NEWSLETTER
From Poland with Love. August
Topic of the Month
A Crypto Scandal Reaches Deep Into Poland’s Right
What began as the collapse of ZondaCrypto, one of Poland’s biggest cryptocurrency exchanges, has developed into something much larger: a criminal investigation into alleged fraud and money laundering, and now a probe into the company’s financial and political links with parts of the Polish right.
The exchange, formerly known as BitBay, was headed by Przemysław Kral. Prosecutors are investigating alleged fraud involving hundreds of millions of złoty. The latest development is potentially explosive: Kral has reportedly obtained the status of a “small crown witness” and is cooperating with prosecutors in exchange for the possibility of a reduced sentence. His testimony is reportedly expected to shed light not only on the company's operations but also on its political connections.
ZondaCrypto developed unusually close relationships with Poland's conservative political and media ecosystem. It sponsored the Polish CPAC conference in 2025, an event closely associated with the right and with Karol Nawrocki's presidential campaign. The company also sponsored the Polish Olympic Committee and advertised on TV Republika.
Now prosecutors are examining possible financial links between ZondaCrypto and a remarkably broad list of right-wing actors. The investigation announced this week explicitly mentions financing involving a foundation connected to former justice minister Zbigniew Ziobro, organisations linked to Confederation’s Przemysław Wipler in the context of cryptocurrency legislation, TV Republika and its CEO Tomasz Sakiewicz, conservative events, and a possible financial benefit received by Radosław Piesiewicz, president of the Polish Olympic Committee. Prosecutors are also examining actions by people allegedly helping fugitive former deputy justice minister Marcin Romanowski (read more in the Politics section). Importantly, these are subjects of investigation, not findings of guilt.
The Republika connection is particularly striking. According to Onet, Sakiewicz negotiated with Kral over the possible purchase of 5–20% of the channel, with the parties even signing a letter of intent. The proposed transaction was ultimately not completed.
Then there is Michał Moskal, a PiS MP. Journalistic investigations have reported that he met Kral in Ibiza in connection with lobbying around cryptocurrency regulation. The allegation is politically significant because the government was simultaneously trying to introduce tighter regulation of the crypto market.
The story has acquired an almost surreal element. Radosław Piesiewicz has faced questions over a luxury Patek Philippe watch reportedly worth around €40,000 that he says he purchased himself, with Kral merely helping facilitate the transaction. Piesiewicz was detained on 27 August as part of the ZondaCrypto investigation. Prosecutors have not yet publicly established that the watch constituted an illicit benefit.
But the relationship between Piesiewicz, ZondaCrypto and the Polish Olympic Committee went much further. ZondaCrypto became the general sponsor of the Polish Olympic Committee and the Polish Olympic team, and the Warsaw John Paul II Olympic Center was renamed the ZondaCrypto Olympic Center. The sponsorship also included a highly unusual system of Olympic rewards partly paid in cryptocurrency. For the 2026 Milan-Cortina Winter Olympics, an individual gold medal was officially valued at PLN 750,000, including PLN 500,000 in cash and PLN 250,000 in tokens; silver was worth PLN 600,000 and bronze PLN 450,000. The prizes also included apartments, cars and other gifts. The arrangement became particularly awkward after ZondaCrypto ran into financial problems and failed to fulfil some of its commitments to athletes. Sport Minister, many activists and athletes call for the dismissal of Piesiewicz.
The political stakes go beyond ZondaCrypto itself. President Karol Nawrocki has repeatedly vetoed legislation regulating the cryptocurrency market, while Donald Tusk has publicly suggested that the emerging Zonda connections explain why parts of the right fought the legislation so aggressively. Nawrocki and PiS reject the suggestion that the vetoes were connected to Zonda (read more in the April issue). Feeling the momentum and public interest, the government decided to take one more try to overturn the presidential veto on the crypto legislation at the next session of the Sejm.
Politics
From "The Best in Poland" to Resignation
On 29 July, Prime Minister Donald Tusk presented Barbara Mróz-Gorgoń as the new Government Plenipotentiary for the Promotion of the Polish National Brand. The Prime Minister described her in unusually glowing terms as "the most outstanding specialist in Poland in shaping brands", saying that she had been advising the government for some time. The ambition was substantial. Mróz-Gorgoń was supposed to coordinate the government's efforts to build a coherent "Poland" brand, prepare a national branding strategy and strengthen Poland's attractiveness to tourists and investors.
Tusk himself described Poland as "a miracle" and an exceptional success story, a country growing faster than any other in Europe and an "absolute phenomenon" among the states that joined the EU after 1989.
Only two weeks later came the report… ”Polaków portret własny” [Self-Portrait of the Poles] was prepared by the Marka Polska Think Tank Foundation, with Mróz-Gorgoń as its substantive lead and author. The document quickly became an object of ridicule after journalists and researchers identified numerous factual and methodological problems. Among the examples reported in the media were claims that young Poles speak fluent Mandarin, that Poland had five Nobel laureates, and that Katowice were located in the central part of the country.
More seriously, questions emerged over the use of AI in producing the document. Mróz-Gorgoń acknowledged that AI tools had been used, while arguing that only for transcription, summarising and editing rather than as a substitute for the research itself. She also said the material in question was a transitional working document and should not have entered the public domain. But it did, it was officially presented and discussed at one of private universities in Warsaw.
The controversy was amplified by the fact that the report had received PLN 200,000 (ca. €45,000) in public funding. The Warsaw District Prosecutor's Office subsequently began checking whether there had been irregularities connected with the financing of the report and requested the relevant documentation and contract from the Ministry of Sport and Tourism. Mróz-Gorgoń defends herself that all the grant was used for research, including focus groups in all corners of Poland, not for writing the report.
The political problem was obvious: the government had appointed an expert to build Poland's reputation, only for her own work to become a national PR crisis. And the report was not the only controversy. After the resignation, journalists also drew attention to Mróz-Gorgoń's role as creative director of Strike King, a combat-sports federation. This became politically sensitive because journalists reported that one of the federation's planned events was supposed to feature Marcin N., a Wisła Kraków hooligan leader who was sentenced to ten years in prison for a fatal assault. The fight ultimately did not take place.
The issue is not that working in the sports or entertainment industry is inherently problematic. The question raised by journalists was whether such connections had been properly disclosed and assessed before Mróz-Gorgoń took a senior government position. According to reporting, questions were also raised about whether her role at Strike King was paid and whether it had been declared to the Prime Minister's Chancellery.
On 21 August, barely three weeks after her appointment, Mróz-Gorgoń resigned. Her explanation was striking. She did not focus on the criticism of the report or its factual problems. Instead, she pointed to what she called an "unimaginable scale of hate", saying that it made it impossible to continue in such a responsible position. The statement immediately generated another wave of criticism. Politicians and commentators argued that she was confusing legitimate public scrutiny with online hate. The resignation itself therefore became another communications crisis.
There was also an extraordinary irony in the episode: a government official whose job was to manage Poland's reputation had become the centre of perhaps the most spectacular government PR disaster of the summer.
Romanowski Surfaces in Transnistria
Fugitive former deputy justice minister Marcin Romanowski appears to have found a new refuge in Transnistria, the Russian-backed separatist region of Moldova. A letter personally signed by Romanowski and sent to a Warsaw court gives an address in Tiraspol and asks for a list żelazny — safe conduct allowing him to return to Poland without being detained. Polish prosecutors, however, stress that his actual whereabouts have not been independently confirmed.
The reaction from the government was explosive. Deputy Defence Minister Cezary Tomczyk said Romanowski was “very likely under the influence of Russian intelligence”, while Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski also questioned what his presence in a Russian-controlled territory means.
For the government camp, the episode is almost too perfect politically: a former PiS deputy justice minister, wanted in connection with the Justice Fund investigation, fleeing first to Orbán's Hungary and apparently ending up in a Russian-backed enclave. Romanowski denies the allegations and says the case is politically motivated. Even PiS figures have been cautious. PiS prime minister candidate Przemysław Czarnek said that if Romanowski really were in Transnistria, it would “cross a line”.
The episode has therefore become another potent symbol in the government's argument that the old PiS political establishment is not simply resisting accountability — some of its former officials are literally seeking protection in authoritarian or Russian-aligned jurisdictions.
Maciej Berek to the Constitutional Tribunal
Donald Tusk has confirmed that Maciej Berek, his minister responsible for supervising the implementation of government policy and a key figure in the government’s legislative process, will leave the government to become a candidate for the Constitutional Tribunal (TK). Berek is a constitutional lawyer and long-time specialist in government legislation. He previously headed the Government Legislation Centre and served as Secretary of the Council of Ministers. Since 2023, he has been one of Tusk's closest institutional collaborators.
Tusk's argument is pragmatic. He says that Berek is an exceptionally competent and "decent" lawyer who understands the Constitution and is capable of helping restore the Tribunal after years of politicisation under PiS. Tusk says that Berek has never been a politician, he has always been a lawyer and civil servant.
The controversy is precisely about whether this is really a restoration of judicial independence. Berek has been deeply involved in preparing government legislation, including laws that could eventually end up before the Constitutional Tribunal. Critics therefore argue that appointing one of Tusk's closest political collaborators reproduces the very model that the current government criticised when PiS appointed politically connected figures to the courts. Supreme Court judge Michał Laskowski called the nomination a disappointment and said that Berek's political proximity to Tusk would create a serious problem of perceived impartiality. Many other democratic activists echo these words.
The nomination looks divisive in the ruling coalition. Head of the Left’s parliamentary club Anna Maria Żukowska posted her words of reservation on social media. Also Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Regional Funds Minister and leader of Poland 2050, does not support Berek in this race.
The political stakes are particularly high because Berek would not be joining an ordinary court. The government is gradually trying to change the balance of power inside the Constitutional Tribunal, which remains heavily shaped by judges appointed during the PiS period. Six new judges nominated by the current parliamentary majority are expected to enter the Tribunal this year, meaning that the balance inside the 15-member court could shift significantly. The new judges could potentially form a majority of the judges actually sitting and, crucially, challenge the current leadership of the Tribunal.
This could put Bogdan Święczkowski, the current president of the TK and a former PiS-era prosecutor general, in a particularly difficult position. There are scenarios in which the newly appointed judges could seek to suspend or otherwise sideline Święczkowski, although the legal basis and procedure for such a move would itself be highly contested. The dispute is therefore not simply about who gets appointed to the Tribunal, but about who will control the institution and which constitutional order will ultimately prevail.
The growing confrontation has even generated rumours about the possibility of two Constitutional Tribunals operating in parallel — one recognised by one side of the political and legal conflict and another by the other side. Such a scenario remains unlikely; it would amount to an extraordinary escalation of Poland's constitutional crisis. But the fact that it is being discussed illustrates how far the conflict over the Tribunal has gone.
This makes Berek's nomination an especially consequential political gamble for Tusk. From the government's perspective, putting experienced constitutional lawyers into the Tribunal is necessary to rebuild an institution that, in its view, was captured and politicised under PiS. From the perspective of critics, however, replacing one politically aligned group of judges with people closely connected to the current government risks creating a new version of the same problem. The question is whether Tusk can restore the credibility of the Constitutional Tribunal without creating the impression that his government is simply taking control of it for itself.
KO–PSL clash over the IPN
The governing coalition has suffered another public split over the future of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN). The Senate rejected the candidacy of historian Mateusz Szpytma, despite the Sejm having approved him a few weeks earlier. The final Senate vote was 38 in favour, 50 against and one abstention.
Szpytma is a long-time IPN historian and former deputy president of the Institute, with particular expertise in the history of Poles who rescued Jews during the Holocaust. His candidacy was supported by PSL, as well as PiS and Confederation in the Sejm. PSL argued that he was a professional historian with no political involvement and that his research on the history of the Polish peasant movement made him a particularly good candidate.
Civic Coalition disagreed. Its senators argued that Szpytma's long association with the IPN and his links to its previous leadership (President Karol Nawrocki was the former IPN head) made him unsuitable for the task of depoliticising the institution. Donald Tusk had already said that the Senate would reject the candidate, despite understanding PSL's position.
The dispute exposes a familiar fault line inside the coalition: PSL sees the nomination as a chance to get a competent historian and finally fill an institution that has been without a permanent president since Karol Nawrocki became president; Civic Coalition sees the same appointment as potentially preserving the political legacy of the old IPN. The result is that the procedure starts again, and the institution remains caught between the coalition partners' competing visions of how to dismantle the PiS-era legacy.
Braun Charged with Holocaust Denial
Far-right MEP Grzegorz Braun has been formally charged in Poland with publicly and deliberately denying Nazi crimes committed at Auschwitz-Birkenau. The charges concern interviews in which Braun claimed that Auschwitz's gas chambers were “fake” and described the historical account of their use as a propaganda narrative.
The European Parliament lifted Braun's immunity in March, clearing the way for the Polish authorities to prosecute him. If convicted under Poland's law criminalising the denial of Nazi crimes, he faces up to three years in prison.
The case is particularly significant because Braun is not a marginal activist but a sitting MEP and leader of the Crown, which is currently polling at around 9% and may be a significant part of the future right-wing government. It is also part of a much broader pattern, Braun is already facing proceedings over other alleged acts, including his December 2023 attack on a Hanukkah ceremony in the Polish parliament (read more in the December 2024 issue).
Economy
New Tax Plan
The government has presented a major tax package for 2027, with Donald Tusk and Finance Minister Andrzej Domański pitching it as a tax cut for the growing middle class financed by higher taxes on the wealthiest. Around 3.5 million taxpayers are expected to benefit.
The main change is to raise the first (12%) PIT threshold from PLN 120,000 to PLN 130,000. A new 24% rate would apply to income between PLN 130,000 and PLN 150,000, while the current 32% rate would only start above PLN 150,000. The maximum annual gain is estimated at around PLN 3,600 (ca. €800).
The government wants to finance this partly by raising CIT from 19% to 22% for companies with annual revenues above €50 million, while the solidarity levy on individuals earning more than PLN 1 million would rise from 4% to 5%.
There is, however, an important political sting: Tusk's 2023 promise to raise the tax-free allowance from PLN 30,000 to PLN 60,000 remains unfulfilled. Tusk now says the government's defence spending and overall fiscal situation make such a move impossible.
The plan also comes at a difficult fiscal moment. Poland's deficit reached 7.3% of GDP in 2025, public debt has crossed the EU's 60% threshold, and the country remains under the EU's excessive-deficit procedure.
Politically, this is clearly also preparation for 2027: Tusk can campaign on giving millions of ordinary taxpayers a break while making the wealthy and large corporations pay more. The problem is that the proposal still needs parliamentary approval and President Karol Nawrocki's signature—and Nawrocki has already demonstrated his willingness to veto the government's fiscal legislation.
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Nawrocki's vetoes are also starting to have a measurable fiscal cost. According to the latest calculations by the Finance Ministry, just six vetoed bills with a direct impact on public revenues could reduce the 2026 budget by around PLN 8 billion (€1.9 billion). The biggest item is the veto of the windfall tax on energy companies, which was expected to bring in PLN 3.8 billion, followed by the higher alcohol excise duty (PLN 1.8 billion), changes to the SENT system (PLN 1.2 billion) and a higher sugar levy (PLN 0.9 billion). The figure does not include dozens of other vetoes whose financial consequences are harder to quantify. This is particularly significant at a time when Poland is already running a very large deficit and faces rising defence expenditure and debt-servicing costs.
The economic consequences of the confrontation are also becoming harder to dismiss. Fitch maintained Poland’s A- sovereign rating in August, but kept its outlook negative, pointing to persistent fiscal pressures and, importantly, the political gridlock between the government and President Nawrocki. The agency has explicitly identified the risk of presidential vetoes as a constraint on the government’s ability to implement measures needed to reduce Poland’s large deficit and rising debt. This gives Nawrocki’s veto strategy an international dimension: while the president argues that he is protecting Polish interests from an overreaching government, rating agencies increasingly see the institutional conflict itself as a risk to Poland’s fiscal credibility.
Nawrocki has also made the presidential veto an unprecedentedly frequent political weapon. By the anniversary of his inauguration on 6 August 2026, he had issued 41 vetoes — more than any previous Polish president. For comparison, Aleksander Kwaśniewski vetoed 35 bills during his two terms, Lech Wałęsa 27, Lech Kaczyński 18, Bronisław Komorowski just 4, and Andrzej Duda 19 during his full ten years in office.
WIG20 Hits a Historic High
Poland's blue-chip WIG20 index has reached its highest level ever, breaking a record that had stood for almost 19 years. The previous record dated back to October 2007, just before the global financial crisis. The index crossed the 4,000-point mark in August, reaching an intraday high of 4,084.47 on 11 August.
The rally reflects strong investor sentiment towards Polish equities, with banks and other large Polish companies among the key drivers. It is also a striking contrast with the political uncertainty surrounding the government: despite the conflict between Tusk's government and President Nawrocki, investors are increasingly betting on Poland's economic fundamentals.
For the government, the record is an attractive counter-narrative to the political turbulence: while politicians fight over vetoes, taxes and the courts, the Polish stock market is at an all-time high.
Poland Becomes the EU's 6th-Largest Economy
Poland has officially become the sixth-largest economy in the European Union by nominal GDP, overtaking Belgium, Sweden, Austria and Ireland. In 2025, Poland's GDP reached €922.9 billion, equivalent to around 4.9% of the entire EU economy. Only Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands are now ahead.
The milestone reflects Poland's sustained economic expansion: real GDP grew by 3.6% in 2025, compared with just 1.5% for the EU as a whole. Poland is now by far the largest economy in Central and Eastern Europe — its GDP is more than twice that of Romania and almost three times that of the Czech Republic.
Security
The MyDr Data Leak
Poland is dealing with one of its largest-ever data breaches. Hackers gained access to the systems of MyDr, a provider of electronic medical-record software used by around 12,000 medical facilities, potentially exposing data relating to almost 19 million people, roughly half of Poland's population. More than 2 TB of data may have been stolen, including highly sensitive information such as prescriptions, medications and other medical records.
The scale is particularly alarming because this is not ordinary personal data: medical information can be used for identity fraud, blackmail and highly targeted phishing. The attackers reportedly demonstrated access by providing information relating to a senior Polish politician, including prescriptions.
The government currently believes the attack was criminally motivated, apparently aimed at extortion, rather than an act of foreign interference. The investigation is ongoing. At the same time, the Personal Data Protection Office (UODO) has launched an inspection of MyDr, including whether the company's security measures and risk assessments were adequate.
There is an additional complication: MyDr says the compromised data is likely historical, dating from 2024 or earlier, and that it cannot yet establish exactly how much information was exposed. It also says there is currently no evidence that the stolen data has been publicly released.
For the government, this is more than another cybersecurity incident. It raises uncomfortable questions about the security of Poland's increasingly digital healthcare system, the protection of citizens' most sensitive data, and whether private technology providers handling critical public data are being adequately supervised.
A Fake Polish-Czech Conflict
A sophisticated disinformation campaign has been trying to manufacture a conflict between Poland and Czechia over Cieszyn Silesia. Fake documents claimed that Warsaw was demanding Czech territory, while fake social-media profiles impersonated diplomats and local residents. The campaign even promoted a fictional demonstration in Třinec under the slogan “Cieszyn Silesia is Czech.” AI-generated images were used to make the story look credible, including a fabricated image of a house supposedly being sold because of Polish territorial ambitions.
The operation exploited a real historical dispute over the Polish-Czechoslovak border, but wrapped it in entirely fabricated contemporary events. It also used paid Facebook advertising, suggesting a deliberate effort to amplify the narrative rather than an organic conspiracy theory. Czech investigators and Polish experts have pointed to methods resembling previous Russian-linked influence operations, although there is not yet definitive public proof that Russia organised this particular campaign.
The reaction has been unusually coordinated. Czech authorities publicly denied any Polish territorial claims, while Donald Tusk warned that the operation was designed to “divide Poles and Czechs.” Polish and Czech officials stressed the strength of bilateral relations, while researchers and fact-checkers highlighted the use of fake identities, forged documents and AI.
The episode is a good illustration of how modern Russian-style information warfare works: take a real historical grievance, manufacture a current crisis around it, impersonate trusted institutions, add AI-generated “evidence” and push it through social media. The objective does not necessarily have to be to make people believe a completely fabricated story. It can simply be to make them distrust their neighbour.
International Relations
Starlink Backs Down After Polish Pressure
SpaceX has reversed its decision to exclude Poland from Starlink's European roaming zone, just days before new rules were due to come into force. The change would have forced Polish users travelling abroad onto more expensive arrangements, potentially raising the cost of a 100GB roaming plan from around €42 to €107.
The original decision triggered an unusually sharp response from the Polish government. Digital Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski said Poland was “not a market of the second category” and demanded equal treatment for Polish customers. Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski went further, telling Elon Musk: “stop discriminating against Polish users, or we might reconsider paying you $50 million a year for your services.”
The episode is particularly sensitive because Poland has been one of the main European supporters of Starlink's role in Ukraine, including financially supporting terminals and subscriptions used by Ukrainian forces. It also revives the long-running personal and political conflict between Sikorski and Musk over Starlink's reliability as critical infrastructure for Ukraine.
For Warsaw, the quick reversal is a small diplomatic victory. But it also highlights an uncomfortable strategic problem: Poland and Europe remain heavily dependent on a private American company for critical communications infrastructure — a company whose owner is increasingly willing to use his platforms and commercial power in political disputes.
Society
Tragedy on the Hungarian Motorway
A Polish coach carrying pilgrims returning from Medjugorje in Bosnia and Herzegovina crashed on the M3 motorway in eastern Hungary on 16 August. The bus, carrying 59 Polish citizens, left the road near Mezőkeresztes and overturned in a ditch. Twelve people died and at least ten were seriously injured.
The victims were residents of the Podkarpackie region. Polish authorities sent medical and consular teams to Hungary, while injured passengers have subsequently been transported back to Poland for treatment.
Hungarian police initially said that the driver may have fallen asleep, although the investigation is ongoing. The driver was detained following the crash.
The tragedy prompted condolences from Prime Minister Donald Tusk, President Karol Nawrocki and other Polish officials, while Hungarian authorities praised the emergency services involved in the rescue operation. Pope Leo XIV also expressed condolences to the families of the Polish pilgrims.
Poland & Germany
Reversed Migration Balance
The migration balance between Poland and Germany has now decisively reversed. In 2025, Germany recorded a net migration loss of 13,600 people to Poland — the largest negative balance among all 119 countries for which German statistics are available. The shift is striking: as recently as 2023, the balance was around +17,000 in Germany's favour. But the story is less about a mass exodus of Poles from Germany than about a dramatic decline in the number of Poles moving there. Compared with the 2013 peak, the Polish inflow to Germany has fallen by 66%, while departures from Germany to Poland have fallen by 36%. The Polish Economic Institute links the reversal partly to the changing economic attractiveness of the two countries, with Poland growing faster and wages rising more rapidly while Germany has experienced prolonged economic stagnation.
Sikorski on AfD’s EU Agenda
The rise of Germany’s AfD is also becoming a direct concern for Poland. AfD co-leader Alice Weidel has said that, if the party comes to power, Germany would leave the Schengen area and the euro, while restoring strict controls on Germany’s borders. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski warned that a German withdrawal from Schengen would have “serious consequences” for Poland, including economic ones, given the enormous volume of cross-border trade and daily movement between the two countries. “But our nationalists don’t calculate what will happen when others start acting as selfishly as they advocate. After all, ‘the AfD is basically the German PiS,’” he added. The comments are particularly significant as the AfD is surging in the polls and could potentially take power in Saxony-Anhalt in September.
Culture
The Giant Mary of Konotopie
Poland has a new religious mega-monument. A 55.6-metre statue of the Virgin Mary has been erected in Konotopie near Toruń, making it the tallest Marian monument in Europe. The statue itself is 40.6 metres high and stands on a 15-metre crown containing a viewing terrace. It was officially consecrated on 15 August by the Bishop of Włocławek.
The people behind it are billionaire businessman Roman Karkosik and his wife Grażyna, who financed the project as a personal votum of gratitude. The reported cost is around PLN 100 million. The project was designed by sculptor Adam Kuba Matejkowski and construction began in 2025.
The scale is precisely what has made the monument controversial. Critics ask why a religious statue needs to be 55 metres high, and whether Poland really needs another gigantic religious monument after the enormous Christ the King statue in Świebodzin. Some commentators have called it another example of Poland's tendency towards "religious gigantomania" — monumental architecture replacing a deeper religious message. Dominican friar Paweł Gużyński argued that the monument reflects a problem within Polish Catholicism: what should be at the centre of Christianity is being pushed to the margins, while the peripheral becomes the centre.
There is also a more material criticism: PLN 100 million directed towards a monument while Poland faces shortages and social needs elsewhere. Karkosik's defenders respond that this was private money and therefore a matter of personal religious choice. The monument's supporters instead emphasise its potential as a pilgrimage and tourist destination.
Polls & Trends
Party Support
CBOS, 17-20.08.2025
Civic Platform 25,8%
PiS 16,5%
Confederation 13%
Crown 8,2%
Together 4,4%
Left 3,8%
Development Plus 3,6%
Poland 2050 3,4%
PSL 2,4%
About the author: Miłosz Hodun is President of Projekt: Polska, a member of the Board of Directors of the European Liberal Forum (ELF), and holds a Doctor of Philosophy degree from Reykjavík University.