NATO

NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific

At a NATO summit that was dominated by the topic of defence spending, China and the security situation in the Indo-Pacific received little attention. Nonetheless, survey data suggests that many European citizens would be in favour of a stronger role for NATO in the Indo-Pacific region. Respondents recognise several long-term threats coming from China and support a stronger diplomatic and military presence of the alliance in the region. Although the security situation in the Indo-Pacific is not seen as a primary security threat, a picture emerges that there is sufficient public support for NATO to explore a more substantial role in the region.

The public opinion survey, conducted in March 2025 with communications agency Meute, captures the perspectives of citizens in six European countries—Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, and Finland—on security concerns related to China, geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific, and NATO’s potential role in the region. The data reflects a representative sample size of approximately 1,000 respondents per country and explores views on military threats, non-military actions, and transatlantic security priorities.

A key conclusion that emerges from this research is that there is both a perceived need and public support for NATO to explore and develop a role in the Indo-Pacific. While European citizens prioritise security closer to home—particularly in Eastern Europe—they also recognise that developments in the Indo-Pacific are relevant to Europe’s long-term interests. This support is often linked to concerns over economic stability and global order, rather than a desire for large-scale military engagement.

Executive summary research “NATO and the Indo-Pacific”

This public opinion survey, commissioned by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and conducted in March 2025, captures the perspectives of citizens in six European countries—Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, and Finland—on security concerns related to China, geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific, and NATO’s potential role in the region. The data reflects a sample size of approximately 1.000 respondents per country and explores views on military threats, non-military actions, and transatlantic security priorities.

A key conclusion that emerges from this research is that there is both a perceived need and public support for NATO to explore and develop a role in the Indo-Pacific. While European citizens prioritize security closer to home—particularly in Eastern Europe—they also recognize that developments in the Indo-Pacific are relevant to Europe’s long-term interests. This support is often linked to concerns over economic stability and global order, rather than a desire for large-scale military engagement.

When respondents were asked in question 2 what Europe should do to counter the rise of China, most supported strengthening domestic industries, diversifying trade, and building diplomatic and strategic alliances. This shows a clear understanding of China as a strategic challenge that extends beyond the military domain. These preferences were most pronounced in Germany and Finland, where economic and policy-driven responses were favored over confrontational approaches.

In question 4, respondents evaluated how significant they perceive the military threat posed by China. Although the overall perception of a direct military threat to Europe is moderate, with under half of all respondents labeling it significant, Germany displayed a high level of concern (47.9%), but remained slightly under the average of the six countries. In any case, this suggests that German citizens are particularly sensitive to shifts in the global security environment, even outside of Europe.

A stronger sense of urgency emerged when non-military threats were considered. Question 8 reveals that respondents are significantly concerned about cyberattacks, economic coercion, and intelligence operations. The most worrying non-military threat (question 9) is cyberattacks, followed by economic coercion, sabotage of critical infrastructure and espionage. Election interference by China is notably low on the public's list of concerns, also in Germany, where only 5% of respondents flagged it as a top threat (compared to a 4% average score). This suggests a distinction in public minds between the types of authoritarian interference that dominate domestic political discourse (such as Russian disinformation) and the more economic or infrastructural tactics associated with China. Considering the role of TikTok in forming opinions, this is an interesting finding.

Question 10 highlights a broad recognition that instability in the Indo-Pacific has the potential to disrupt global trade and supply chains, with around three-quarters of respondents expressing some level of concern. Germany, again, scores high in concern, with Germans recognizing the strategic interconnectedness of European and Indo-Pacific security.

The clearest support for a role for NATO in the Indo-Pacific comes in question 12. While full endorsement for a military role in the region remains limited, close to half of German respondents support NATO increasing its diplomatic and military presence. What strikes the attention is the amount of undecideds, leaving room for societal debate and political leadership. At the same time, the follow-up in question 13 shows that support drops when such involvement might come at the expense of European security priorities such as Ukraine. This illustrates that while there is appetite for a more global NATO, it must not come at the cost of its European commitments and security issues in Europe.

This balancing act is further reflected in question 14, where respondents—including in Germany—support the idea that European NATO allies should focus on regional threats, while allowing the U.S. to lead in the Indo-Pacific. This suggests a pragmatic public understanding of NATO's capabilities and limitations, and a desire for strategic division of labor between Europe and the United States.

In question 17, only around 33.8% of Germans are (very) confident that NATO would be effective in deterring Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific. This finding highlights a gap between public support for NATO’s engagement in the region and belief in its actual capacity to operate there. The scepticism is not rejectionist, but instead suggests the need for NATO to build credibility, capabilities, and partnerships if it wants to play a meaningful role in the Indo-Pacific.

Finally, question 19 provides insight into what role the European Union should play in the Indo-Pacific. The German public, like the overall average, does not see the EU as a military actor in the region. Instead, there is support for strengthening economic ties and diplomatic engagement. In Germany, only 15% support independent military partnerships, while 33% support enhanced diplomatic efforts and 29% prefer economic engagement. This underscores the view of the EU as a soft power complement to NATO’s strategic function.

In conclusion, the survey reveals that European citizens, including those in Germany, support NATO exploring a greater role in the Indo-Pacific. However, this support is conditioned on NATO maintaining its European commitments and support for Ukraine and mostly acting through partnerships and diplomacy. Regionally we see diverging prioritizations on the preferred focus for NATO. The insights provide a foundation for policy recommendations that combine transatlantic coordination, strengthening the economy, capacity-building, and a layered approach to deterrence.