BRICS
BRICS – A Challenge to the West?
15th BRICS SUMMIT
© Wikimedia CommonsNew Delhi, September 7th, 2026 — There will be quite a show in New Delhi on September 12th and 13th. Prime Minister Narendra Modi will host representatives of the BRICS+ countries for the first time: ten, perhaps even eleven heads of state and government, including Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. The hosts can be expected to produce some striking images.
The group photograph alone will send a powerful message. The number of BRICS members has more than doubled. The second day will also see representatives from seven of the ten BRICS partner countries in attendance, along with other nations that have expressed an interest in joining the group.
BRICS is clearly a success story. But does it really pose a challenge to the old, Western-dominated world order?
There are good reasons to doubt it. Among the new members of the BRICS club are three countries currently involved in the war in the Gulf, on different sides: Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. The conflict is likely to be one of the summit's major topics. But it also highlights a fundamental weakness of BRICS: the sheer diversity of its members. They include autocracies and democracies, economic powerhouses and countries that remain relatively underdeveloped. Their interests differ widely, as do, in some cases, their alliance commitments.
A fault line has run through BRICS for more than a decade. Should the grouping become an alternative to the western multilateral institutions, as China and Russia would have it? Or should it serve as a voice for the Global South while remaining geopolitically non-aligned? India and Brazil favor the latter approach, as do some of the newer members, such as Egypt and Indonesia. South Africa, the fifth member of the original group, has, by contrast, tilted increasingly towards China in recent years.
India and Brazil have repeatedly blocked statements and initiatives aimed against the West. The idea of creating a BRICS currency, for instance, has gone nowhere—not because India and Brazil are particularly fond of the dollar, but because they are even less keen on a currency dominated by China's yuan. So far, the group has made progress only in promoting the greater use of local currencies in cross-border payments.
The expansion of BRICS also illustrates the struggle between its two internal camps. China and Russia backed the admission of Iran, adding another explicitly anti-Western member. India and Brazil, meanwhile, supported the inclusion of two countries that remain broadly pro-Western: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The Gulf conflict could nevertheless alter this balance of power. Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular are suffering from the war launched by the United States. It remains to be seen whether this will affect their commitment to their Western alliances. Some observers fear that the addition of new members could shift the relative weight within BRICS further towards China and Russia.
Yet it would be simplistic to regard every application for BRICS membership as a choice against the West. Europeans absorbed this kind of black-and-white, friend-or-foe thinking deeply during the Cold War. In other parts of the world, geopolitical realities are viewed in more nuanced terms. Amid today's upheavals, China's rise and America's partial retreat from its role as the world's policeman and financier, many countries simply want to be prepared for whatever comes next.
Having a seat at the table of several different groupings—G20 and BRICS, for example—is therefore a perfectly rational strategy. For many countries, joining BRICS is less a rejection of the West than an exercise in diversification and risk management.
The growth of BRICS nonetheless sends a clear message. Many countries in the Global South evidently feel that existing multilateral institutions neither represent them adequately nor provide sufficient support for their development. That needs to change urgently. Countries in Africa, Latin America and South Asia need a greater voice in the various UN bodies and institutions, including the UN Security Council.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund need stronger financial backing, while development loans should be easier to access. The World Bank, particularly when dealing with the world's poorest countries, is often excessively risk-averse. As a result, sensible ideas can fail—for example, schemes designed to insure private investment in renewable-energy infrastructure against political and other risks.
The BRICS bank is an attractive alternative for many poorer countries, even if its capital base remains limited and its decisions are often influenced by politics. Nor should the increasingly close co-operation among BRICS countries in areas critical to future development be underestimated. Technology transfer, research, standards, artificial intelligence and health are all fields in which the group is deepening its collaboration. Indeed, despite its geopolitical divisions, BRICS is making its greatest progress in precisely these areas. That is likely to be evident again at the New Delhi summit.
If the West wants to compete with BRICS, its countries must above all get their economies growing again. In 2000, the combined GDP of the BRICS+ countries, excluding Saudi Arabia, was little more than half that of the G7. By 2015, BRICS+ had overtaken the G7. By 2025, its GDP was already 37% larger. If that trend continues, the geopolitical influence of BRICS will grow with it.
Germany and the European Union should also deepen their political and economic ties with those BRICS countries that are not anti-Western. Ratifying the agreements with India and Mercosur will be particularly important in this regard.
This year, the host, India, is likely to ensure that the BRICS summit produces no explicitly anti-Western message. Next year, however, China will take over the presidency. China is openly seeking a world order no longer dominated by the West, and appears convinced that the long-term trends are moving in precisely that direction. For China, BRICS is an important platform for expanding its political and economic influence, strategically embedded in the Belt and Road Initiative and complemented by bilateral forms of co-operation.
That, ultimately, is why the rise of BRICS deserves our close attention.