world’s conscience. We call for renewed international attention to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the West Bank and for genuine diplomatic efforts that place Palestinian rights and dignity at the center—not just regional power games.”

The lack of shelters in a critical situation like a military confrontation between the U.S., Israel, and Iran particularly affects the Palestinian population in Israel. Dr. Amnon Ramon from the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research (JIPR) explains that both Israeli and Palestinian residents in Jerusalem – less heavily attacked – felt  comparatively safe from Iranian missiles. A particular danger, he sees, is that in East Jerusalem, there is a lack of shelters and public bunkers, and checkpoints make access to parts of the city difficult for Palestinians, which in an emergency could lead to life-threatening situations. Protests against the Netanyahu government, which quieted during the confrontation between Israel and Iran, have now been taken up again by broader segments of the population to express their frustration.

Avner Inbar from the liberal think tank Molad raises the question of a long‑term change in Israel: “He [Netanyahu] will draw great political gain from a war considered successful – but if the Iranian threat no longer exists, will Israelis still believe they need him?” Thus, tension toward Iran may be defused for the time being, but the deep-seated conflict between Israel and Gaza could persist and continue to cast a shadow over the region, flaring up again, and again.

North Africa and the branch toward Europe

In response to the recent escalation of military tensions between Israel and Iran, Tunisia has adopted a clear and consistent stance. The Tunisian government officially condemned any form of military aggression and stressed the need to avoid regional escalation. Tunisia reaffirmed its support for international law, particularly the principles of sovereignty and non‑intervention, and renewed its solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Official statements from the foreign ministry called for de‑escalation and urgent resumption of diplomatic dialogue to prevent further instability in the Middle East, which could quickly affect neighboring Europe.

Public opinion in Tunisia reacted loudly and emotionally to the conflict on social media. Much of the online discussion expressed strong support for Iran’s position, often embedded in a general anti‑Israeli and pro‑Palestinian stance deeply rooted in Tunisia’s collective consciousness. Hashtags related to Palestine and resistance were widespread on platforms like Facebook and X. Many Tunisians view the conflict in the context of greater regional injustice and Western double standards, frequently criticizing Israel and its Western allies. Civil society organizations and influential figures echoed this stance, reaffirming Tunisia’s traditional alignment with causes perceived as just in the Arab and Muslim world.

Similar reactions were observed in other North African countries. In Morocco, for instance, the prevailing view was that further escalation or expansion of the conflict by Israel was unacceptable – despite Iran being a supporter of the independence movement in Western Sahara, the Frente Polisario, and thus a kind of “friend of the enemy.” Fear of a regional conflagration and the desire for stability shaped both public and diplomatic responses. Across North Africa, there is a common pattern: criticism of Israel and solidarity with the Palestinians, coupled with a desire not to be drawn into a larger conflict.

Conclusion

The unprecedented direct military confrontation between the U.S., Israel, and Iran has put the fragile order in the Middle East to a new stress test – with global attention. The escalation demonstrated how quickly regional conflicts can acquire global dimensions and how thin the ice is on which diplomacy, security, and economic stability in the region are built. It also revealed the continued significance of the U.S. in the region and that Iran and its proxies have been significantly weakened. Europe’s and Germany’s influence in this conflict is hardly visible or measurable. Trump made this very clear by leaving the G7 summit without consulting his European partners.

While Israel sees a strategic victory against its arch‑enemy in U.S. support, internal political doubts about Netanyahu’s long‑term leadership and Israel’s future – which also depends on calm with the Palestinian territories – are growing.

The Gulf States and neighboring countries like Jordan and Lebanon, on the other hand, are doing everything they can to prevent the spread of violence – not for idealistic reasons, but out of sober self‑interest that also benefits Europe: if not peace, then the absence of violence is the prerequisite for economic development, political sovereignty, and social stability.

At the same time, the essential causes of conflict remain unresolved: the Israeli‑Palestinian conflict, the suffering in Gaza, and destabilisation by Iran’s proxies suggest that a long‑term conflict resolution will not be achieved through drone strikes or so-called “hard diplomacy,” but only through structural solutions, political reforms, and regional dialogue. Such a solution approach requires a roadmap in the near term, but above all the willingness of the involved parties to engage in dialogue and compromise. The Middle East stands at a crossroads: whether it enters an era of reconciliation or again descends into a cycle of violence depends on whether dialogue gains more weight than drones.