Democracy

Europe & Malaysia: Staving Off the Foreign Narrative Threat

A survey findings point to the effectiveness of Chinese and Russian narratives among different parts of the Malaysian population. With digital omnipotence and social media overconsumption providing ample room for the spread of these narratives.

Concerned onlookers are confronted by the combined reality of the normalisation of these narratives within the domestic Malaysian media landscape. As they present opportunities for the broad dissemination of anti-democratic and anti-Western material. While this situation remains fluid, the threat factor also offers the chance for Germany and Europe to find common ground with Malaysia by playing up their political similarities and by sharing best practices in combatting these kinds of disinformation.

The Two Surveys On Chinese and Russian Influence

The Merdeka Strategic Development Center (MC) – a Malaysian firm known for its market surveys – published a report entitled Perception on Geopolitics & Regional Issues: Narrative Report. This report was closely followed by a complementary study, published by Cyfluence Research Center (CRC) – an independent, non-profit organisation based in Germany – entitled Digital Influence Vectors in Malaysia. Both studies, along with the policy paper, were commissioned by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom (FNF) Malaysia as a part of the Foundation’s research into democratic resilience and liberal governance in Southeast Asia.

Both studies point to the growing threat of Chinese and Russian influence campaigns in Malaysia. An omnipotence of digital consumption (especially social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, TikTok and RedNote) and the generally permissive nature of the Malaysian media environment, carry threats not only for the robustness of Malaysia’s democratic foundations. If left unattended, this threat may continue to erode the appeal of Western political values and, ultimately, German and European interests.

Both studies find that Malaysians consume up to five hours of social media content per day. Given the proliferation of fake news and other disinformation campaigns on social media, this entails that Malaysians are regularly exposed to content that seeks to undermine the veracity of trustworthy news sources. In particular, the elderly and social groups with lower levels of digital literacy were found to be highly susceptible to such disinformation.

Malaysia's Media Environment

MC’s report outlines that Malaysians do generally tend to fact-check the content found on social media platforms, albeit – as CRC’s findings suggest – with room for improvement. The MC study notes that Malaysians typically turn to trusted domestic news sources to verify questionable content. As MC’s report also carefully articulates, exposure alone does not determine local geopolitical attitudes. Other factors, such as relational proximity, trust, economic reliability and institutional credibility all play a part in the formation of such opinions.

Yet, as per both reports, this is precisely where the real risk lies insofar as the threat of Chinese and Russian narratives in Malaysia are concerned. Due to the inherent openness of the Malaysian media environment, Chinese and Russian state-sponsored media have fairly seamlessly penetrated this domain. They even have managed, at times, to get local media outlets to repeat, reproduce and endorse their stories – stories predominantly aimed at legitimising their authoritarian regimes, ways and worldviews.

Where this becomes more pernicious is in the risk that it entails both for Malaysian democracy and for the appeal of European public diplomacy. On the one hand, when local media amplifies authoritarian governance narratives, it can erode public confidence in democratic values. MC’s findings suggest a link between disillusionment with democratic outcomes and openness to systems that trade political freedoms for economic returns. In China’s case, there is an argument to be made given the extent of the respect locally for the economic achievements of its single-party governance structure.

On the other hand, the permeable nature of the Malaysian media environment gives ample room for China and Russia to spread anti-Western narratives. According to CRC, this has been favourable to the Russian Embassy in Malaysia, as they exploited this by invoking colonial grievances (by rekindling memories of struggles against colonialism) and pointing to Western involvement in conflicts such as those in Gaza and Iran. Russia’s approach serves two purposes: to cultivate goodwill through the sentiment ‘the enemy of my enemy [US] is my friend’ and to employ diversionary tactics as a means of deflecting attention away from its own military transgressions; some of which have directly impacted Malaysia (MH-17), others which have not (Ukraine).

Malaysia's Diversity

While both reports do respectively raise alarm bells, they do bring nuance too by reinstating deep-rooted Malaysian attachment to democratic ideals and institutions. Both showcase scepticism and a general lack of enthusiasm among Malaysians (particularly those of high digital literacy) for China’s autocratic political system. The appeal for an equivalent Russian model does not appear to garner much traction in Malaysia and, if and when it has done so, it is among a fairly restricted segment of society.

Resorting to ethnic heuristics – although logical given Malaysia’s social make-up – the studies do tend to gloss over the variables which come to impact perceptions of China and Russia within these communities. Ethnicity may not necessarily guarantee influence across the board, even if some communities may constitute an important target group for these narratives (e.g. Malaysian Chinese for the Chinese communication strategy). CRC highlights the sophistication behind these narratives and communication strategies. But its own empirical findings confirm that exposure to narratives does not automatically translate into influence; particularly where scepticism is already present. Both studies however apply other highly comprehensive demographic variable sets (age, education, income, etc.) to offset the above and to reinforce the credibility of their respective findings.

Neither study draws a direct line between public exposure to disinformation and shifts in Malaysian foreign policy towards China or Russia. The example of Malaysia’s partner country status in BRICS serves as a case in point. MC’s survey indicates that public opinion on this step is ambivalent. Although generally supportive, many Malaysians worry that it could provoke a reaction from the United States. This apprehension alone thus mitigates the benefits of rapprochement with BRICS.

Malaysia’s recent vote in support of the Ukraine at the United Nations General Assembly is another such case in point. Both MC and CRC’s findings point to doubts among respondents as to the real aggressor behind the war in Ukraine (with some believing in the responsibility of the US over Russia). The Malaysian government’s position deviates from this apparent popular consensus. Both of these examples reiterate the complexity of assuming linear relationships between possible social media disinformation and government policies.

Both reports make very strong cases as to the existential threat of sourcing news from social media with the vitality and vibrancy of Malaysian democracy. They also do well to expose the damage done to Western liberal norms and values by Chinese and Russian narratives in Malaysia. At the same time this also represents an opportunity for Germany and Europe to reimagine their positions within this landscape to reposition themselves as credible and valuable partners to Malaysia. This can be achieved by:

• Exploring means of promoting cognitive resilience (i.e. dealing with social media overconsumption, fact-checking and verification best practices, raising the level of critical thinking, trading ideas on how best to combat disinformation, etc.), articulating educational campaigns and undertaking research as equals (in light of Europe’s own travails with foreign disinformation) on the design of policies and regulatory capacity meant to boost cognitive resilience
• Working hand-in-hand to promote common values and similarities, especially since Germany, European states and Malaysia are democracies who believe in the rule of law and upholding human rights
• In order to neutralise the salience of Chinese and Russian narratives, Germany and Europe need to revisit their public diplomacy stances and reinstate themselves as credible, trustworthy and mutually supportive alternative hedging partners to Malaysia
• Part of this reinvention process does not rely on the quality of bilateral relations with Malaysia alone. Much work needs doing on better understanding how negative press in Germany and Europe not only directly contributes to undermining the attraction of democratic values and liberal norms but how it also lends itself forcefully to the anti-Western narratives pushed by China and Russia in Malaysia
• One means of combatting this negative press is to operate through the enhanced usage of Track II/III diplomacy: this instrument can serve as a vital bulwark in getting local actors of note (influencers, local experts, industry captains, etc.) to serve as a conduit for the promotion of Germany and Europe’s interests. This could be done by targeting social media but also traditional news sources by empowering credible Malaysian voices
• The recklessness of US foreign policy under Trump 2.0 presents a paradox for Germany and Europe – although it painfully brings into question the prospect of cutting the transatlantic umbilical cord, it forces reflection on how Germany and Europe can wean themselves off from projections of the West, which have often been poorly received in Malaysia, largely because of the hegemonic mishaps associated with US foreign policy. Doing so could serve the dual purpose of enhancing German and European soft power and thus do more to push back indirectly against Chinese and Russian narratives     

Read more about how Europe can learn from the Malaysian case, where anti-democratic narratives are fuelled by external influences, by accessing the policy paper here.

Dr. Benjamin Robin Barton is the Head of School for Politics, International Relations & Economics  at the University of Nottingham Malaysia