

# PUBLIC SURVEY ON SOCIOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN LEBANON

Follow-up Survey

Report of Findings

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International Social & Development Research

Ipsos in Lebanon  
May 2026



**FRIEDRICH NAUMANN  
STIFTUNG** Für die Freiheit.

Lebanon and Syria



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## Executive Summary

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Lebanon continues to navigate a period of acute uncertainty shaped by ongoing conflict dynamics, economic strain, and political disruption. In this context, Ipsos conducted a follow-up study to a nationwide public opinion survey implemented in partnership with FNF (with data collection carried out between **December 23, 2025, and January 26, 2026**). The objective was to assess citizens' perceptions of security developments, governance performance, displacement dynamics, and national priorities amid evolving wartime conditions. The study builds on a previous nationwide wave, enabling the tracking of shifts in public sentiment following the escalation observed in early 2026.

### **Study Approach**

Ipsos conducted 1,100 interviews with Lebanese citizens aged 21 and above across all eight governorates using a mixed-mode approach (CAPI and CATI) to ensure broad geographic and demographic representation, including conflict-affected and displaced populations. A stratified sampling design with quotas by governorate, age, and gender ensured national representativeness. A stratified sampling design with quotas by governorate, age, and gender ensured national representativeness.

Data collection was conducted between **March 24 and April 21**. Fieldwork was conducted during an active period of regional escalation and internal displacement. As such, findings reflect public opinion at the time of data collection and may evolve as security and political conditions change.

### **Key Findings**

#### **Security concerns dominate public perception**

Public sentiment is overwhelmingly shaped by insecurity. A near-consensus describes the security situation as unstable, and a large majority expects further escalation. While most respondents anticipate the conflict will continue in the short to medium term, perceptions of prolonged regional instability are more uncertain. Concern about humanitarian consequences is widespread and intense, particularly regarding displacement and its social and economic implications.

#### **Displacement and humanitarian needs are central but contested**

The public prioritizes immediate humanitarian support for displaced populations, though responses reveal fragmented expectations. While many emphasize shelter, basic needs, and organized accommodation, others stress security considerations or express skepticism about the state's ability to respond. This reflects a tension between humanitarian imperatives and concerns about social cohesion and governance capacity.

#### **Strong demand for stability, but limited confidence in government capacity**

While security and ceasefire efforts are seen as top priorities, confidence in the government's ability to deliver remains low. Evaluations of government performance are predominantly negative, and skepticism is particularly strong regarding the government's ability to secure a ceasefire or enforce state authority over weapons. At the same time, public support for the principle of state control remains relatively high, highlighting a gap between desired outcomes and perceived feasibility.

### **Lebanese Armed Forces retain comparatively higher trust**

In contrast to broader skepticism toward political leadership, the Lebanese Armed Forces and its leadership are viewed as relatively credible and capable of maintaining stability. Confidence in the military is strong across most regions, positioning it as a key institutional anchor in a context of low political trust.

### **National priorities reflect a shift from immediate security to structural recovery**

Peace and security dominate as the top immediate priority. However, when broader priorities are considered, attention shifts toward **economic crisis, reconstruction, and displacement**, indicating that citizens view recovery and economic stability as central to long-term national resilience. This reflects a layered priority structure, with short-term stabilization followed by medium- and long-term recovery concerns.

### **Political attitudes reflect division, fatigue, and conditional engagement**

Public opinion on postponing parliamentary elections is evenly split, with opposition expressed more strongly than support. While a majority report that their voting intentions remain unchanged, a significant minority indicate shifts in preferences or disengagement from participation. This suggests that while political engagement persists, it is increasingly shaped by uncertainty and fatigue.

### **Fragmented perceptions of conflict drivers and geopolitical influence**

Responsibility for escalation is divided, with Israel and Hezbollah emerging as the most frequently cited actors, though perceptions vary sharply by region. Similarly, views on regional influence are fragmented, with the United States, Iran, and Israel identified as key actors, but with no unified national perspective.

### **No single pathway to stability**

Public preferences for preventing escalation are split between ceasefire agreements, regional negotiations, relying on the armed resistance, and stronger state control over security decisions. This indicates the clear divisions existing in the Lebanese society, and a lack of consensus on how stability should be achieved, despite broad agreement on the need for it.

### **Conditional support for international engagement**

Citizens expect the international community to play a constructive role, particularly through security guarantees and economic support, though a segment favors non-interference. Similarly, attitudes toward Syria are largely oriented toward neutrality or limited involvement, reflecting cautious positioning toward regional actors.

### **Strong regional and community-level variation across nearly all indicators**

Differences across governorates are evident in perceptions of security, governance, displacement, and external influence. Regions such as Bekaa, Baalbek-Hermel, and Nabatiyeh tend to exhibit stronger security concerns and distinct geopolitical views, while other regions place relatively greater emphasis on economic or governance-related issues. Equally significant are the divides that emerge across districts representing different religious communities, particularly on questions of state authority over weapons, perceptions of government performance, attribution of escalation responsibility, and views on regional actors. In several instances, community-level

differences are as sharp as regional ones, and the two dimensions often reinforce each other, underscoring the importance of accounting for both geographic and community-level context when interpreting national findings.

### **Strategic Implications**

Overall, the findings point to a public that is highly responsive to immediate crisis conditions while maintaining clear expectations around stability and recovery. Security remains the dominant short-term concern, but economic and reconstruction priorities define the longer-term outlook.

The gap between public expectations and perceived government capacity represents a key challenge, with the risk of growing frustration if progress is not visible. At the same time, the pragmatic nature of public opinion presents an opportunity for policy approaches that are solution-oriented and focused on tangible outcomes.

Regional and community-level variation and fragmented geopolitical perceptions introduce additional complexity, requiring differentiated approaches that account for local realities, community-specific narratives, and sensitivities, particularly on sovereignty-linked issues where positions are firmly held across different groups.

In this context, public opinion remains fluid and contingent on evolving conditions. The trajectory of attitudes will depend heavily on developments in security, displacement, and economic stabilization.

### **Recommendations at a Glance**

- **Policymakers:** Prioritize visible progress on security, ceasefire efforts, and economic relief, while communicating transparently about feasibility and timelines to manage public expectations.
- **Friedrich-Naumann Foundation (FNF):** Align programming with citizen priorities around stability, recovery, and sovereignty, while strengthening civic engagement and tailoring interventions to both regional dynamics and district-level sensitivities, particularly where district-level divides intersect with the most contested policy questions.
- **Civil society and reform actors:** Shift toward practical, solution-oriented platforms focused on recovery, displacement, and economic resilience, and re-engage citizens through targeted, outcomes-driven outreach.
- **International partners and donors:** Align support with Lebanese public priorities, particularly security and economic recovery, while working through local institutions and remaining sensitive to sovereignty concerns.

# I. Introduction

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## 1. Research Background

Lebanon continues to face a highly fluid environment shaped by overlapping economic, political, and security pressures. This report presents the findings of a follow-up study conducted between March and April 2026, building on an initial wave carried out between December 23, 2025, and January 26, 2026, commissioned by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF). The initial study provides a robust baseline of public opinion prior to recent developments, showing that Lebanese citizens perceive the country's challenges as systemic and interconnected, with the economy, corruption, and internal instability consistently ranking among the most pressing concerns.<sup>1</sup> These findings are consistent with broader public opinion research, including Arab Barometer (2025), which similarly highlights the centrality of economic hardship, governance failures, and internal instability in shaping public sentiment. While late-2025 findings pointed to a modest SUNNIFNF study confirms that trust in key institutions such as government and parliament remained low, and perceptions of public service delivery continued to be weak<sup>2</sup>.

At the same time, the broader regional conflict has introduced an additional layer of uncertainty that is likely to reshape these perceptions. Crucially, the Ipsos–FNF January 2026 data predates the renewed escalation observed in March 2026, indicating that the relative improvements captured at that time were likely fragile and highly susceptible to reversal under heightened insecurity<sup>3</sup>. This is further aligned with external reporting, including updates from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2026), which document large-scale displacement across Lebanon following the escalation, placing significant pressure on host communities, infrastructure, and access to essential services.<sup>4</sup>

In parallel, recent political developments have further shaped the national context. In March 2026, Lebanon's parliament voted to extend its own mandate by two years, postponing scheduled elections considering the ongoing conflict. Such developments are likely to influence public perceptions of governance, democratic processes, and national direction, particularly in a context where institutional trust is already strained.

Against this backdrop, there is strong value in conducting an updated, nationally representative follow-up survey. By repeating key indicators from the previous nationwide study and incorporating a limited number of new questions tailored to the evolving context, the research will enable the tracking of potential shifts in public opinion. It will provide insight into how recent developments may be shaping perceptions of security escalation, expectations regarding the duration of the conflict, national priorities, displacement dynamics, and attitudes toward political decisions such as the postponement of parliamentary elections. More broadly, the study will offer an updated snapshot of public sentiment and help contextualize earlier findings within a rapidly changing environment.

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<sup>1</sup> Arab Barometer. (2024). Lebanon public opinion report 2024. <https://www.arabbarometer.org/report/lebanon-public-opinion-report-2024/>

<sup>2</sup> Arab Barometer. (2025). Lebanon and the regional conflict. <https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/Arab-Barometer-IX-Lebanon-Public-Opinion-2025.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> Ibid

<sup>4</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2026). Lebanon flash update #3 (16–22 March 2026). <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/121690>

## 2. Research Objectives

The overarching objective of this follow-up study is **to update and track Lebanese citizens' perceptions of key socio-political developments in light of recent political and security dynamics**, while enabling comparison with findings from the previous nationwide survey. The study aims to assess shifts in public sentiment on selected priority issues and capture emerging concerns related to the evolving national and regional context. Specifically, the study aims to:

- Assess changes in public perceptions of the current political and security situation, including views on recent regional escalation and its implications for Lebanon.
- Examine citizens' expectations regarding the duration and potential trajectory of the ongoing conflict and its anticipated impact on daily life and national stability.
- Identify national priorities as perceived by citizens at the current stage, including governance, economic conditions, security, and social concerns.
- Explore public attitudes toward displacement from the South and perceptions of its social, economic, and political implications.
- Evaluate perceptions regarding the postponement of parliamentary elections and its implications for democratic processes and political confidence.
- Compare selected indicators with findings from the previous survey to identify continuity and shifts in public opinion over time.

## II. Methodology

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To achieve the objectives of the study, Ipsos implemented a nationally representative quantitative public opinion survey using a mixed-mode data collection approach combining Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) and Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). A total of 57% of interviews were conducted via CATI and 43% via CAPI. This approach ensured broad geographic coverage across Lebanon while maintaining access to respondents in areas affected by displacement and evolving security conditions. The survey targeted Lebanese citizens aged 21 years and above residing in Lebanon. A total sample of **1,100 respondents** was interviewed nationwide across all eight Lebanese governorates, ensuring representation by key demographic characteristics including age, gender, and geographic location. Coverage included conflict-affected areas through the inclusion of internally displaced populations residing outside their areas of origin at the time of data collection.

A **stratified sampling design** was applied to ensure representativeness across major population groups. Sampling was structured in three stages:

- **First**, governorates were used as primary strata, with quotas applied to ensure proportional geographic coverage in line with the national population distribution.
- **Second**, within each governorate, respondents were selected using random sampling with quotas based on key demographic variables, including age and gender, to reflect the national population structure.
- **Third**, within selected households (for CAPI interviews) or eligible contact frames (for CATI interviews), one respondent meeting the eligibility criteria was selected in accordance with quota requirements to maintain demographic balance.

The questionnaire had an average length of interview (LOI) of approximately 15 minutes and included a core set of tracking indicators repeated from the previous nationwide survey, alongside a limited number of additional questions reflecting recent political and security developments. Specifically, the questionnaire contained six core indicators covering government performance, state authority over weapons, national priorities, geopolitical perceptions, and security-related perceptions (including escalation risk and stability concerns). While only one indicator remained fully identical in wording, the others were conceptually aligned, enabling robust comparison of key trends over time. These additions covered perceptions of regional escalation, expectations regarding the duration of the conflict, views on displacement from conflict-affected areas in the South, national priorities under wartime conditions, and attitudes toward the postponement of parliamentary elections.

This methodology enables reliable comparison with findings from the previous study while providing an updated snapshot of public sentiment in light of evolving political and security dynamics.

### ***Study Limitations***

While the survey provides a robust and nationally representative snapshot of public opinion in Lebanon, several limitations should be considered when interpreting the findings.

#### **First, the survey was conducted during an active war context.**

Data collection took place amid ongoing security tensions and displacement dynamics affecting several regions of the country. In such environments, perceptions of security, governance, and political developments can shift rapidly in response to unfolding events. The findings therefore reflect attitudes at the time of data collection and may evolve as the political and security situation changes.

#### **Second, displacement conditions influenced the interview environment for some respondents.**

A portion of the sample included internally displaced persons (IDPs), some of whom were residing in temporary shelters or host community settings at the time of the survey. These circumstances may shape respondents' perceptions of security, government performance, and national priorities in ways that differ from those of non-displaced populations. While the inclusion of displaced populations strengthens the representativeness of the survey under current conditions, responses from these groups should be interpreted within the context of their immediate living conditions and exposure to crisis-related pressures.




#### **Third, social desirability bias may affect responses to sensitive political and security topics.**

Given the sensitivity of issues such as weapons under state authority, regional actors' influence, and government performance during wartime, some respondents may have been cautious in expressing critical or controversial views. This may lead to some underreporting of politically sensitive opinions.

#### **Finally, survey-based measures reflect stated perceptions and expectations at a specific moment in time.**

Indicators such as expectations regarding escalation, conflict duration, or electoral participation capture respondents' current views rather than future behavior. In periods of heightened uncertainty and rapid political change, attitudes and intentions may evolve quickly as conditions shift.




### III. Profile of Respondents



The sample consists of 1,100 respondents, with a perfectly balanced gender split (**50% male, 50% female**). In terms of age distribution, the **largest share** of respondents falls within the 35–49 age group (**36%**), followed by those aged 50–64 years (**27%**). Younger adults aged 21–34 years account for **19%** of the sample, while **18%** are aged 65 years and above, indicating a relatively **mature and well-distributed population**.

Geographically, respondents are represented **across all governorates**, with the highest concentration in Mount Lebanon (**42%**). This is followed by North Lebanon (**13%**) and the South (**12%**), while Nabatiyeh accounts for **8%**. Akkar and Beirut each represent **7%** of the sample, followed by Bekaa (**6%**) and Baalbek-Hermel (**5%**), ensuring **broad national coverage**.



In addition, sample reflects broad coverage across Lebanon's districts. Baabda and Matn represent the largest shares (**11% each**), followed by Akkar, Aley, Beirut, Nabatiyeh, and Saida (**7% each**). Chouf, Tripoli, and Keserwan each account for (**6%**), while Tyre represents (**5%**) and Baalbek and Zahle (**4% each**). Smaller shares are drawn from Minieh-Danniyeh and Jbeil (**3% each**), West Beqaa and Zgharta (**2% each**), and Marjaayoun, Koura, Batroun, Hermel, Rachaya, and Bcharre (**1% each**). This distribution ensures representation across Lebanon's diverse districts, capturing geographic variation in attitudes and priorities across the country.



In terms of employment status, the sample reflects a diverse economic composition. **Full-time** employees represent the largest share (**23%**), closely followed by **homemakers** (**22%**) and **self-employed** individuals (**20%**). A further **8%** are employed **part-time**, while **10%** are **unemployed** and **actively seeking work** and **6%** are unemployed but **not looking for work**. **Retirees** account for **7%** of the sample, while **students and apprentices** represent a smaller segment (**3%**).

Regarding marital status, **most respondents are married** (**66%**), while **27% are single**. Smaller proportions are **widowed** (**4%**) or **divorced/separated** (**3%**), indicating a predominantly **family-based population**.

In terms of educational attainment, the sample is relatively **well distributed across different levels**. Around **one-third** of respondents have completed university education (**32%**), while an additional **7%** have **pursued postgraduate studies**. Secondary education accounts for **20%** of the sample, followed by primary education (**24%**). A further **11%** report technical education, while **smaller shares have low or no formal education**, including **4%** who are literate without formal schooling and **3%** who report no education.




Household size distribution suggests that **mid-sized households are most common**. One quarter of respondents (**25%**) **live in households of four members**, followed by **20% in households of five**. Households of three (**14%**) and six members (**13%**) are also relatively common, while both smaller households (one to two members) and larger households (seven or more members) are **less prevalent**.

In terms of household income, the sample is skewed toward lower income brackets. Approximately **30%** of respondents report earning **less than \$500 per month**, while **29% fall within the \$500–\$999 range**. Around **14% report incomes between \$1,000 and \$1,499**, with progressively smaller shares in higher income categories. Only **4% report earning \$3,000 or more**, while **12% refused** to disclose their income, indicating some sensitivity around financial information.

## IV. Perceptions of Security & Conflict Dynamics

### 1. Perceived Stability




Perceptions of the current security situation in Lebanon are overwhelmingly negative, with a near-universal consensus around instability. A large majority of respondents (77%) describe the situation as **very unstable**, while an additional 16% consider it **somewhat unstable**, bringing total negative sentiment to 93%.

Positive perceptions are almost negligible, with only 4% viewing the situation as **somewhat stable** and just 2% as **very stable**, highlighting the absence of any meaningful sense of security among the population.

**Nine in ten** Lebanese describe the security situation not merely as bad or concerning, but as a **full crisis**. This reflects a population that has come to see instability as part of its **daily reality**. Against this backdrop, the other findings in this report, including distrust in government, fear of further escalation, and deep economic despair, should be understood **not as isolated issues, but as consequences of this underlying condition**.

## 2. Predictions of Escalation & Duration




Expectations of further escalation remain high among the public, reflecting a prevailing sense of uncertainty and concern about the trajectory of the conflict. Half of respondents (**50%**) believe that escalation is **very likely**, while an additional **27%** consider it **somewhat likely**, bringing total expectations of escalation to **77%**.

In contrast, a relatively small share expresses confidence that escalation can be avoided, with **9%** stating it is **not very likely** and **7%** **not likely at all**, while another **7%** remain unsure.

**Three in four** Lebanese expect the situation to get worse, and half expect it to deteriorate severely. This is not anxiety about a possible outcome, it is a settled **expectation that things**


**will continue to decline**. As a result, even genuine progress on the ground may fail to shift public perception, because the public has already **concluded that escalation is the default trajectory**.



At the national level, expectations are clustered in the short to medium term. A plurality anticipates the war lasting several months (**47%**), followed by a few weeks (**27%**), indicating that the conflict is seen as ongoing but contained, rather than imminent or protracted. Expectations of a long-term conflict remain marginal (**e.g., 5% more than one year**), while uncertainty (**15%**) signals limited confidence in forecasting the trajectory.

At the district level, the largest contrast is between predominantly Shia and predominantly Sunni areas. **Respondents from predominantly Shia districts are the most optimistic**, with Marjaayoun (**87%**) and Baalbek (**48%**) recording the highest "few weeks" expectations nationally, suggesting a belief in a relatively near-term resolution. **Predominantly Sunni districts present the opposite picture**, with Minieh-Danniyeh and Akkar among the highest for uncertainty (**30% and 26% respectively**) and greater anticipation of a prolonged conflict, reflecting a more pessimistic and less consolidated outlook. **Predominantly Christian districts concentrate in the medium-term**, with Matn recording the highest "several months" share among adequately sized districts, indicating a cautious but bounded expectation that sits between the Shia and Sunni extremes.

Overall, while expectations converge around a contained but not immediate resolution, they diverge sharply in confidence and time horizon across districts, with predominantly Shia areas skewing toward near-term resolution, Christian-majority districts toward medium-term containment, and Sunni-majority areas toward greater uncertainty and longer-term risk.




At the national level, expectations remain anchored in the short to medium term, with several months (**37%**) and a few weeks (**30%**) dominating. However, compared to perceptions of the conflict within Lebanon, there is greater uncertainty (**19%**) and a slight shift toward longer timelines, indicating that the regional dimension is viewed as more complex and less predictable.

At the district level, the same underlying structure persists but becomes more pronounced. Predominantly Shia districts show the most optimistic outlook, with stronger expectations of a short timeline (e.g., Marjaayoun **87% a few weeks**) and lower uncertainty, suggesting confidence in a near-term resolution. Predominantly Christian districts remain centered on the medium term (e.g., Matn **47% several months**), reflecting a cautious but contained expectation. In contrast, predominantly Sunni districts display higher uncertainty (e.g., Minieh-Danniyeh **52% unsure**) and greater openness to longer-term scenarios, indicating a more pessimistic and less stable outlook. Mixed districts also show elevated uncertainty (**27%**), reinforcing that more diverse areas tend to hold less consolidated views.

Overall, while short- to medium-term expectations dominate, the regional framing amplifies divergence. Shia districts skew toward short-term optimism, Christian districts toward cautious medium-term expectations, and Sunni and mixed districts toward uncertainty and longer-term risk, highlighting different levels of confidence in how the conflict may evolve.

## Concern of Internal Armed Conflict/Civil Violence



Concern about the potential for internal armed conflict or civil violence in Lebanon is relatively high, though somewhat divided. Most respondents (**57%**) express concern, including **30%** who are very concerned and **27%** somewhat concerned. At the same time, a notable **43%** express limited or no concern, with **28%** not concerned at all and **15%** not very concerned, indicating a polarized public outlook.

The distribution suggests that while concern is widespread, it is not universally shared, and a significant portion of the population remains either unconvinced or desensitized to the risk of internal escalation.

Regional differences, however, reveal sharper contrasts in perception. Higher levels of intense concern are observed in North Lebanon (**43%**), Akkar (**39%**), Baalbek-Hermel (**38%**), Beirut (**36%**), and Mount Lebanon (**31%**), indicating that respondents in these areas are more likely to perceive a tangible risk of civil unrest. In contrast, concern is significantly lower in Bekaa (**8%**) and Nabatiyeh (**11%**), where respondents are less likely to view internal conflict as an imminent threat.


Conversely, Bekaa stands out for its exceptionally high share of respondents who are somewhat concerned (**71%**), suggesting a more moderate but widespread level of concern rather than extreme anxiety. Nabatiyeh also shows elevated moderate concern (**58%**), reinforcing this pattern.

Lower concern is particularly evident in the South, where **39%** report being not concerned at all, alongside **23%** who are **not very concerned**, indicating a relatively more reassured or resilient outlook compared to other regions.

Overall, the findings highlight a fragmented perception landscape, where concern about civil conflict varies significantly by region, ranging from high-intensity fear in certain areas to relative dismissal or normalization of risk in others. This suggests that perceptions of internal instability are likely shaped by localized experiences, exposure to conflict dynamics, and differing levels of perceived vulnerability.

## V. Humanitarian & Economic Impact of the War

### 1. Humanitarian Impact & Displacement



Concern about the humanitarian impact of the war is both widespread and highly intense among the population. A strong majority of respondents (**69%**) report being very concerned, while an additional **19%** are somewhat concerned, bringing total concern to **88%**. In contrast, only a small minority express low or no concern, including **6%** who are not concerned at all and **3%** not very concerned, with **4%** remaining neutral.

The distribution is heavily skewed toward the highest intensity level, indicating that concern is not only prevalent but deeply felt, reflecting a strong awareness of the war's humanitarian consequences, including displacement and damage to livelihoods.


Regional patterns further reinforce this high level of concern, while also revealing variations in intensity. Elevated levels of very high concern are observed in Mount Lebanon (**74%**), Beirut (**71%**), Akkar (**71%**), and the South (**67%**), suggesting particularly strong sensitivity to humanitarian risks in these areas. North Lebanon (**65%**) and Baalbek-Hermel (**64%**) also report high levels of intense concern, though slightly lower in comparison.

In contrast, Nabatiyeh stands out with a comparatively lower share of respondents who are very concerned (**50%**), but this is offset by a significantly higher proportion expressing moderate concern (**47%**), indicating a shift from extreme to more moderate levels of concern rather than

an absence of it. A similar pattern, though less pronounced, is observed in Bekaa, where **61%** are very concerned and a notable **38%** somewhat concerned.

Lower concern remains limited across all regions, though slightly more visible in North Lebanon (**10% not concerned at all**) and Beirut (**9%**), suggesting pockets of relative detachment or differing perceptions of exposure.

Almost every Lebanese citizen is worried about the humanitarian impact of the war. The difference across regions is due to differences in how intensely the impact is felt, with those closest to displacement and destruction feeling it most intensely. As a result, humanitarian response cannot be designed around a national average, it needs to meet communities at their specific level of exposure and urgency.



Perceptions of the likelihood of permanent displacement are notably high, reflecting strong public concern about the long-term consequences of the conflict. Nearly half of respondents (**49%**) believe permanent displacement is very likely, while an additional **22%** consider it somewhat likely, bringing total perceived likelihood to **71%**.

In contrast, a smaller share expresses skepticism, with **14%** stating displacement is unlikely and **12%** very unlikely, while **4%** remain unsure. As with other indicators, responses are skewed toward the highest intensity category, suggesting that concerns are not only widespread but firmly held.


Regional variations reveal important differences in both intensity and certainty. Higher levels of strong belief in displacement are observed in Akkar (**61%**), Mount Lebanon (**57%**), and North Lebanon (**50%**), indicating heightened concern in these areas. Beirut also reflects relatively high concern (**47%**), closely aligned with the national average.

Most Lebanese people believe permanent displacement of conflict-affected communities is a real and likely outcome of the war. Nabatiyeh is the clear exception, where **nearly half** of residents consider displacement **unlikely**, a direct **reversal of the national picture**. This reflects a community with a fundamentally **different reading of the conflict**. As a result, policies around

displacement and return will need to account for the fact that the affected communities themselves **do not all share the same assessment of the risk**. Similarly, Bekaa shows a different pattern, with a lower share of “very likely” responses (**36%**) but a notably high proportion selecting somewhat likely (**50%**), indicating more moderate, but still widespread, concern.

Lower perceived likelihood is also somewhat more evident in Beirut (**22% unlikely**) and the South (**15% unlikely, 15% very unlikely**), though these remain secondary to the dominant expectation of displacement.

## 2. Government Priorities & Economic Impact of the War




At the national level, priorities are **fragmented**, with no single dominant approach. Immediate humanitarian support (**30%**) and sanctuary and medical assistance (**29%**) lead, indicating a focus on immediate needs, but without clear consolidation around one option. Other priorities security stabilization (**18%**), reconstruction and return (**13%**), and international support (**11%**) form a secondary tier, suggesting that expectations extend across short-term relief and longer-term recovery, rather than converging on a single pathway.

Regionally, priorities diverge along functional lines. Humanitarian support is more emphasized in areas such as Akkar (**35%**) and the South (**33%**), pointing to immediate relief needs, while security stabilization dominates in places like Nabatiyeh (**49%**) and Bekaa (**38%**), indicating greater concern with safety conditions before return. International support stands out in Baalbek-Hermel (**35%**), reflecting localized expectations of external involvement. Open-ended responses reinforce this segmentation, combining basic needs (shelter, food, healthcare) with **security concerns** and **skepticism toward government capacity**, suggesting that preferences are shaped by **perceived feasibility as much as priority**.

At the district level, patterns become more structured but remain distributed. Predominantly Shia districts place stronger emphasis on security stabilization (e.g., Tyre **44%**, Baalbek **39%**), aligning with a security-first approach. Sunni and mixed districts lean more toward immediate humanitarian support (e.g., Minieh-Danniyeh **49%**, Zahle **45%**), reflecting urgent material needs. Christian districts show relatively higher preference for sanctuary and medical assistance (e.g., Jbeil **52%**, Keserwan **47%**), indicating a more **protection and service-oriented outlook**. In

some areas, **international support** becomes more prominent (e.g., Hermel **44%**), pointing to **localized reliance on external actors**.

Different communities in Lebanon prioritize distinct approaches to displacement policy. In Shia districts, security is the primary condition for return. Sunni and mixed districts emphasize immediate humanitarian assistance, while Christian districts prioritize protection and access to healthcare services. These differences reflect the varied circumstances and drivers of displacement, as well as what each community considers necessary for a safe return. As a result, a single national framework is unlikely to be effective, as it fails to account for fundamentally different definitions of need and recovery across regions.




Perceptions of the war's impact on Lebanon's economy are overwhelmingly negative, with near-universal consensus on its severity. An overwhelming majority of respondents (**87%**) believe the war is having a **very significant** negative impact, while a further **10%** consider the impact **somewhat significant**, bringing total perceived negative impact to **97%**.

In contrast, only a negligible share of respondents perceive the economic impact as limited, with just **2%** stating it is **not very significant** and **1%** **not significant at all**, indicating virtually no divergence in views.

**97%** of Lebanese respondents believe the war is **significantly damaging the economy**, with virtually **no meaningful variation across regions, age groups, or communities**. This reflects one of the rare issues in Lebanon that **transcends political, sectarian, and demographic divisions**, emerging instead as a broadly shared lived reality. The findings therefore suggest that economic recovery should not be approached or communicated as a partisan or constituency-specific priority, but rather as a **national imperative backed by an exceptionally broad public mandate for government action**.

## VI. Government Performance, Trust & State Authority

### 1. Attitudes & Confidence Towards Government



At the national level, evaluations are predominantly negative, with **62% expressing negative views** versus **32% positive**. The concentration in very negative (**41%**) indicates that dissatisfaction is not only widespread but strongly held, pointing to a high-intensity credibility deficit rather than mild disapproval.


Regionally, negativity is unevenly distributed. The South (**57% very negative**) and Nabatiyeh (**52%**) show the **highest intensity of dissatisfaction**, followed by Baalbek-Hermel and Mount Lebanon (both **42% very negative**), indicating **clusters of strong rejection**. In contrast, Akkar stands out with higher positive sentiment (e.g., **22% very positive**, **35% somewhat positive**), suggesting a **more favorable or less critical stance**. Beirut presents a more balanced profile, with comparable shares of somewhat positive (**34%**) and very negative (**34%**), while Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel show more distributed negativity, indicating dissatisfaction that is broad but less concentrated at the highest intensity.

At the district level, the divide becomes more pronounced and structured. Predominantly Shia districts exhibit the most intense dissatisfaction, with very high shares of very negative evaluations (e.g., Tyre **66%**, Nabatiyeh **63%**), reflecting a consolidated rejection. Christian-majority districts also lean negative (e.g., Baabda **57%**, Matn **47%**), but with less concentration, suggesting a broader but less intense critique. In contrast, Druze and mixed districts show **relatively higher positive evaluations** (e.g., Chouf **59%** positive), making them the only areas where positive sentiment approaches or exceeds negative, indicating a **more favorable or less polarized assessment**.

Most Lebanese respondents believe the government has handled the war **poorly**, with criticism concentrated not only in scale but also in **intensity**. The findings point beyond generalized dissatisfaction toward a **deeper erosion of confidence in the government's ability to respond effectively to the crisis**. As such, the challenge appears to extend beyond public communication

or messaging, suggesting that visible and tangible action is likely to be more important in restoring public confidence than reframing the current situation alone.

At the same time, perceptions are not entirely uniform across the country. Shia-majority districts exhibit the **strongest levels of rejection**, while Christian-majority districts reflect broader but comparatively **less intense criticism**. In contrast, Druze-majority and more demographically mixed areas tend to express relatively **more positive evaluations of government performance**, indicating that perceptions of the government's wartime response remain shaped by distinct **regional and communal dynamics** rather than a single unified national perspective.



At the national level, confidence is **decisively low**, with **68%** expressing **no confidence** versus **29%** expressing **any confidence**. The concentration in not confident at all (**51%**) indicates that skepticism is deep and entrenched, pointing to a **severe credibility gap** rather than marginal doubt.



Regionally, this pattern is broadly consistent, with high shares of strong skepticism in Mount Lebanon (**58% not confident at all**), Nabatiyeh (**53%**), and the South (**52%**), alongside Beirut (**49%**). This suggests that low confidence is not localized, but rather widely shared across different contexts, with limited regional deviation.

At the district level, skepticism becomes near-universal but varies in intensity. Predominantly Shia districts show the most absolute rejection, with virtually no positive sentiment, indicating a fully consolidated lack of confidence. Christian-majority districts are similarly pessimistic (e.g., Baabda and Matn), but with slightly more dispersion, suggesting less rigid positioning. In contrast, Druze and Sunni districts introduce limited variation, with relatively higher though still minority shares of very confident responses (e.g., Akkar **30%**, Aley **21%**), indicating **greater openness but not a shift in overall sentiment**.

**More than half** of all Lebanese people have no confidence whatsoever that the government can secure a ceasefire, and **fewer than one in three** believe it can. This is the starting position for most Lebanese people, not emerging as a consequence of recent events. As a result, any ceasefire achievement, even a partial one, would need to be communicated clearly and quickly to have any chance of shifting a deeply entrenched public assumption. Shia districts anchor the most

absolute skepticism, Christian districts reflect broad but less concentrated pessimism, and Druze and Sunni districts show modest variation, highlighting differences in how firmly this skepticism is held rather than whether it exists.

## 2. Perceptions of State Control Over Weapons and Government Capacity




Public attitudes toward exclusive state control of weapons in Lebanon are strongly supportive at the national level, but this overall figure masks one of the deepest community-level divides in the survey.

At the national level, a clear majority (**68%**) agree, including (**56%**) who strongly agree and (**12%**) somewhat agree. In contrast, (**30%**) disagree, split between (**19%**) strongly and (**11%**) somewhat, while (**3%**) remain unsure. The heavy concentration in the "strongly agree" category indicates that support is not only widespread but firmly held.

Regionally, the pattern is sharply polarized. Agreement is highest in Akkar and North Lebanon (**92% each**), reflecting near-consensus in these areas, while Nabatiyeh records the lowest agreement at (**23%**), with opposition reaching (**77%**), the highest in the survey. The remaining governorates fall between these two extremes, with support declining gradually from Mount Lebanon and Beirut toward the South, Bekaa, and Baalbek Hermel.

At the district level, the divide is equally stark. **Christian and Sunni-majority districts converge around near-unanimous support**, with Koura, Zahle, Minieh-Danniyeh, and Akkar all recording agreement rates above 90%, reflecting broad and firmly held consensus in these areas. Druze-majority districts follow closely, with Chouf and Aley both above 80%. **Predominantly Shia districts present a sharply contrasting picture**, where disagreement clearly outweighs agreement across Baalbek, West Beqaa, Tyre, Hermel, and Nabatiyeh, making these the only districts in the survey where opposition to state weapons authority is the majority position.

Overall, while a clear national majority supports exclusive state control over weapons, the district-level breakdown reveals that this majority is driven overwhelmingly by Christian, Sunni, and Druze-majority districts, while opposition is concentrated almost entirely in predominantly Shia areas. The national figure therefore reflects two very different realities rather than a shared consensus, making this one of the most polarized issues in the entire survey.




Perceived feasibility of consolidating all weapons under state authority is decisively low, with **62%** judging it unrealistic versus **33%** seeing it as achievable. The distribution is skewed toward the most extreme negative response (**39%** “not realistic at all”), indicating entrenched skepticism rather than uncertainty. Compared to typically higher support for the principle itself, this reflects a clear expectation–feasibility gap, suggesting that endorsement is largely normative rather than operational.

Regional variation is present but does not alter the overall pessimistic baseline. North Lebanon and Akkar show relatively higher confidence, with stronger representation in the “very realistic” category, indicating pockets of conditional optimism. In contrast, Bekaa and Nabatiyeh concentrate in “not very realistic,” pointing to skepticism that is firm but less absolutist. Baalbek-Hermel combines high rejection with a meaningful share of moderate optimism, signaling internal fragmentation rather than a cohesive stance.

At the district level, feasibility perceptions align closely with prior positions on weapons control. Predominantly Shia districts exhibit near-total rejection, with negligible positive sentiment, indicating consistency between opposition to the principle and disbelief in its implementation. Predominantly Christian districts remain largely pessimistic but with slightly more dispersion, suggesting less rigid positioning. Sunni and Druze-majority districts display comparatively higher perceived feasibility, with Akkar and Chouf leading, reflecting a closer alignment between support for the principle and belief in its achievability.

Most Lebanese people **support** the principle of exclusive state control over weapons, but most also believe it will **never actually happen**. The Lebanese people have no expectation that their government can deliver it. This finding reflects what people **want, not what they think is achievable**, and building real momentum will require visible steps that close that gap.

### 3. Government Priorities During the War




Public views on the government’s top priority during the war clearly converge around securing a ceasefire. A plurality (**40%**) identifies this as the main priority, well ahead of other options, highlighting a strong preference for immediate **de-escalation**.

Other priorities are more fragmented. Protecting civilians ranks second (**15%**), followed by preventing further escalation and reconstruction and return of displaced people (both **11%**). Economic stability, diplomatic engagement, and other responses each account for **8%**, indicating lower relative importance.

Lebanese respondents **prioritize achieving a ceasefire** above all other potential government actions. While protecting civilians, providing economic relief, and supporting reconstruction remain important public priorities, they rank considerably **behind the demand for de-escalation**. The findings suggest that many citizens perceive the continuation of the conflict as the **central obstacle** preventing meaningful progress on broader economic, social, and humanitarian challenges. Consequently, government initiatives in these areas, regardless of their scale or intent, are **unlikely to generate substantial improvements** in public sentiment unless accompanied by visible progress toward reducing hostilities and restoring stability.

## VII. Security Solutions & Institutional Confidence




At the national level, preferences converge around two dominant strategies state strengthening (**55%**) and **ceasefire (53%)** indicating a dual emphasis on internal capacity and external de-escalation. Other options fall into a secondary tier (e.g., **integration 34%**, **international mediation 31%**, **gradual disarmament 28%**), suggesting they are seen as conditional or longer-term pathways. Armed resistance (**19%**) remains a **clear minority position**, reinforcing the overall tilt toward **institutional and diplomatic approaches**.

Predominantly Christian, Sunni, and Druze districts broadly converge around strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces as **the primary pathway** toward national security, with Chouf, Aley, Akkar, Tripoli, and Matn all recording support levels exceeding **60%**. Within this broader alignment, however, important variations emerge in the **preferred pace and mechanism of implementation**. Druze-majority districts demonstrate comparatively greater openness toward transitional arrangements, with Chouf showing notably higher support for both gradual disarmament (**48%**) and integration approaches (**41%**) than most other areas. Sunni-majority districts such as Tripoli and Akkar reflect a similar tendency, while predominantly Christian districts appear comparatively **more cautious toward hybrid or transitional security models**. These differences therefore appear less rooted in competing end goals than in differing preferences regarding the sequencing and structure of implementation within a broadly shared institutional framework.

In contrast, predominantly Shia districts reflect a **different security outlook**. These areas combine some of the **highest levels of support for a ceasefire with almost no support for disarmament**, including **0%** in Nabatiyeh and **2%** in Tyre, while simultaneously recording the strongest endorsement of armed resistance nationally, reaching **61%** in Tyre. Rather than representing minor policy variation, these findings point to a distinct conception of national security in which existing armed capabilities are maintained **alongside state structures rather than integrated into them**.

Consequently, national security frameworks centered on gradual disarmament or weapons consolidation are likely to encounter **substantial resistance** in predominantly Shia areas, where

such approaches appear fundamentally **misaligned** with prevailing local perceptions of security and deterrence.




At the national level, confidence is strong and clearly skewed positive, with **73%** expressing confidence in Rodolphe Haykal and a high share reporting very high confidence (**48%**). In contrast, low confidence remains limited (**22%**), indicating that the Lebanese Armed Forces are viewed as a credible stabilizing institution, even in a context of broader uncertainty.

Regionally, differences emerge primarily in the intensity of confidence rather than its direction. Akkar and the South stand out for very high confidence (**71%**), followed by Mount Lebanon (**52%**), reflecting strong conviction in these areas. Beirut (**48%**) and North Lebanon (**41%**) align more closely with the national average, indicating moderate but still positive sentiment. In contrast, Bekaa (**18%**) and Baalbek-Hermel (**20%**) show lower strong confidence, with sentiment shifting toward somewhat high confidence (e.g., Baalbek-Hermel **56%**), suggesting **more cautious or conditional trust**.

At the same time, some areas display greater internal division. Bekaa records elevated somewhat low confidence (**38%**), pointing to a more polarized outlook, while Beirut shows the highest very low confidence (**18%**), indicating **a pocket of stronger criticism** despite overall balance.

Overall, confidence in military leadership is broadly positive but uneven in intensity. Some regions exhibit strong conviction, while others reflect more moderate or conditional trust, highlighting that the credibility of the armed forces is widely recognized but not uniformly experienced across contexts.

## VIII. Political Attitudes & Electoral Behavior




Nationally, opinion is **evenly split** on postponing parliamentary elections (**46% support, 46% oppose**), but this balance is **misleading**. Opposition is more concentrated in the strongly oppose category (**34%**) than support is in strongly support (**20%**), indicating that **rejection is more firmly held** and more likely to translate into **active resistance**.

Regionally, attitudes are **polarized** rather than mixed. Akkar and North Lebanon form a clear **opposition bloc**, with high shares of **strong opposition**, while Mount Lebanon and Beirut follow a similar pattern at lower intensity. In contrast, Bekaa, Baalbek-Hermel, and Nabatiyeh show **high support**, but this is largely concentrated in somewhat support, pointing to **conditional acceptance** rather than strong endorsement. The South remains **divided**, with a slight **opposition lean**.

At the district level, attitudes consolidate into two distinct blocs. Predominantly Shia districts show very high support (e.g., **West Beqaa 95%**, **Nabatiyeh 90%**), but mostly within somewhat support, indicating **broad but low-intensity acceptance**. In contrast, Sunni and Christian districts exhibit strong and concentrated opposition, with high shares in strongly oppose (e.g., **Tripoli 53%**, **Akkar 51%**), reflecting entrenched resistance. Druze-majority districts fall in between, leaning toward opposition but with lower intensity.

Overall, the aggregate split masks a structured divide. Support is concentrated and relatively soft, while opposition is more widespread and more strongly held, implying that the political cost of postponement is likely to be driven by the intensity of opposing sentiment rather than the balance of opinion alone.



Public perceptions of the reasons behind postponing parliamentary elections are largely centered on **security conditions and the ongoing war**, which is cited by most respondents (**55%**) as the primary driver. This clearly outweighs all other explanations, indicating that the postponement is widely viewed because of the current security environment rather than institutional or logistical limitations.

The second most cited reason, though at a significantly lower level, is **political interests of parties (26%)**, suggesting that a notable portion of the population perceives the decision as politically motivated. Other explanations, including **political disagreements (8%)**, **fear of instability (5%)**, and **logistical or administrative constraints (1%)**, remain relatively marginal, while **6%** of respondents are unsure.


Regional variations reveal meaningful differences in how these reasons are interpreted. The role of **security conditions and war** is most strongly emphasized in **Bekaa (77%)**, **Nabatiyeh (77%)**, and **Baalbek-Hermel (73%)**, indicating a clear consensus in these areas that security realities are the dominant factor. In contrast, this perception is less pronounced in **the South (38%)** and **North Lebanon (43%)**, where alternative explanations gain relatively more traction.

Perceptions of **political interests of parties** are more prominent in **North Lebanon (34%)**, **Mount Lebanon (31%)**, **Beirut (29%)**, and **the South (31%)**, suggesting stronger skepticism in these regions regarding the political motivations behind the postponement. Conversely, this view is notably limited in **Bekaa (5%)** and **Baalbek-Hermel (11%)**, where security-related explanations dominate.

A distinct pattern emerges in **North Lebanon**, where a relatively high share of respondents (**14%**) report being unsure, indicating greater ambiguity or lack of consensus in this region.

Additionally, **fear of instability** is more visible in **Baalbek-Hermel (11%)**, **the South (10%)**, and **Bekaa (9%)**, suggesting that beyond immediate security conditions, broader concerns about maintaining stability also influence perceptions in these areas.

Overall, the findings indicate that while the postponement of elections is predominantly attributed to security conditions, there is a notable undercurrent of skepticism, particularly in certain regions, where political motivations are perceived to play a significant role.




Nationally, the impact of the war on voting behavior is **limited but not negligible**. A majority report no change (55%), indicating overall **stability in political preferences**, but a sizeable minority reflects **movement or withdrawal**. Around 28% report influence on their vote (including 18% significant change), while 16% do not intend to vote, pointing to a **meaningful level of disengagement** alongside shifting preferences.

Regionally, this stability is unevenly distributed. Bekaa stands out for very high stability (83% **no impact**), with Mount Lebanon, Nabatiyeh, and the South also showing relatively **stable voting intentions**. In contrast, North Lebanon and Akkar display lower stability (39% **no impact** in both), alongside higher shares of significant change (e.g., 34% and 31%), indicating **greater political fluidity**. At the same time, Baalbek-Hermel and Nabatiyeh show elevated non-participation (e.g., 29% and 33%), suggesting that in these areas the conflict is driving **withdrawal rather than realignment**.

At the district level, three **distinct patterns** emerge. **Predominantly Shia districts** are characterized by higher disengagement, with notable shares reporting they **do not intend to vote** (e.g., **Baalbek 30%**, **Nabatiyeh 29%**), reinforcing a pattern of political withdrawal. Predominantly Sunni districts, particularly in the North, show the highest levels of change, with Minieh-Danniyeh (42%), Akkar (31%), and Tripoli (31%) reporting **significant shifts**, alongside nearby **Christian-majority districts** such as Koura (39%) and Zgharta (41%), indicating that fluidity is geographically concentrated rather than purely community-driven. In contrast, Christian districts in Mount Lebanon show the highest stability, with Keserwan (65%), Matn (64%), and Jbeil (66%) reporting **no impact**, pointing to **entrenched preferences**.

Overall, the data reflects a dual dynamic. Stability dominates at the aggregate level, but this coexists with localized pockets of change and disengagement. The key distinction is not simply whether attitudes shift, but how they shift, toward realignment in the North and toward withdrawal in parts of Bekaa and the South, highlighting different forms of political response to the conflict.

## IX. Influence of Actors & Geopolitical Perceptions




At the national level, attribution of responsibility is **fragmented**, with no dominant consensus. Israel (**37%**) and Hezbollah (**28%**) emerge as the primary actors, but neither commands a majority, indicating competing narratives rather than a unified interpretation. The relatively high uncertainty (**14%**) further reinforces that a significant share of the population does not hold a fixed view, while attribution to domestic leadership (**9%**) and other external actors remains **secondary**, suggesting the issue is framed primarily through a **security and conflict lens** rather than governance.

Regionally, attribution patterns form clear blocks. Nabatiyeh (86%), Baalbek-Hermel (62%), and Bekaa (56%) show strong alignment around Israel, indicating a **cohesive external attribution narrative**. In contrast, North Lebanon (**14%**) and Akkar (**18%**) display low attribution to Israel and instead lean toward Hezbollah (e.g., **41%** and **39%**), reflecting a **shift toward internal attribution**. These same regions also show higher uncertainty (e.g., **23%** in North Lebanon), pointing to less consolidated views. Baalbek-Hermel stands out with relatively higher attribution to **Iran (11%)**, suggesting **greater sensitivity to broader geopolitical framing**.

At the district level, these divides become structurally consistent. Predominantly Shia districts show overwhelming attribution to Israel (e.g., Nabatiyeh **84%**, Tyre **63%**, Baalbek **63%**) and minimal attribution to Hezbollah, indicating a highly cohesive narrative with little internal contestation. Predominantly Christian districts present the sharpest contrast, with Hezbollah most frequently identified (e.g., Matn **47%**, Keserwan **45%**, Jbeil **45%**), reflecting a clear internal attribution frame. Sunni districts follow a similar pattern, with Tripoli (**40%**) and Akkar (**39%**) leaning toward Hezbollah but combined with **higher uncertainty** (e.g., Minieh-Danniyeh **36%** unsure), suggesting less consolidated positions. Druze-majority districts exhibit a more distributed attribution, with Chouf spreading responses across Hezbollah (**25%**), **political leadership (16%)**, and Israel, alongside **higher uncertainty (22%)**, indicating a **less fixed interpretation**.

Overall, Shia and Christian districts attribute responsibility for the escalation to two different actors: **the former to Israel, and the latter to Hezbollah**. These are not merely differing

opinions, but **fundamentally distinct interpretations of how the conflict began and why**. As a result, they directly shape the **types of solutions each community is willing to accept**, and any political process that fails to acknowledge this divide will struggle to build the cross-community legitimacy it needs to hold.




At the national level, perceptions of influence are **concentrated but not unified**. The United States (**35%**) leads, followed by Iran (**26%**) and Israel (**19%**), indicating that influence is primarily attributed to **external powers**, but without a dominant consensus. The presence of uncertainty (**11%**) further suggests that views are **not fully consolidated**.

Regionally, patterns show **clear divergence**. In areas such as Nabatiyeh (**69%**) and Bekaa (**56%**), the United States is strongly emphasized, while in Akkar (**42%**) and North Lebanon (**36%**), Iran becomes more central, reflecting **competing geopolitical frames** rather than a shared interpretation. Israel's influence is more selectively emphasized (e.g., Baalbek-Hermel **40%**), reinforcing that **attribution varies by context rather than following a single hierarchy**.

At the district level, these differences become **systematic**. Predominantly Shia districts emphasize the United States (e.g., Nabatiyeh **64%**), aligning with a broader **external attribution narrative**. In contrast, Sunni and Christian districts more frequently identify **Iran** (e.g., Zgharta **65%**), reflecting a shift toward **internalized regional influence linked to local actors**. Druze-majority districts show a more distributed pattern (e.g., Chouf **32%** for Iran), indicating less fixed views and a broader reading of influence.

Perceptions of external influence over the conflict closely **mirror perceptions of responsibility for the escalation itself**, revealing two distinct and **competing interpretive frameworks** across Lebanese communities. Shia-majority districts predominantly identify the United States and Israel as the **primary external actors shaping the conflict**, while Christian- and Sunni-majority districts more frequently point to **Iran**. These patterns suggest that views toward regional actors are **not isolated assessments of geopolitical influence**, but rather components of **broader, internally coherent narratives** regarding the origins, drivers, and perceived threats surrounding the conflict. As a result, attitudes toward external actors appear deeply intertwined with **communal identity and political positioning**, reflecting fundamentally different understandings of where responsibility lies.

## X. Regional & International Roles in Stabilization




At the national level, preferences are **evenly split** across three approaches: ceasefire, regional negotiations, and stronger state control (each **28%**) indicating the absence of a dominant strategy. Rather than consensus, this reflects **competing solution frameworks**: immediate de-escalation, broader diplomatic engagement, and internal consolidation of authority. Other options remain **secondary**, suggesting limited traction beyond these core approaches.

Regionally, this balance breaks into **distinct priorities**. Support for a **ceasefire** is strongest in areas such as Baalbek-Hermel (**55%**) and Bekaa (**50%**), pointing to a clear preference for immediate de-escalation. In contrast, **state control** is more emphasized in Akkar (**47%**) and North Lebanon (**42%**), reflecting a **shift toward internal solutions**. **Regional negotiations** gain relatively more traction in places like Nabatiyeh (**50%**), indicating a **third, diplomacy-focused pathway**. The low support for state control in some areas (e.g., Nabatiyeh **2%**) highlights a **sharp divide on the role of the state**.

At the district level, the three-way split resolves into **structured patterns**. Predominantly Shia districts show a strong preference for ceasefire-based solutions (e.g., West Beqaa **81%**), reinforcing a focus on external de-escalation. Mixed and Druze-majority districts display relatively higher support for regional negotiations (e.g., Chouf **33%**), indicating a more **diplomatically oriented outlook**. In contrast, Christian and Sunni districts in the North show **more balanced distributions**, with no single option dominating, reflecting a pragmatic and less consolidated approach. Certain outliers, such as Zahle (**63%** for international mediation), point to **localized expectations of external involvement**.

The apparent national three-way split regarding the best approach to preventing further escalation **does not reflect a shared consensus**, but rather fundamentally different understandings of both the **nature of the conflict and the mechanisms required to resolve it**. Predominantly Shia districts tend to prioritize achieving a ceasefire agreement, while Druze-majority and more demographically mixed communities place greater emphasis on broader regional negotiations. In contrast, Christian- and Sunni-majority communities are more inclined to favor strengthening the **Lebanese state and its institutions domestically**. These preferences

point to **distinct political and strategic frameworks rather than variations of a single outlook**. Consequently, efforts to develop a unified national de-escalation strategy may face challenges if they attempt to **accommodate all approaches simultaneously**, as overly broad positioning risks failing to resonate meaningfully with any of the constituencies involved.



Public expectations of the role of the international community are primarily centered on **security and economic support**, with a clear hierarchy of priorities. The most cited role is **providing security guarantees for Lebanon (39%)**, followed by **economic support and reconstruction assistance (31%)**, indicating that respondents expect both immediate stabilization and longer-term recovery support.

A smaller share of respondents believe that the international community should **stay out of Lebanese affairs (13%)**, while **active diplomatic involvement (12%)** is also selected by a minority. Only **4%** remain unsure.

The results suggest that the public largely favors **constructive external involvement**, particularly in terms of security and economic assistance, rather than disengagement.


Regional variations reveal notable differences in emphasis. Support for **security guarantees** is strongest in **Nabatiyeh (63%)**, followed by the **South (44%)** and **Bekaa (42%)**, indicating a heightened demand for security-focused intervention in these areas. In contrast, this priority is less emphasized in **North Lebanon (28%)** and **Akkar (29%)**.

**Economic support and reconstruction** are most prominent in **Beirut (42%)** and **North Lebanon (40%)**, followed by **Akkar (36%)** and **Bekaa (35%)**, suggesting that economic recovery is a more pressing concern in these regions.

The view that the international community should **stay out of Lebanese affairs** is particularly notable in **Baalbek-Hermel (26%)**, where it is significantly higher than in other regions, indicating stronger preferences for non-interference.

Support for **active diplomatic involvement** is relatively higher in **Bekaa (20%)** and **Nabatiyeh (19%)**, pointing to greater openness in these areas to diplomatic engagement beyond economic or security support.

Overall, Lebanese respondents express support for international involvement, but their preferences indicate **clear distinctions** regarding the form that involvement should take. International support focused on **security guarantees and economic assistance** is viewed positively, whereas direct political involvement receives considerably less support. These patterns suggest that the public differentiates sharply between **external assistance perceived as supportive and involvement perceived as intrusive or interventionist**. As a result, the legitimacy of international engagement appears **closely tied to its perceived scope and purpose**, with external actors potentially risking public trust if their role is seen as extending **beyond support** into political interference.



Public opinion on Syria's role is clearly oriented toward **non-intervention or limited involvement**. The most common view is that **Syria should remain neutral (42%)**, closely followed by **avoiding involvement in Lebanese affairs (38%)**, indicating a strong overall preference for distancing Syria from active engagement in Lebanon.

A smaller share supports **coordination with Lebanese authorities (14%)**, suggesting some openness to controlled, formal interaction, while very few believe Syria should **play an active role (2%)**. Only **4%** are unsure.

The results point to a dominant sentiment favoring **neutrality and non-interference**, with limited appetite for deeper Syrian involvement.

Regional differences further reinforce this pattern. Support for **neutrality** is particularly high in **Nabatiyeh (71%)**, **Bekaa (65%)**, and **Baalbek-Hermel (51%)**, highlighting stronger preferences for disengagement in these areas. In contrast, neutrality is less emphasized in **North Lebanon (34%)** and the **South (33%)**.


Preference for **avoiding involvement** is strongest in the **South (48%)** and **Mount Lebanon (42%)**, followed by **Baalbek-Hermel (40%)**, indicating a broader rejection of Syrian interference across several regions.

Support for **coordination with Lebanese authorities** is relatively higher in **North Lebanon (25%)** and **Akkar (25%)**, suggesting these areas are more open to structured cooperation rather than full disengagement.

The idea that Syria should **play an active role** remains marginal across all regions, with only a slight uptick in **Baalbek-Hermel (7%)**, but still at a very low level overall.

Overall, the findings show a consistent national preference for limiting Syria's role, with most respondents favoring neutrality or non-involvement, and only a minority supporting any form of active engagement.

## XI. National Priorities & Issue Salience



At the national level, **peace and security clearly dominate as the top priority (49%)**, standing far ahead of all other issues. This highlights a strong public focus on immediate stability concerns over longer-term structural challenges.

A second tier of priorities emerges, led by **reconstruction and displacement (17%)** and the **economic crisis (13%)**, indicating that while stability is the primary concern, recovery and economic pressures remain highly salient.

Lower-tier priorities include the **refugee situation (9%)** and **political reform and governance (8%)**, while **regional relations (3%)** and other issues (**2%**) receive minimal attention.

Regionally, the dominance of **peace and security** is consistent but varies in intensity. It is particularly elevated in **Bekaa (59%)** and **Nabatiyeh (57%)**, reinforcing the urgency of security concerns in these areas, while relatively lower in **Akkar (35%)**.


**Reconstruction and displacement** stands out strongly in **Beirut (33%)**, significantly above other regions, suggesting a more pronounced concern with recovery and rebuilding in the capital. It also remains relatively high in the **South (22%)** and **Nabatiyeh (21%)**.

The **economic crisis** is more emphasized in **Akkar (20%)** and **Baalbek-Hermel (20%)**, indicating stronger economic pressure perceptions in these regions.

The **refugee situation** becomes particularly salient in **Bekaa (21%)** and **Baalbek-Hermel (22%)**, where it ranks notably higher than the national average, reflecting localized pressures.

Finally, **political reform and governance** is more prominent in **Akkar (16%)**, suggesting relatively greater concern with institutional and governance issues there.

Overall, the findings show a clear hierarchy led by security concerns, with secondary priorities shaped by regional realities, particularly around reconstruction, economic hardship, and displacement-related pressures.



When looking beyond the single top priority, public concerns become more **distributed across structural and recovery-related issues**. **Reconstruction and displacement (27%)** emerges as the leading second priority, followed closely by the **economic crisis (25%)**, while **peace and security (19%)** ranks third.

This shift suggests that while security dominates as the immediate concern, respondents increasingly prioritize **recovery and economic stabilization** when considering their broader set of concerns.

Mid-tier issues include the **refugee situation (12%)** and **political reform and governance (9%)**, while **regional relations (6%)** and other responses remain secondary.

Regionally, **reconstruction and displacement** are particularly prominent in the **South (39%)**, significantly above the national average, reinforcing strong recovery concerns in this area. It also remains relatively elevated in **Mount Lebanon (29%)**.


The **economic crisis** stands out most in **Nabatiyeh (41%)**, indicating heightened economic pressure perceptions there, while remaining consistently important across most regions.

**Peace and security**, while dominant as a top priority, plays a more moderate role here, though still relatively higher in **Baalbek-Hermel (27%)** and **Bekaa (24%)**, reflecting continued security concerns in these regions.

The **refugee situation** becomes particularly salient in **Bekaa (26%)** and **Baalbek-Hermel (20%)**, mirroring patterns seen in Top 1 and pointing to localized pressures.

**Political reform and governance** is more emphasized in **Beirut (14%)** and **North Lebanon (12%)**, suggesting relatively stronger institutional concerns in these areas.

Overall, the Top 2 results reveal a more nuanced priority structure, where immediate security concerns give way to **longer-term recovery, economic stability, and displacement-related challenges**, with regional variations reflecting differing local realities.



At the Top 3 level, priorities become more **balanced and structural**, with **economic crisis (26%)** and **reconstruction and displacement (25%)** emerging as the leading concerns, slightly ahead of other issues. This indicates that beyond immediate and secondary priorities, respondents are increasingly focused on **longer-term recovery and economic stability**.

**Political reform and governance (13%)**, **peace and security (12%)**, and the **refugee situation (12%)** form a mid-tier cluster, suggesting that institutional and social pressures remain relevant but are not dominant at this level. **Regional relations (10%)** gains relatively more importance here compared to Top 1 and Top 2, indicating growing awareness of broader geopolitical dynamics when considering a wider priority set.

Regionally, the **economic crisis** is particularly elevated in the **South (35%)**, reinforcing stronger economic concerns in this area.

**Reconstruction and displacement** stands out sharply in **Baalbek-Hermel (44%)** and **Nabatiyeh (42%)**, highlighting significant recovery and displacement-related pressures in these regions.


**Political reform and governance** is more emphasized in **North Lebanon (19%)**, suggesting relatively higher concern with governance issues there.

**Peace and security** remains consistent across regions, with only slight variation, indicating it is a baseline concern rather than a differentiating one at this level.

The **refugee situation** is notably higher in **Bekaa (30%)**, confirming strong localized pressure related to displacement dynamics.

Finally, **regional relations** gain more prominence in **Akkar (16%)**, **North Lebanon (14%)**, and **Beirut (14%)**, suggesting increased sensitivity to regional dynamics in these areas.

Overall, the Top 3 results reveal a shift toward **structural and systemic concerns**, where economic hardship, reconstruction, and governance collectively define the broader national priority landscape, with regional variations reflecting localized economic and displacement realities.



Peace and security dominate as the immediate top priority, while economic and reconstruction concerns become more prominent as secondary and tertiary priorities.

Nearly half of respondents (**49%**) rank **peace and security** as their top priority, significantly ahead of all other issues, highlighting the urgency of stability concerns. However, its importance declines at lower ranks (**19% for Top 2 and 12% for Top 3**), suggesting it is seen as an immediate rather than sustained priority.

In contrast, **economic crisis** and **reconstruction & displacement** gain importance beyond the first rank. The economic crisis rises from **13%** (Top 1) to **25%** (Top 2) and remains high at **26%** (Top 3), while reconstruction increases from **17%** (Top 1) to **27%** (Top 2) and **25%** (Top 3). This indicates that once immediate security concerns are accounted for, respondents shift focus toward **recovery and economic stability**.

Overall, Lebanese respondents prioritize **ending the war** above all other national concerns. Once security and stability are restored, public attention shifts primarily **toward economic recovery and reconstruction**, while issues related to political reform and governance rank considerably lower by comparison. The findings suggest that public priorities are currently shaped by **immediate concerns** surrounding safety, economic hardship, and day-to-day survival, leaving broader institutional or structural reform issues perceived as **secondary**. Consequently, reform agendas centered primarily on governance and political transformation may struggle to gain **meaningful public resonance** unless accompanied by visible progress on security, economic stabilization, and basic living conditions first.

## XII. Key Insights & Strategic Implications:

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### 1. Cross-cutting Themes

Public opinion in Lebanon is currently shaped by a **clear hierarchy of needs**, where immediate security concerns coexist with deeper structural anxieties. Peace and security emerge as the dominant top priority, cited by nearly half of respondents, reflecting a widespread perception that stability remains the essential precondition for any form of recovery. However, when looking beyond the immediate, priorities shift markedly toward **economic crisis, reconstruction, and displacement**, indicating that citizens are not only concerned with short-term stabilization but also with long-term recovery and livelihood restoration.

This duality highlights a population that is both **crisis-driven and forward-looking**. Security is seen as urgent, but economic survival and rebuilding are the enduring concerns shaping public expectations. The consistency of economic and reconstruction-related priorities across Top 2 and Top 3 rankings reinforces the idea that **recovery, rather than politics, is the central organizing lens of public opinion**.

At the same time, public attitudes toward governance reflect **deep skepticism and low institutional confidence**. Evaluations of government performance are largely negative, and confidence in the government's ability to secure key outcomes, such as a ceasefire, remains limited. This is paired with strong support for state-centered solutions, including backing for state control over weapons, yet a simultaneous perception that such outcomes are not realistic in the current context. This gap between **desired outcomes and perceived feasibility** is a defining feature of the current public mood.

Geographic divides further shape these attitudes. Regions such as **Bekaa, Baalbek-Hermel, and Nabatiyeh** tend to prioritize security more strongly and exhibit higher sensitivity to conflict-related issues, including displacement and external threats. In contrast, other regions show relatively greater emphasis on economic concerns or governance-related issues. These differences reflect **localized experiences of the crisis**, where proximity to conflict, economic vulnerability, and demographic pressures influence how priorities are formed.

District-level affiliation emerges as an equally significant, and at times **more powerful**, lens for understanding public opinion than governorate-level geography alone. On several of the most contested issues in the survey, including state control over weapons, perceptions of the government, attribution of escalation responsibility, and attitudes toward regional actors, differences across districts are **sharper and more consistent** than broader regional patterns suggest. Respondents from predominantly Shia districts **consistently diverge** from those in Christian, Sunni, and Druze-majority areas on questions touching on armed groups, external influence, and institutional authority, while the latter three tend to cluster more closely together **despite differences in emphasis**. These district-level differences do not simply repeat the governorate-level findings; they represent **a more granular and revealing layer of opinion formation, rooted in proximity to conflict, community narratives, and diverging readings of the drivers and solutions of the current crisis**.

Geopolitical perceptions also play a central role. Views on the drivers of escalation, the role of international actors, and preferred pathways to stability are not uniform, and vary significantly across regions. While some respondents emphasize external actors such as Israel or the United States, others attribute greater responsibility to internal or regional dynamics. Similarly, proposed solutions to stabilize the situation range from military strengthening and ceasefire agreements to diplomatic and multilateral approaches. This indicates that **there is no single national consensus on how stability should be achieved**, even if there is broad agreement on its necessity.

Overall, Lebanese public opinion reflects a society navigating overlapping crises, where **security, economic survival, and reconstruction are tightly interconnected**, and where expectations from the state remain high despite low confidence in its ability to deliver.

## 2. Comparison: Initial Vs Follow Up Studies

Theme	Initial Study (Baseline)	Follow-up Study	Change/Insight
<b>Humanitarian Concerns</b>	Secondary priority (captured via national priorities & refugee-related questions)	88% concerned, 69% very concerned about humanitarian impact	Shift from peripheral awareness → central, deeply felt concern
<b>Government Performance</b>	44% positive (10% very + 34% somewhat)	32% positive (10% very + 22% somewhat)	Decline in positive perceptions (-12%)
<b>State Control Over Weapons</b>	66% agree (48% strongly + 18% agree)	68% agree (56% strongly + 12% agree)	Stable, slight strengthening of support
<b>Geopolitical Perceptions</b>	Fragmented influence (US, Iran, regional actors; no dominant actor)	Fragmented attribution (Israel 37%, Hezbollah 28%; US 35%, Iran 26%)	Persistent fragmentation, no unified narrative
<b>Community-Level Divides</b>	-Shia strongly opposed to state weapons authority (91%), Christians and Sunnis strongly in favor. -Shia overwhelmingly negative on government	-Shia-majority districts strongly oppose state weapons control (56%); Christian, Sunni, Druze districts near-unanimous in support. -Shia districts most negative on	-Shia vs. non-Shia divide persists and widens. -Weapons authority remains the most polarized issue. Government negativity deepens in Shia areas.

	performance; others broadly positive. Fragmented geopolitical attributions across communities, no unified narrative.	government. Israel blamed in Shia areas; Hezbollah in Christian and Sunni districts.	Attribution patterns structurally consistent, reinforcing divergent community narratives.
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**Comparison with Initial Study**

The follow-up findings provide a structured comparison with the initial study, highlighting both **continuity in core perceptions** and **notable shifts in intensity and framing** under evolving conflict conditions.

**a) Humanitarian Concerns: From Secondary to Central**

- In the initial study, humanitarian and displacement-related issues were captured primarily through national priorities and refugee-related questions, where they appeared as secondary concerns relative to economic and security issues.
- In the follow-up, these issues are measured more directly and emerge as highly prominent, with 88% of respondents expressing concern about the humanitarian impact of the war, including 69% who are very concerned.
- While based on different measurement approaches, this shift indicates that humanitarian impacts have moved from peripheral awareness to a **central and deeply felt dimension** of public perception.

**b) Government Performance: Declining Positive Perceptions**

- Perceptions of government performance show a **clear decline in positive evaluations** across waves.
- In the initial study, 44% of respondents reported positive views of government performance (10% very positive, 34% somewhat positive). In the follow-up, this decreases to 32% (10% very positive, 22% somewhat positive).
- This suggests a deterioration in public confidence, particularly in the context of the government’s handling of the war.

**c) State Authority Over Weapons: Stable but Slightly Strengthened Support**

- Public attitudes toward exclusive state control over weapons remain **consistently strong across both waves**, with a slight increase in support.
- In the initial study, 66% of respondents expressed agreement (48% strongly agree, 18% agree). This rises marginally in the follow-up to 68% (56% strongly agree, 12% agree).
- This indicates that while the broader context has evolved, support for state authority as a principle remains stable and even slightly reinforced.

**d) Geopolitical Perceptions: Persistent Fragmentation**

- Geopolitical perceptions remain **structurally fragmented across both waves**, despite changes in measurement approach.
- In the initial study, external influence was assessed through questions on the most influential actors and countries, revealing no single dominant actor and a divided landscape across the United States, Iran, and other regional players.
- In the follow-up, the framing shifts toward conflict-specific attribution. Israel (37%) and Hezbollah (28%) are identified as the primary contributors to escalation, while the United States (35%) and Iran (26%) are seen as the most influential actors.
- Despite this shift from general influence on attribution of responsibility, perceptions remain divided, with **no unified national narrative emerging**.

#### e) **Community-Level Divides: Intensification Rather Than Convergence**

- Community-level divisions observed in the initial study remain present in the follow-up findings but appear to have **intensified** and become more sharply consolidated around **key conflict-related** issues.
- In the initial wave, attitudes toward state authority over weapons already revealed a pronounced divide, with Shia respondents **strongly opposing** exclusive state control over weapons, while Christian and Sunni respondents expressed **broad support**.
- In the follow-up, these patterns become even more pronounced at the district level, with Shia-majority districts **strongly opposing** state weapons control, while Christian-, Sunni-, and Druze-majority districts demonstrate near-unanimous support. Similarly, perceptions of government performance and attribution of responsibility for the conflict reveal increasingly segmented **communal narratives**, with Shia-majority areas expressing significantly **stronger criticism** of the government and differing sharply from Christian and Sunni-majority areas in identifying the **primary drivers of escalation**.
- These findings suggest that communal divides have not narrowed over time, but rather **persisted** and, in some cases, **deepened**, particularly on issues related to **weapons authority, government legitimacy, and interpretations of the conflict itself**.

#### f) **Overall Comparison Insight**

Taken together, the comparison highlights both continuity and intensification in Lebanese public sentiment across the two waves. Core perceptions, including skepticism toward government performance, support for state authority, fragmented geopolitical views, and strong community-level divides, remain structurally consistent over time. However, the follow-up findings indicate that these perceptions have become more immediate, emotionally charged, and experience-driven under the pressures of ongoing conflict.

Humanitarian concerns have moved to the forefront of public consciousness, confidence in government performance has weakened further, and communal divisions surrounding weapons authority, responsibility for escalation, and political legitimacy appear more deeply consolidated. Overall, the findings suggest that the conflict has not fundamentally transformed public opinion patterns, but rather reinforced and intensified existing societal and political fault lines.

### 3. Risks & Opportunities

The current environment presents a **complex mix of risks and openings**, shaped by the gap between public expectations and perceived state capacity.

A key risk lies in the **misalignment between priorities and trust**. While citizens clearly identify security, economic recovery, and reconstruction as top priorities, confidence in the government's ability to effectively address these challenges remains low. This disconnect increases the likelihood of **growing frustration and volatility**, particularly if visible progress is not achieved in the short term.

Another **significant risk** stems from the **depth of divergence in priorities and perceptions**, both across governorates and across districts. Differences in **how conflict drivers are understood, which actors are blamed, and which solutions are preferred** are not solely broad geographic phenomena. District-level divides, particularly between predominantly Shia areas and Christian, Sunni, and Druze-majority districts on questions of **weapons, state authority, and external influence**, represent a **more granular and deeply rooted layer** of fragmentation that governorate-level analysis alone does not fully capture. These divergences risk complicating the development of **unified national strategies**, particularly on sovereignty-linked issues where district-level positions are firmly and intensely held.

At the same time, the data highlights a strong opportunity in the form of **clear and consistent public demand for stability and recovery**. Despite differences in how solutions are perceived, there is broad agreement on the end goals: security, economic stabilization, and reconstruction. This creates a foundation upon which policy actors can build, as public expectations are **aligned around outcomes even if not around methods**.

There is also an opportunity to leverage the **pragmatic nature of public opinion**. Across multiple issues, responses suggest that citizens prioritize what works over ideological positioning. Support for ceasefires, institutional strengthening, and international involvement in specific roles indicates openness to **practical, results-oriented approaches**. This pragmatism can facilitate policy acceptance if reforms are framed in terms of tangible benefits.

Finally, the strong emphasis on economic and reconstruction priorities presents a window for **integrated policy approaches**. Addressing economic hardship, displacement, and infrastructure rebuilding simultaneously, rather than in isolation, is likely to resonate more effectively with public expectations and reduce the risk of perceived policy fragmentation.

### 4. Policy Relevance for Stakeholders

The findings point to a need for **policy approaches that are both immediate and structural**, combining short-term stabilization efforts with longer-term recovery strategies.

First, there is a clear imperative to **prioritize visible progress on security and stability**, as these remain the most urgent public concerns. However, security interventions alone are unlikely to be sufficient. They must be accompanied by **tangible economic measures**, particularly those that address cost of living pressures, employment, and access to basic services.

Second, communication will play a critical role. The gap between **what citizens want and what they believe is realistic** suggests the need for clearer, more transparent messaging around policy

feasibility, timelines, and expected outcomes. Managing expectations while demonstrating incremental progress will be key to maintaining public confidence.

Third, regional and district-level differentiation should be **embedded into policy design**. Given the **variation in priorities** across both governorates and districts, one-size-fits-all approaches are unlikely to be effective. **Tailoring interventions to local needs**, whether related to displacement, economic vulnerability, security exposure, or diverging narratives around sovereignty and armed groups, can improve **both impact and public acceptance**. Particular care is needed on issues where district-level positions are **sharply polarized**, as framing and communication choices may significantly affect how policies are received across different areas.

Fourth, the openness to multiple pathways for stability, including military, diplomatic, and international approaches, provides an opportunity to pursue **multi-track strategies**. Policies that combine internal strengthening with external engagement are likely to align more closely with the diversity of public preferences.

Finally, the strong and consistent emphasis on economic recovery and reconstruction underscores the importance of **linking all policy efforts back to tangible improvements in daily life**. Public support is likely to remain contingent on whether policies translate into visible, material change.

### XIII. Recommendations

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#### 1. For Lebanese Policymakers

##### **Deliver visible, tangible progress on security and economic relief**

Public demand is overwhelmingly focused on security, peace, and economic relief. Policymakers should prioritize a few visible, credible actions such as ceasefire efforts, support for displaced populations, and cost-of-living measures. Even incremental progress can help rebuild trust given low confidence in government performance.

##### **Communicate transparently on timelines and feasibility**

There is a clear gap between public expectations and perceived feasibility. Policymakers must communicate honestly about what is achievable, within what timeframe, and under what constraints. Transparent, realistic messaging paired with visible progress will help maintain public confidence.

##### **Adopt regionally and district-sensitive approaches to policy design**

Survey findings show strong variation in priorities and perceptions across both governorates and districts. Policies must be tailored to local needs, with security emphasized in Bekaa and Nabatiyeh, reconstruction in Beirut and the South, and economic concerns in Akkar and Baalbek Hermel. On issues where district-level divides are most pronounced, such as state control over weapons and perceptions of external actors, policymakers should exercise particular care in framing and communication to avoid deepening existing divisions. Uniform national approaches are unlikely to be effective.

#### 2. For the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation (FNF)

##### **Reframe engagement around stability, recovery, and sovereignty**

FNF should align its messaging with citizens' priorities: stability, reconstruction, and economic recovery. Framing programs around tangible outcomes rather than abstract reforms will reduce resistance. Emphasizing sovereignty and institutional dignity will strengthen local legitimacy.

#### **Prioritize regional and district-sensitive programming**

Significant variation across governorates and districts requires tailored programming approaches. Different areas have distinct entry points, narratives, and priorities that uniform programming cannot adequately address. On cross-cutting issues where district-level divides are sharp, FNF should invest in dialogue formats that bring different groups into shared conversation around common goals, particularly economic recovery and institutional accountability, where broader consensus exists across areas.

### 3. For Civil Society and Reform Movements

#### **Shift from protest to practical recovery-oriented platforms**

Citizens remain engaged but frustrated with ineffective governance. Civil society should focus on actionable, solution-oriented platforms addressing security, reconstruction, and economic survival. Credible alternatives are more likely to gain lasting public support than purely oppositional messaging.

#### **Counter disengagement with solutions-focused community outreach**

Electoral disengagement is rising, especially in certain regions. Outreach should connect participation to tangible outcomes like reconstruction and economic decisions. Framing elections as directly impactful can help re-engage citizens.

### 4. For International Partners and Donors

#### **Align support explicitly with Lebanese public priorities**

Security and economic recovery are core public demands, not external agendas. Donors should clearly link their support to these priorities, including ceasefire, reconstruction, and stabilization efforts. This framing increases legitimacy and reduces backlash.

#### **Work through Lebanese institutions and avoid reinforcing polarization**

External involvement risks politicization due to fragmented perceptions across both regions and districts. Channeling support through local institutions and civil society is more broadly acceptable. Engagement should be calibrated to both regional and district-level sensitivities, particularly on sovereignty-linked issues where perceptions of foreign influence vary sharply across areas, to avoid deepening existing divisions.

## XIV. Conclusions

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Public opinion in Lebanon is currently shaped by a convergence of crisis conditions, where security concerns, economic hardship, and political uncertainty are tightly interconnected. The findings point to a population that is not disengaged, but rather highly reactive to immediate conditions, with attitudes formed through the lens of instability and survival. Citizens continue to prioritize the role of the state and national institutions, yet their expectations are grounded in performance and outcomes rather than political rhetoric. This reflects a broader shift toward pragmatic evaluation of governance, where legitimacy is increasingly tied to the ability to deliver stability and economic relief.

Security considerations dominate the national mindset. Peace and security emerge as the primary national priority, while preferences for stabilization strategies reflect a balance between institutional strengthening, diplomatic solutions, and negotiated outcomes. At the same time, there is a clear gap between aspiration and perceived feasibility. While many support the principle of stronger state control and institutional authority, fewer consider these outcomes realistically achievable under current conditions. This gap highlights a cautious and uncertain public outlook, shaped by prolonged exposure to conflict and limited confidence in the state's capacity to enforce change.

Economic concerns remain deeply embedded within this security-first framework. Issues such as reconstruction, displacement, and the broader economic crisis consistently rank among top priorities, reinforcing the idea that economic recovery is inseparable from stability. Public attitudes suggest that citizens are not evaluating economic reform in isolation, but as part of a broader need for security, continuity, and basic service provision. The prominence of displacement in particular underscores the extent to which conflict-related disruptions are influencing both immediate needs and longer-term national priorities.

Political confidence remains fragmented. While a segment of the population expresses confidence in leadership and institutions, significant portions remain skeptical or uncertain, reflecting a broader environment of low trust. This is further reinforced by attitudes toward electoral processes. Support for postponing elections is balanced by notable opposition, indicating that while security conditions justify caution for some, concerns about democratic continuity persist. At the same time, a meaningful share of the population reports disengagement from voting altogether, suggesting that prolonged instability may be contributing to political fatigue among certain groups.

Geopolitical perceptions are a central feature of public opinion. Citizens demonstrate strong awareness of external influence, with opinions divided on the role and impact of international and regional actors. While some actors are perceived as contributing to escalation, others are seen as essential to stabilization, particularly in terms of security guarantees and economic support. However, these views are far from uniform. Attitudes toward external involvement, including the role of neighboring countries and the international community, vary significantly across regions, reflecting differing security experiences and political alignments. This indicates that public acceptance of external engagement is conditional and closely tied to perceived national benefit and respect for sovereignty.

Regional and district-level disparities further reinforce the complexity of the Lebanese context. Differences across governorates are evident across multiple indicators, including perceptions of security, political confidence, external influence, and national priorities. Equally significant, however, are the divides that emerge at the district level. On several of the most contested issues in the survey, including state control over weapons, perceptions of government performance, attribution of escalation responsibility, and attitudes toward regional actors, differences across districts are as sharp and consistent as those observed at the governorate level, and in some cases more revealing. These patterns suggest that public opinion is shaped not only by broad geographic exposure to conflict and economic conditions, but also by highly localized narratives, community alignments, and diverging readings of the conflict and its causes. National-level findings must therefore be understood within both a governorate-level and a district-level landscape.

Overall, the data portray a society navigating a period of acute uncertainty. Citizens remain attentive, engaged, and responsive to developments, yet their views are marked by caution and

realism. The prevailing sentiment is neither one of optimism nor complete disillusionment, but rather a conditional outlook in which expectations are closely tied to the evolution of security conditions and the state's ability to respond effectively. In this context, the trajectory of public opinion will likely remain fluid, with the potential for rapid shifts as political and security dynamics continue to evolve.