Disinformation

Mapping the Future of Political Disinformation in Europe

The information space is set to become the most critical ideological and geostrategic battleground. Over the coming years, competition to shape public perceptions, political identities, and interpretations of reality will intensify. In this environment, the ability to control and narrate events matters more than facts themselves, creating a hotbed for disinformation. Disinformation has become one of the greatest threats to the functioning of democracy because it has the potential to erode trust in democratic processes and institutions, polarize public opinion, and render citizens unable to distinguish facts from manipulation.

The future of disinformation will be defined not simply by an increasing amount of false content and information manipulations, but by the convergence of geopolitical competition, narrative battles, emerging technologies and tactics, and the evolving role of digital platforms. Consequently, this paper takes a holistic approach to assessing the factors that will likely shape the future of disinformation in the European Union.

The EU will have to address the challenges posed by disinformation actors, both within and beyond its borders, in the changing geopolitical environment.

• Russia will continue to pose the most immediate threat of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) to the EU. It will pursue a dual-track strategy of intensifying FIMI operations while propagating pragmatism in EU-Russia relations. These operations will target elections, escalate security tensions, exacerbate divisions between and within member states, and widen the strain in transatlantic relations.
• China represents a more latent but growing long-term challenge. While the focus of European attention remains on trade and industrial policy, the scale and intensity of Chinese FIMI operations expand in the background. China will intensify its charm offensive, presenting itself as an appealing and reliable economic partner to the EU. However, it will also exacerbate transatlantic tensions and target European trade and industrial policies by pressuring EU governments and societies with a carrot-and-stick approach.
• Domestic disinformation actors within the EU pose the most complex threat. These actors continue to converge on a similar narrative, facilitating the cross-border diffusion and amplification of disinformation within the EU. They not only make the fight against disinformation more contentious in the EU decision-making but also use it as a campaign strategy to mobilize voters by exploiting their anxieties, grievances, and perceived threats, thereby gaining electoral advantages over the mainstream. They will target contentious policy debates related to migration, the green transition, identity, European integration, deregulation and external threats.
• The growing transatlantic divide over disinformation is poised to become a defining feature of EU-US relations in the years ahead. The Trump administration will continue to push the idea of "free speech," portraying EU’s digital regulations as censorship and an attack on the U.S. economy and "natural rights". The dispute is expected to escalate with threats of sanctions, tariffs, and export restrictions. Meanwhile, US actors may bolster EU-internal disinformation actors by legitimizing and supporting their policies and narratives.

The European mainstream will have to respond to five narrative clusters designed to destabilize the EU. These are not isolated messages, but a mutually reinforcing ecosystem. Currently, mainstream parties are losing the battle to counter these narratives.

• Anti-EU/NATO narratives can further erode support for the European project and trust in the transatlantic security alliance.
• Anti-establishment narratives will exacerbate public distrust of the political establishment and independent institutions, thereby undermining the functioning of democratic societies.
• The battle of strategic narratives about Ukraine will continue to sit at the intersection of the EU's vision of the international world order and its most important policy debates. Disinformation actors will link existing concerns about the cost of living, sovereignty, and migration to Ukraine-related policies.
• Anti-migration disinformation will remain the most electorally potent disinformation tactic. This is because migration encompasses several perceived threats, such as economic insecurity, cultural change, health concerns, and identity issues.
• Disinformation actors will exacerbate the politicization of gender and "woke" issues because they provide fertile ground for tribalism and polarization.

Political actors, institutions, the media and civil society at the EU and national levels should prioritize prebunking over debunking by warning citizens in advance about manipulative narratives and techniques. This preemptive exposure raises critical awareness.

Big tech and new technologies will outpace the EU regulatory framework.

• Big Tech deploys geopolitical leverage, lobbying, and strategic withdrawal to blunt enforcement. The Commission's Digital Omnibus proposal signals that this pressure is working.
• The rapid spread of new technologies is transforming the disinformation landscape by enabling large-scale production, lowering production costs, accelerating distribution, and circumventing regulations faster than democratic institutions can respond. AI-generated content, bot networks, superspreader accounts, monetization of disinformation, algorithmic challenges, and generative AI-enabled chatbots pose severe challenges.

The effectiveness of the EU’s disinformation efforts will hinge on implementation, coordination, enforcement, and adequate resources.

• The EU’s efforts are reflected in online platform regulation, media literacy, a toolbox to counter FIMI, risk assessment and mitigation, and strategic communications. However, relevant EU legislation, including the Digital Services Act, the Artificial Intelligence Act, and the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising, largely suffers from fragmented implementation, enforcement, and limited resources.
• European resilience requires a firm political will to establish a legal, political, institutional, informational and societal infrastructures that render disinformation less effective. This requires a whole-of-society approach across member states.
• Although most EU member states have introduced measures to counter disinformation, the ambition, institutional design, and implementation of these responses vary considerably, creating structural vulnerabilities across the EU. While some member states have adopted ambitious and comprehensive anti-disinformation strategies, others have only made limited progress without a coherent framework. Disinformation actors are expected to target the member states with the most vulnerable national frameworks through cross-border information operations.