Suppression of Opposition under Orbán

Hungary’s Next Election: A Test for Democracy

Article 2(1) of the Hungarian Constitution states: “Members of Parliament shall be elected by the citizens on the basis of universal, equal suffrage in direct and secret elections, with free expression of will (...)”.

But it is precisely this fundamental right that could be put to the test next spring. Parliamentary elections are coming up in Hungary and there is a danger that they will not comply with the principles of freedom and equality.

Since Victor Orbán had to watch from the sidelines in the early 2000s as others determined the fate of the country, he has done everything in his power to prevent a return to political irrelevance. Since then, he has been systematically building a power apparatus designed to make him unassailable. But since last year, there has been a challenger who could contest his office. Péter Magyar, Orbán's former party colleague, is leading in the polls and could thus pose a threat to the Prime Minister.

Péter Magyar was associated with Orbán's Fidesz party for almost twenty years. He was married to Hungary's former Minister of Justice and served in the European Parliament for Fidesz. Since the beginning of 2024, Péter Magyar has been Orbán's most significant political opponent. With the Tisza Party, Magyar won almost 30% of the vote in the European elections; although Fidesz emerged victorious, it achieved its worst result ever. Tisza joined the EPP group in the European Parliament, which Fidesz had left several years ago. Magyar's popularity stems primarily from the scandal surrounding his ex-wife, who was forced to resign following the pardon of someone who had covered up child abuse. In the wake of this, Magyar released an audio recording in which his ex-wife admitted to cover-ups in judicial circles and accused the government of mafia-like behavior. Magyar then organized the largest anti-government demonstrations in years. Magyar and Tisza have since gained popularity and support, especially among opposition voters. He could pose a threat to Orbán, among other things, through his insider knowledge.

This article looks at the obstacles Orbán has erected in recent years to secure his power against any threat from the opposition. For this purpose, various laws that could pose a threat to the opposition in the next election are examined below.

Overview of the measures

Sovereignty Act

Back in December 2023, the Hungarian Parliament created a new office for the protection of sovereignty. Its purpose was to monitor organizations and individuals who allegedly pursued foreign interests because they accepted funds from abroad. The office was given far-reaching powers and is allowed, for example, to intervene in the investigative activities of other authorities. Those affected could face up to three years in prison. The law drew criticism from the EU. The EU Commission took Hungary to court, accusing it of violating fundamental democratic principles such as the right to freedom of expression. The oral hearing before the European Court of Justice on this law began on Tuesday, September 16th, 2025.

At the beginning of this year (2025), the development reached a new escalation level. Shortly after Orbán announced his intention to drive “bugs” out of Hungary, a Fidesz member of parliament submitted a draft bill to parliament that would expand the sovereignty law. The office is to be given further powers, such as the ability to ban the organizations concerned, which could result in opposition figures being barred from next year's election campaign. The draft law accuses individuals or organizations of concealing foreign funding, despite civil society groups already disclosing funds transparently, as required by law. Once again, the law primarily affects opposition figures, journalists, and organizations that are particularly committed to gender diversity. The timing is hardly coincidental: Péter Magyar, Orbán's biggest challenger, is currently ahead in the polls.

The draft law sparked a wave of protests, which is unusual for the Hungarian population. At the same time, however, a survey shows that around 20 percent of the population supports the aims of the law. It aims to protect Hungary's independence, as well as issues such as marriage, biological sex, and Christian culture from the influence of other governments.

Revocation of Hungarian citizenship

The second law to be considered here also restricts the rights of opposition members in particular:

In January 2025, the Hungarian Parliament passed a law that deeply infringes on citizens' rights: anyone who has a second citizenship in addition to Hungarian citizenship can have their Hungarian citizenship revoked. According to Section 9/B (1a) of the Hungarian Constitution, this applies to persons who pose a threat to public order or security. Particularly controversial is the addition that any citizen can submit a proposal as to whom citizenship should be withdrawn.

Opposition politicians and government critics are particularly affected by the law. The law is based on the accusation that they are acting on behalf of another government or power and thus want to harm Hungary.

Citizenship can be annulled for up to ten years. Such a regulation is unique internationally. The establishment of the law also followed an unusual process, as it was passed without public debate in parliament and signed by the president on the same day. This approach not only reveals the restructuring of the state according to Orbán's ideas, but also a direct attack on EU law and the fundamental values of liberal democracies.

Changes to constituencies

At first glance, the following law does not appear to be an attack on the fundamental values of liberal democracy. However, a closer look reveals that the law also disadvantages the opposition and thus undermines democracy.

The government made its first far-reaching changes to constituencies back in 2011. At that time, not only was the number of members of parliament halved, but it was also stipulated that each party must field candidates in at least two-thirds of the administrative districts. This is a hurdle that smaller opposition parties in particular find almost impossible to overcome.

In November 2024, the constituencies were changed again, resulting in two fewer direct mandates in Budapest and two more in the rural surrounding areas. According to an election researcher from the think tank Political Capital, this cannot be justified by a possible population shift. Rather, there is a suspicion that the aim is to weaken the opposition: in the past, it always won safe seats in Budapest, which have now been reduced.

Change in ballot paper distribution

A law of a different nature but similar effect is the following:

Less than a year ago, supporters of the Fidesz party voted in favor of a change to the electoral law in the Justice Committee. Since then, envelopes may no longer be issued for ballot papers. One can only speculate about the reasons for the law, but one can assume that the law is aimed at weakening the opposition.

The opposition warns that this is an attack on the secrecy of the ballot and sees it as another attempt to undermine the foundations of free and secret elections. For example, in smaller communities, election officials can more easily check who voted for which candidate.

Legitimization of providing false residential addresses

The following law also plays into the hands of the Fidesz party:

Since 2022, a law has allowed citizens to provide fictitious residential addresses, even if they have no intention of living there. This was justified by the decriminalization of hundreds of thousands of Hungarians who had forgotten to report their change of residence. Critics, however, see this as an opportunity for electoral fraud. During the 2018 election, hundreds of voters were illegally transported from abroad by bus to neighbouring Hungarian communities so that they could cast their votes there. They allegedly lived in their dozens in single-family homes. Their owners were asked to confirm the voters' false addresses and were lured with job offers. The new regulation legalizes this practice. In 2022, voters were able to legally vote in communities where they do not live, allowing Fidesz to defend its majority there. Jobs and money were offered in return.

Change in voting rights for Hungarians living abroad

Like the previously mentioned law, the next law also plays into the hands of Fidesz. As a result of the Treaty of Trianon, approximately 2 million citizens of Hungarian descent live in neighboring countries. While most Hungarians have to travel thousands of kilometers to cast their vote in person at a Hungarian embassy or representative office, in 2018 voting rights for Hungarian minorities in Romania, Ukraine, and Serbia have been made easier. They can conveniently cast their votes by mail. This change in the law is no coincidence. Many members of the Hungarian minority in neighboring countries are Fidesz voters, partly because they benefit from Budapest's government. They receive state subsidies such as social benefits or simplified access to citizenship.

István Székely, Vice President for Social Affairs of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ), rejects these accusations. He argues that the right to vote for Hungarians living abroad is a purely symbolic act. Individual representatives cannot be elected, resulting in only a small number of seats being won.

Significance for the opposition

All these legislative changes have one thing in common: they significantly restrict the work of the opposition.

Under the pretext of protecting Hungary from foreign influence, the Sovereignty Law conceals the surveillance and suppression of the opposition. Peter Magyar, among others, is accused of exerting influence on foreign countries through financial contributions. The law on dual citizenship carries the risk of opposition figures being expelled from Hungary. The change in constituencies has ensured that fewer opposition members will be represented in parliament, while the ban on ballot envelopes could lead to a long-term undermining of the secrecy of the ballot. Removing secrecy could intimidate voters and deter them from supporting the opposition. The legalization of fictitious residential addresses also helps Fidesz secure more votes. The amendment to the electoral law for Hungarians living abroad has the same effect.

The existence and work of the opposition is a fundamental requirement for democracy. All these laws show how Orbán is systematically undermining the liberal values of democracy and critics argue this represents a shift toward autocracy.

The consequences extend beyond Hungary's borders. Orbán has already prevented or delayed sanctions against Russia and financial and military support for Ukraine in the recent past, and his rapprochement with other authoritarian states such as China could also become a problem for the future and security of Europe.

Conclusion

This article has highlighted the measures the Orbán government has taken in recent years to weaken the opposition and consolidate its own power base. Since a strong opposition is one of the central elements of a democracy, this development represents a significant strain on the political system. The 2026 elections will determine whether Hungary can continue to exist as a functioning democracy within the EU.