Interview

Rethinking the Iranian Threat

Danny Citrinowicz is a Senior Researcher in the Iran and the Shi’ite Axis Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). He served for 25 years in Israel Defense Intelligence, including as head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division and as the division’s representative in the United States.

In this interview, Citrinowicz examines how Israeli threat perceptions of Iran have evolved from the direct Iranian attacks of 2024 to the current 2026 war. His analysis points to a sobering reassessment: Israel increasingly sees the challenge not only as one of degrading capabilities, but as a deeper strategic confrontation with a resilient Iranian regime, an active regional axis, and a missile program now viewed as a central threat in its own right.

Q. If you compare Israeli thinking before the direct Iranian attacks of 2024, before the current 2026 war, and today, where do you see the sharpest change in how the Iranian threat is understood?

The main change is the understanding that Israel cannot keep “mowing the grass” indefinitely. After the first Iran war, a major lesson was that Israel cannot focus only on reacting to force buildup and degrading capabilities, because then Iran can simply rebuild its capabilities.

Therefore, the policy shifted toward bringing down the regime, not only dealing with its force buildup. Although this did not succeed, that was the strategic idea. This is essentially the gap between the first Iran war and the second Iran war.

Q. Which earlier Israeli assumptions about deterrence, proxy warfare, and the balance between direct and indirect Iranian pressure now look outdated or incomplete?

Regarding earlier assumptions, several basic assumptions led to misunderstandings and strategic problems during the campaign.

The first was the assumption that the Iranian regime was weak enough that Israel could bring it down through airstrikes alone.

The second was that the Iranian axis and proxy forces were very weak and would not respond. This included Hezbollah. There was considerable surprise when Hezbollah did respond. In effect, this was a strategic ambush they had prepared for us, rather than one we had prepared for them.

I think we were also very surprised by the activity of the Shiite militias in Iraq, which were highly active. Conversely, we were surprised, for better or worse depending on how one looks at it, by the Houthis. In practice, they joined the war very late, instead of coordinating with Iran from the beginning, which is an interesting thing in itself.

But I think the main point, and the basis for the gap between what was planned for the campaign and the realities of the war, is the underestimation of Iran’s ability to recover, and the overestimation of airpower and its ability to bring down regimes.

Q. Has the weight Israel assigns to different components of the threat shifted, for example between the nuclear program, missile and drone capabilities, Hezbollah and other proxies, and the question of domestic resilience and air defense?

From Israel’s perspective, there has not really been a change in the threats themselves. When we examine Israel’s confrontation with Hezbollah, there has been no real change in how the threat is understood more broadly.

That said, in the Iranian context, it should be noted that Israel now sees the Iranian missile program, and not only the nuclear program, as a highly significant threat, almost at the level of an existential threat. Therefore, Israel is also acting in that domain.

This is the main change that has emerged. But in terms of the components of the threat, they have remained the same.

Q. Looking ahead, does this reassessment mainly point to tactical adaptation, or to a deeper change in Israeli strategic doctrine, including how Israel thinks about coordination with the United States and Europe?

At the moment, Israel is in the process of adapting its security doctrine to a reality of “endless war,” in which it is no longer willing to tolerate any emerging threat.

In other words, as things stand, political and diplomatic tools have become marginal compared with military tools. The doctrine currently taking shape in Israel is that we are committed to dealing with every threat that raises its head against us, with all the implications that entails.

This is the doctrinal shift that Netanyahu is leading.

Citrinowicz’s assessment suggests that Israel is moving toward a more expansive and less tolerant security doctrine: one that seeks to confront emerging threats early, relies more heavily on military tools, and places less confidence in political or diplomatic containment.

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz is a Senior Researcher in the Iran and the Shi'ite Axis Program at the Institute for National Security Studies. Citrinowicz served 25 years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in the Israeli defense intelligence and as the division’s representative in the United States.