Interview
What Moscow is Learning from the War in Iran
Arkady Mil-Man is a senior researcher and Head of the Russia Research department at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). A former Israeli ambassador to Russia and Azerbaijan, he has spent decades working on Russia, the Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet space from both diplomatic and analytical positions.
In this interview, Mil-Man examines how Moscow is likely interpreting the war with Iran, and what those conclusions may mean for Ukraine, Europe, and Western deterrence. His answers point to a central concern for European policymakers: Russia may become more cautious about direct escalation, but more persistent in applying indirect, multidimensional pressure below the threshold of open confrontation.
Q. As Moscow watches the war with Iran unfold, which lessons is it most likely drawing about deterrence, escalation, and the limits of Western response?
First, deterrence is no longer understood as a function of capability alone. The war with Iran has reinforced in Moscow the view that its effectiveness depends not only on the possession of force, including nuclear weapons, but also on the perceived willingness to use it. In the Kremlin’s view, the United States has demonstrated a higher level of readiness to escalate than previously assumed, including in situations that do not directly involve its core security interests. This undermines earlier assumptions that U.S. behavior would be tightly constrained by risk management logic.
Second, the role of escalation is being reinterpreted. Whereas it was previously seen as a tool of pressure to improve negotiating positions, it is now increasingly viewed as a means of producing outcomes. The sequence of “pressure – negotiation - renewed escalation” points to a cyclical logic in which force becomes not a supplement to diplomacy, but its continuation. For Moscow, this blurs the boundary between political process and military action.
Third, Russia is reassessing its understanding of the limits of Western response. On the one hand, the United States appears more willing to act proactively, absorb higher costs, and operate with fewer institutional constraints. On the other, the conflict underscores a persistent gap between military superiority and the ability to translate it into durable political outcomes. The conclusion in Moscow is inherently dual: the West is both less restrained and less predictable than previously assumed, yet its capacity to impose decisive outcomes remains structurally constrained.
Taken together, these conclusions point to a more unstable deterrence environment in which not only capabilities, but perceptions of intent and the dynamics of escalation, play a central role.
Q. In your view, how might Russian readings of this war shape its future conduct in Ukraine or its broader approach to Europe?
Russia’s reading of the war is likely to push its strategy toward Ukraine and Europe in a direction that is both more cautious and more structurally confrontational.
At its core, the lesson for Moscow is simple: durable agreements cannot be trusted. Diplomacy is increasingly viewed not as a pathway to settlement, but as a tactical instrument within a longer cycle of pressure. Any deal is treated as provisional. This will make Russia more skeptical in future negotiations over Ukraine, operating on the assumption that concessions invite additional demands rather than closure.
The Iranian case is also being used as a template for interpreting Western behavior. The focus is no longer on regional balances, but on patterns: a willingness to escalate, the deliberate use of ambiguity, and the erosion of the boundary between coercion and war. These patterns are now being projected onto both Ukraine and the European theater, leading Moscow to assume a wider range of Western options and a higher tolerance for risk than previously believed.
Operationally, this reinforces a strategy of calibrated pressure. Russia is unlikely to seek direct escalation, given the risks, but will instead expand indirect pressure prolonging military operations, leveraging hybrid tools, and applying pressure across multiple domains while staying below critical thresholds.
For Europe, the implications are significant. Moscow increasingly views the continent not as a single front to be confronted, but as a space to be worked over time testing cohesion, probing resilience, and exploiting political, economic, and institutional vulnerabilities. The result is not a shift toward decisive confrontation, but toward sustained, multidimensional pressure designed to erode rather than overwhelm.
Q. Does this conflict reinforce Russia’s preference for indirect confrontation through proxies and regional disruption, or could it also affect how Moscow thinks about direct military pressure and strategic risk?
The conflict is reinforcing Russia’s preference for indirect pressure rather than direct confrontation. At the same time, it is forcing Moscow to take a more careful and nuanced view of risk.
On the one hand, the war confirms that indirect methods remain effective. Hybrid tools, proxies, and regional disruption allow Russia to exert pressure without crossing into the territory of direct escalation with a stronger adversary. In this sense, the Iranian case reinforces an existing lesson: in such an environment, direct confrontation carries prohibitive risks.
On the other hand, the very logic of risk perception is shifting. U.S. behavior, more assertive and less predictable, introduces a higher degree of uncertainty. Yet this is unlikely to produce a symmetrical response from Russia. If anything, it suggests the opposite: Russia is likely to act more carefully and with greater precision, focusing on clear signaling, managing uncertainty, and avoiding escalation beyond critical thresholds.
The key shift, therefore, is not a move toward direct pressure, but the erosion of clear escalation boundaries. The environment is becoming more fluid, and less predictable. In the end, Russia is likely to remain within a framework of indirect pressure, but operate with greater precision seeking to apply pressure while avoiding dynamics that could spiral beyond control.
Q. For European policymakers, what is the most important takeaway from the way Russia is likely interpreting this war?
The key takeaway for European policymakers is this: Russia is adjusting to a view of the United States as less predictable, more willing to escalate, and less constrained by rules. This shift is making Europe’s security environment more unstable.
From Moscow’s perspective, the war shows that the United States is readier to use force and less tied down by alliances or institutional limits than many had assumed. That, in turn, weakens confidence in long-term agreements and reinforces the sense that pressure from the West is not episodic, but ongoing. As a result, Russia is increasingly treating stability as temporary and confrontation as the default.
For Europe, this means a more uncertain landscape. If Russia believes escalation thresholds are unclear and flexible, it is likely to operate closer to them: probing, testing, but trying not to cross the line outright. The risk, of course, is that this kind of behavior increases the chances of miscalculation or unintended escalation.
At the same time, Europe should expect not a series of isolated crises, but sustained, multi-layered pressure. Russia’s approach is likely to focus on gradual erosion across political, economic, informational, and military domains all at once. Responding to that requires more than crisis management; it calls for resilience and the ability to compete over the long term.
Finally, diplomacy itself is becoming less reliable as a stabilizing tool. If Moscow sees negotiations as temporary and instrumental, agreements alone won’t be enough. What Europe needs instead is a mix of deterrence, resilience, and strategic clarity, something that can shape Russian expectations, not just react to them.
In other words, Europe has to prepare for a security environment where the rules are less clear, deterrence is less stable, and pressure is constant.
Mil-Man’s assessment underlines a difficult policy challenge for Europe. If Moscow increasingly views agreements as provisional, escalation thresholds as fluid, and pressure on the West as a long-term strategy, then European security policy cannot rely on crisis management alone.
For German and European decision makers, the implication is clear: deterrence, resilience, institutional strength, and strategic clarity must be treated as necessary conditions for preserving our open societies and rules-based order.
Arkady Mil-Man is a senior researcher and the Head of the Russia Research Field at the Institute for National Security Studies. He was the Israeli Ambassador to Russia (2003-2006) and Israeli Ambassador to Azerbaijan (1997-2000). He began his career at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a Senior researcher of the Soviet Union at the Center for Political Research. He later headed the department in the Center responsible for the research of Russia and the Far East. Mil-Man also served as Deputy Head of the Group of Israeli diplomats in Moscow (1989-1990) before the renewal of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He founded the Israeli Embassy in Kazakhstan (1992) and became the first Israeli Chargee d'Affairs in that country. Later he worked as a Counsellor and Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in the Israeli Embassy to Russia and held different positions in the headquarters of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for post-Soviet countries. After his diplomatic career, Mil-Man worked, among other positions, in the Israeli high-tech sector, managing a venture capital fund with his partners that invested in Israeli start-ups. Mil-Man studied at Tel Aviv University and Hebrew University (political science, international relations, and history).