Europe - Political Analysis

EUROPE’S SAFE FRAMEWORK: POLITICAL OBSTRUCTIONISM VS STRATEGIC INCLUSIVITY

Tacan İldem, Ambassador (R), Chairman of EDAM – Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies

The views expressed in this text reflect the author’s personal opinions based on his individual expertise and do not represent the official position of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. 

Introduction

The European Union’s emerging Security Action for Europe (SAFE) framework represents a significant step toward strengthening Europe’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) and advancing the goal of “strategic autonomy.” SAFE, still under development, seeks to bring together the EU’s currently fragmented defence instruments into a single, coherent system—linking capability development, industrial resilience, and long-term strategic ambition.

By integrating the European Defence Fund (EDF), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the EDIRPA procurement mechanism, SAFE aims to align Europe’s industrial capacity with its strategic objectives. In doing so, it supports both Europe’s defence capabilities and the autonomy of its wider security ecosystem.

Burden-Sharing and the Transatlantic Equation

SAFE must be viewed in the broader transatlantic context. With President Trump’s return to the White House, the debate around Europe’s “strategic autonomy” has taken on new urgency. The United States continues to shoulder a disproportionate share of NATO’s defence burden while pressing Europe to assume more responsibility.

The 2014 Wales Summit set the benchmark of allocating 2% of GDP to defence—an objective consistently met by only a handful of Allies, including Poland, the UK, and the Baltic states. U.S. pressure during Trump’s first term accelerated European defence spending. At the 2024 Hague Summit, NATO members went further: they committed to spending 5% of GDP on defence and security by 2035, with 3.5% dedicated to NATO capability targets and 1.5% to resilience and critical infrastructure.

These commitments reinforce Europe’s determination to build strategic capacity through initiatives like SAFE. But European security cannot be defined solely by EU borders. Key non-EU Allies—namely the UK, Norway, and Türkiye—are indispensable to any credible vision of Europe’s future in defence and security. Their security is inseparable from Europe’s.

Third-Country Participation

The EU’s approach to involving non-member states in its defence programmes remains restrictive. Participation is permitted only when demonstrable “added value” exists and strict conditions concerning export controls, data security, and intellectual property are met.

Norway and the UK enjoy limited participation due to their strategic proximity and interoperability with EU forces. Türkiye, however, faces additional political obstacles. The EU’s unanimity requirement enables Athens and Nicosia to veto Turkish involvement, citing unresolved disputes. Under current security conditions, it may be necessary to consider qualified majority voting for priority projects or to grant the European Commission more flexibility in enabling participation by Europe’s three non-EU NATO Allies. A similar impasse was previously resolved pragmatically in the A400M programe under the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR).

Existing models for third-country participation include:

1. Project-based cooperation, when a partner’s contribution is essential;

2. Observer status, granting limited access;

3. Association agreements, reserved for trusted partners such as Norway.

These models, originally designed for PESCO and the EDF, will likely shape SAFE as well.

Eligibility typically relies on:

• Added value and unique technical contributions

• Reciprocity and mutual benefit

• Alignment with EU foreign and security policy

• Information and intellectual property security

• No decision-making rights for non-members

• Unanimous approval by EU member states

While these rules ensure coherence, they often politicise the process and create rigidity.

Under the EDF, EU funding can cover up to 65% of project costs. Non-EU entities cannot receive these funds but may participate by self-financing, subject to strict security screening. This allows technical involvement but excludes financial partnership—meaning that Turkish defence companies could contribute to SAFE projects without accessing EU funds.

Benefits of Cooperation

Despite constraints, cooperation provides clear advantages.

For Türkiye and other partners:

• Access to Europe’s R&D and innovation networks

• Joint opportunities in AI, cyber, and space technologies

• Greater interoperability with EU and NATO standards

• Increased visibility and structured engagement within European defence discussions

For the EU:

• Additional industrial capacity, scale, and innovation (e.g., Türkiye’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), missiles, and naval systems)

• More resilient and diversified supply chains

• Improved NATO–EU coherence and reduced duplication

Even without EU membership, structured cooperation can strengthen Europe’s collective defence.

Türkiye’s Strategic Role and the Cost of Exclusion

A NATO member for over 70 years, Türkiye remains central to European and transatlantic security. It hosts key NATO facilities—including Allied Land Command in Izmir and the missile-defence radar in Kürecik—and provides strategic reach from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia.

Türkiye’s defence industry has developed into a dynamic source of capability. Its UAVs, naval platforms, and missile systems have reshaped battlefields from Ukraine to Africa, elevating Türkiye to the role of a significant security provider.

For Europe to pursue strategic autonomy while sidelining one of its most capable defence producers and long-standing NATO Allies is a contradiction. Ankara perceives this exclusion as politically motivated and inconsistent with the NATO–EU strategic partnership, leading Türkiye to focus more on bilateral engagement with individual EU member states.

The EU, for its part, must evolve from a transactional approach toward a strategic partnership that harnesses Türkiye’s potential while encouraging political alignment. Although accession talks are effectively frozen, Türkiye’s strategic relevance has not diminished. Its exclusion from consultations on the EU’s Black Sea Strategy illustrates the short-sightedness of current policy.

After all, the EU should remember that it set aside its own rule that candidate countries should not have unresolved territorial disputes when it admitted Cyprus in 2004, even though the Greek Cypriot side had rejected the UN-brokered Annan Plan aimed at resolving the Cyprus question— a turning point that has not only held hostage some of the Union’s key decisions but also long hindered NATO–EU cooperation.

Türkiye’s relevance extends well beyond geography. As an energy corridor, technological innovator, and regional stabiliser, it contributes directly to Europe’s resilience. Excluding Türkiye from SAFE would therefore be strategically counterproductive.

Constructive Engagement and Partnerships Beyond the EU

Rebuilding political trust is essential. Without progress in the Ankara–Athens–Nicosia triangle—which appears unlikely in the near term—cooperation with Türkiye will continue mainly through bilateral and minilateral channels, as well as technical formats similar to structured NATO–EU engagement with non-EU Allies. These certainly lack institutional depth while remaining somewhat functional.

On one side, Athens and Nicosia should recognise that leveraging Türkiye-EU relations for narrow national objectives has lost its effectiveness. On the other side, the EU should adopt a realistic approach: distinguishing between membership and strategic partnership without undermining Türkiye’s long-term EU perspective.

Under current circumstances, partnerships with key NATO/EU members—such as the UK and Germany—offer practical pathways for integrating Türkiye into Europe’s defence ecosystem. The recent visits of Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Chancellor Friedrich Merz to Ankara signal rising interest in cooperation on aviation, unmanned systems, innovation, and security dialogue.

Such bilateral initiatives could lay the groundwork for a networked European defence architecture—one that connects EU and non-EU partners through flexible, capability-driven cooperation rather than rigid institutional structures.

Conclusion

SAFE represents a milestone in Europe’s pursuit of strategic responsibility and industrial resilience. Its success will hinge on whether the EU can act strategically rather than allowing a few member states to block key decisions.

Excluding Türkiye—a crucial NATO Ally with robust industrial capacity, a pivotal geographic position, and an enduring commitment to transatlantic security—weakens Europe’s security and undermines the very notion of strategic autonomy. Europe’s defence posture will be credible only if it is built on an inclusive strategic vision, not on political obstruction.