FRIEDRICH NAUMANN STIFTUNG Für die Freiheit.

AUSGABE 03|25, 27.07.2025

Politik International

MENA

THE SYRIAN REFUGEES RETURN

A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF LESSONS FROM VIETNAM, BOSNIA, AND KOSOVO REFUGEE RETURN

IBRAHIM JOUHARI | GAELLE MOUNSEF
LEA FATHALLAH

Imprint

Publisher

Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom – FNF MENA
Mu'ath bin Jabal Street 55, Jabal Amman, Jordan
www.freiheit.org/en/mena
@fnf.mena

Authors

Ibrahim Jouhari
Gaelle Mounsef
Lea Fathallah

Contact

Phone: +962 6 461 9186
Email: mena@freiheit.org

Date of Publication

July 2025

About the MENA Regional Office

Operating from our five offices across the region, we actively promote political dialogue to support innovative liberal ideas and solutions. Our projects serve as liberal platforms where the Foundation's partners, from the Gulf to the Levant and across the southern Mediterranean, can exchange ideas, spark creativity, and discuss geopolitical developments.

Table of contents

Introduction

The complex issue of refugee return is a global challenge, profoundly influenced by a confluence of political, economic, and social factors in both the host country and the country of origin. Indeed, many aspects related to the country of origin, including security, governance, infrastructure, and economic opportunities, determine whether a return is desirable or even feasible. On the other hand, for host countries, economic factors (such as labor market impact and welfare burdens), political considerations (including public opinion and electoral dynamics), and social aspects (i.e., cultural integration and cohesion) generally weigh heavily against the return of refugees.

Understanding the historical dynamics of repatriation offers invaluable insights for addressing contemporary displacement crises, particularly the ongoing discussions regarding the potential return of Syrian refugees from Germany. This detailed analysis examines the primary findings and key incentivizing factors from three distinct refugee return movements: Vietnamese refugees in the United States, Bosnian refugees, and Kosovo Albanian refugees. It aims to identify actionable lessons and propose tailored strategies for the current situation of Syrians residing in Germany. Specifically, it is interested in reviewing and assessing the following patterns and policy pathways to identify best practices:

- Structured and voluntary return programs or initiatives that are supported by robust legal frameworks;
- Monitoring and accountability mechanisms to guarantee safety and a rights-based approach;
- Post-return reintegration support, including financial, psychosocial, etc.

The above will form a robust basis to craft policies and strategies specifically tailored to the needs of Syrian refugees in Germany, thereby ensuring that policy recommendations are grounded in proven practice, as demonstrated by historical precedent.

1.Historical overview of Syrian refugees in Germany

A.The 2015 refugee crisis

The 2015 European migrant crisis represented the largest movement of refugees into Europe since World War II, with over one million asylum seekers arriving in Germany between 2014 and 2016. The principal driver was the escalation of the Syrian civil war, which displaced millions and created a humanitarian emergency across the Middle East and Europe. In 2015 alone, Germany received more than 700,000 asylum applications[1], with Syrians constituting the largest group. By the end of 2023, nearly 972,000 Syrians resided in Germany, and the recognition rate for Syrian asylum applications was exceptionally high at 99%.[2]



Policy response:

Germany's government, led by Chancellor Angela Merkel, made a pivotal decision to suspend the Dublin Regulation for Syrians, allowing them to apply for asylum in Germany regardless of their entry point into the EU. Merkel's declaration "wir schaffen das" ("we can manage this") became emblematic of Germany's open-door policy. This approach was in stark contrast to many other EU states, which closed borders or limited refugee intake. The German public's initial response was largely welcoming, with crowds greeting refugees at train stations. However, the scale of arrivals quickly became a polarizing political issue, fueling the rise of the far-right AfD and intensifying debates about integration and national identity[3].

---

[1] World Bank, Forced Migration, Social Cohesion and Conflict The 2015 Refugee Inflow in Germany, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/830181643248457941/pdf/Forced-Migration-Social-Cohesion-and-Conflict-The-2015-Refugee-Inflow-in-Germany.pdf
[2] EU Commission, Institute for Employment Research (IAB): Syrian workers in Germany, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/whats-new/publications/institute-employment-research-iab-syrian-workers-germany_en?prefLang=ga
[3] Le Monde, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/12/14/scholz-says-integrated-syrian-refugees-welcome-to-stay-in-germany_6736054_4.html

Social and economic impact:

The influx put significant pressure on German public institutions, particularly in housing, education, and social services. Despite these challenges, Syrian refugees made notable strides in integration:

- Labour market: By 2023, the employment rate among Syrians who arrived as asylum seekers reached 61% after seven years, with a particularly strong presence in healthcare, logistics, and social sectors.
- System relevance: A majority of employed Syrians (62%) work in system-relevant jobs, compared to 48% of native Germans.
- Naturalization: Around 163,000 Syrians have been naturalized since 2015[4].

A.Ongoing migration

While the peak of arrivals was in 2015-2016, Syrian migration to Germany has continued, albeit at lower levels. By the end of 2024, nearly one million Syrians were living in Germany, making them one of the largest refugee populations in Europe. The German government's focus shifted from emergency response to long-term integration, with an emphasis on language acquisition, employment, and social cohesion. Research shows that local institutional factors, such as the availability of integration courses and opportunities for interaction with native Germans, strongly influence social integration.[5].

Integration outcomes:

Social integration: Studies demonstrate that regions with more integration courses and greater opportunities for contact between Syrians and Germans yield better integration outcomes. However, Syrians in Germany generally have low levels of social integration. A study by EconPol, which used Facebook connections between Syrian refugees and local Germans as a criterion for measuring integration, found that Syrian refugees had, on average, only five connections with Germans[6].

---

[4] EU Commission, Institute for Employment Research (IAB): Syrian workers in Germany, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/whats-new/publications/institute-employment-research-iab-syrian-workers-germany_en?prefLang=ga
[5] Michael Bailey, National Bureau of Economic Research, https://www.nber.org/papers/w29925
[6] Theresa Kuchler and Johannes Stroebel, The social integration of Syrians in Germany, EconPol https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/272146/1/1822854571.pdf

Moreover, there are large geographic differences in the social integration of Syrians living in Germany. Syrians living in blue regions have, on average, more than twice as many Facebook friends as Syrians living in orange regions. Rural areas have the highest degree of social integration. For example, Syrians in rural regions of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, and southern Bavaria have an average of more than seven German Facebook friends. In contrast, the social integration of Syrians in medium-sized cities such as Ansbach, Kaiserslautern, and Cottbus is comparatively low. The integration of Syrians living in Germany's largest cities, like Berlin, Munich, and Cologne, is somewhere in between[7].

Map of Social Integration



Source: Authors' compilation. © ifo Institute

Intention to stay: Social and economic integration are key determinants of refugees' intentions to remain in Germany. Strong emotional and social ties to Germany increase the likelihood of permanent settlement, while isolation or lack of integration fosters uncertainty and consideration of return.

Return and voluntary repatriation:

Before the fall of the Assad Regime, Germany established voluntary return programs (e.g., REAG/GARP), offering financial incentives and logistical support for Syrians wishing to return. However, actual returns remain very limited. For example, in 2018, only 437 Syrians returned under these programs, and there have been concerning reports of disappearances and detentions among returnees, underscoring the risks involved and the ongoing insecurity in Syria. The German government has consistently maintained that returns must be voluntary and that Syria is not considered safe for return.[8].

---

[7] Theresa Kuchler and Johannes Stroebel, The social integration of Syrians in Germany, EconPol https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/272146/1/1822854571.pdf

[8]https://ecre.org/germany-supported-the-return-of-437-people-to-syria-reports-on-disappearance-of-returnees-raise-concern/

Indeed, the REAG/GARP program assists refugees and asylum seekers in returning to their country of origin or in migrating to another country. It supports the organisation of the journey and pays the costs for the travel ticket.[9]. Further support for reintegration is available for many countries through the StartHilfePlus programme. However, the latter program is not offered for a return to Syria. Moreover, there is a significant amount of bureaucracy, and the process is further hindered by the large number of applicants, resulting in a wait time of approximately 12 weeks.[10].

A.The fall of the Assad regime

However, the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024 fundamentally altered the political landscape of Syria and the calculus for return among the Syrian diaspora[11]. German authorities responded by suspending new asylum applications from Syrians, citing uncertainty over Syria's future and the need to reassess the safety of return. This move affected tens of thousands of pending applications and sparked intense political debate, with some parties calling for expedited returns and others warning against premature repatriation[12].

Impact on refugees' intentions:

A recent study exploring survey data from just before and after Assad's fall found a significant shift in Syrian refugees' settlement intentions in Germany:
The share intending to stay permanently declined by 8.4 percentage points after the regime collapse, with a corresponding rise in uncertainty and consideration of return. However, there was no immediate increase in concrete plans to return, indicating that while aspirations shifted, actual behavior remained cautious. Emotional attachment to Germany remained stable, but attachment to Syria increased, reflecting the reactivation of affective ties and a renewed hope for a future return.[13].

Although this change in intentions is expected to increase, without economic and security assurances and support, the number of returns to Syria remains limited. This topic will be fully explored in the policy recommendation part of this paper.

---

[9] All in all, the aid covers tickets and travel to the airport, in addition to a maximum of 2,000 EUR for medical support and a one time support of 1,000EUR per person and up to 4,000 EUR per family. https://iom-p-we-webapp-ger-rfg-002.azurewebsites.net/en/programmes/reag-garp/
[10] https://iom-p-we-webapp-ger-rfg-002.azurewebsites.net/en/programmes/reag-garp/
[11] The Downfall of Assad: Syrian Refugees' Settlement Intentions after the Unexpected Regime Change https://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2025/dp0925.pdf
[12]https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/12/09/germany-and-austria-freeze-syrian-asylum-applications-local-media-report
[13] The Downfall of Assad: Syrian Refugees' Settlement Intentions after the Unexpected Regime Change https://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2025/dp0925.pdf

Public and political discourse:
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz emphasized that well-integrated Syrians are welcome to stay, especially given their contributions to the labour market, notably in healthcare. Nevertheless, political pressure from the far-right and centre-right parties has intensified, with calls for chartered return flights and financial incentives for voluntary return. These debates are occurring against a backdrop of labour shortages and concerns about the loss of skilled workers if mass returns were to happen.[14]. Thus, in such an apolitical climate, the importance of this paper becomes paramount in framing the discussion and developing actionable policy recommendations that preserve human dignity and rights.

Barriers to return:
Despite the regime change, the majority of Syrians in Germany remain hesitant to return due to persistent insecurity, destroyed infrastructure, unresolved property claims, and economic hardship in Syria. The UNHCR and other international bodies maintain that conditions do not yet guarantee safe and dignified return, echoing the lessons from historical case studies that underline the necessity of demonstrable security, legal guarantees, and robust reintegration support.
Finally, the experience of Syrian refugees in Germany since 2015 reflects the complex interplay between humanitarian response, integration policy, and shifting geopolitical realities. The fall of the Assad regime has reignited debates about return, but both research and historical precedent highlight that safe, voluntary, and sustainable return requires more than regime change; it demands genuine security, legal restitution, economic opportunity, and international oversight. German public institutions face the ongoing challenge of balancing integration for those who remain with the development of responsible, rights-based return policies grounded in historical lessons and empirical evidence. Thus, to fully develop the necessary actions to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees, this paper will thoroughly examine three historical refugee return case studies.

2. Historical case study of refugees' return

A.Case Study 1: Vietnamese Refugee Return (1975-1990)
The conclusion of the Vietnam War with the Fall of Saigon in April 1975 triggered a significant exodus of Vietnamese citizens, with a substantial number seeking asylum in the United States. By the late 1980s, dangerous sea crossings by “boat people” fleeing Vietnam to first asylum countries in Southeast Asia continued despite mounting regional pressure; in response, the international community (particularly UNHCR) devised a two-pronged strategy to ensure the safe and dignified return of refugees:

i.The Orderly Departure Program (“ODP,” 1979-1997):
The Orderly Departure Program (ODP) was established by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide immigrants with legal and safe migration paths to reduce dangerous boat exoduses: 623,509 Vietnamese were relocated under the ODP from 1980 to 1997, 458,367 of whom moved to the United States–all under UNHCR oversight.[15]

---

[14]https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/12/14/scholz-says-integrated-syrian-refugees-welcome-to-stay-in-germany_6736054_4.html
[15]Dave Roos, “How the End of the Vietnam War Led to a Refugee Crisis,” HISTORY, September 1, 2021, https://www.history.com/articles/vietnam-war-refugees.

ii.The Comprehensive Plan of Action ("CPA," June 1989):

The Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) instituted refugee-status screening across host countries and Hong Kong for boat arrivals after designated cut-off dates, which varied per country. The screening criteria were designed to be equitable and efficient, and these procedures were carried out by local government authorities in first asylum countries—including Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, and the Philippines—with further technical support from UNHCR. Recognized refugees were offered resettlement opportunities in third countries, and more than 530,000 Vietnamese and Laotians were resettled throughout the eight years of the CPA.[16] Screened-out individuals, on the other hand, were offered monitored and voluntary repatriation to Vietnam.[17]

At the same time, these legal frameworks were complemented by comprehensive reintegration support and monitoring. For instance, the UNHCR's monitoring program included visits to 12-13% of returnees and local authorities in southern provinces and 45% in the North to verify their safety and identify potential abuse or harassment.[18]Indeed, the primary drivers deterring return were the overwhelming political and economic disincentives within post-war Vietnam. The communist regime viewed those who fled as traitors, and any attempt to return carried the severe risk of persecution, including incarceration in re-education camps under brutal conditions. Economically, Vietnam was experiencing widespread food shortages, hyperinflation, and pervasive poverty. Hence, a significant step forward in lowering return barriers was the decision by Vietnamese authorities to waive prosecution for illegal departures, with the government expediting school enrollment and civil documentation for returnee families.[19]

To counter the spread of misinformation and in an attempt to reduce irregular migration, furthermore, the UNHCR coordinated a mass media campaign which expanded from northern Vietnam in 1990 to full national coverage by the end of the year using radio, print, and familiarization visits for NGO personnel, an important step to build returnees' confidence that their rights would be respected. The case of Vietnam, therefore, underscores the importance of safe legal channels (coupled with transparent screening and voluntary return guarantees) as well as predictable and needs-based reintegration aid tied to community development and comprehensive, proactive information campaigns alongside robust third-party monitoring.

---

[16]Shu Tri, "Chapter 4: Flight from Indochina," in The State of the World's Refugees: 50 Years of Humanitarian Action (Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 85, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/443739.
[17]General Assembly, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1990, A/45/12, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 24 September 1990, https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/unhcr/1990/en/42264
[18]US Department of State, "Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1991," http://archive.org/stream/countryreportson1991unit/countryreportson1991unit_djvu.txt, February 1, 1992, Vietnam, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1262357.html.
[19]US Department of State, "Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1991."

B.Case Study 2: Bosnia Refugee Return (1995-2004)

One of Europe's most severe forced displacement crises took place during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, where over 2.2 million people (nearly half the population) were displaced from their homes.[20] This war, fueled by ethnic tensions and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, was characterized by widespread violence, including campaigns of "ethnic cleansing" which aimed to remove certain ethnic groups from specific territories forcibly. The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 formally ended the conflict, enshrining the "right to return" for all displaced persons within its framework.[21]While international efforts, including those by the UNHCR, were successful in facilitating mass property restoration, they frequently failed, however, to guarantee significant and long-lasting social reintegration. This period emphasizes the complex interplay of political challenges, including ethnic obstructionism and weak governance structure under the Dayton framework; economic barriers such as widespread housing destruction and pervasive unemployment; and social tensions, particularly the persistence of ethnically segregated enclaves and deep-seated trauma among returnees. These factors significantly hindered both the initial willingness to return and the long-term sustainability of the repatriation process.
Two main elements emerged as significant incentives for return in Bosnia, namely:

i"Right to Return" and Property Restitution:

The Commission for Real Property Claims (CRPC), a crucial body created to handle and settle property restitution claims, was formed under Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords. The enforcement of these provisions was greatly aided by the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP), notably enforced by the OHR, systematically invalidated property transactions conducted during the war under coercion or through unlawful means.[22]In 1999, the OHR was granted the "Bonn Powers" to remove officials who were impeding the implementation of peace. As a result, 21 officials from the Republika Srpska (RS) were fired by 2002.[23] The successful resolution of an astounding 200,000 property claims by 2003 demonstrated the effectiveness of a strong legal system and decisive international enforcement in facilitating the return of property to its rightful owners. Mass property reports from 1999 to 2003 show that this gave returnees a concrete asset and a base. For example, the 2001 "Bulldozer Initiative" expedited returns, allowing 15,000 minority returns in only six months.[24]

---

[20]Mark Cutts, "The Humanitarian Operation in Bosnia, 1992-95: Dilemmas of Negotiating Humanitarian Access," Working Paper Series (Geneva, Switzerland: UNHCR, May 1999), https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/3ae6a0c58.pdf.
[21]"Genocide In Bosnia - Holocaust Museum Houston," Holocaust Museum Houston, August 2, 2023, https://hmh.org/library/research/genocide-in-bosnia-guide/.
[22]Elizabeth Ferris, "Internal Displacement, Transitional Justice, and Peacebuilding: Lessons Learned," Brookings (blog), November 11, 2008, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/internal-displacement-transitional-justice-and-peacebuilding-lessons-learned/.
[23]Maja Sahadžić, "The Bonn Powers in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Between a Rock and a Hard Place," ConstitutionNet, November 29, 2022, https://constitutionnet.org/news/bonn-powers-bosnia-and-herzegovina-between-rock-and-hard-place.
[24]"Interim Evaluation Of Reconstruction And Return Task Force (RRTF)," Minority Return Programmes in 1999 (Sarajevo: European Stability Initiative, September 14, 1999), https://www.esiweb.org/publications/interim-evaluation-reconstruction-and-return-task-force-rrtf.

ii. Security Presence and International Oversight:

i.Between 1998 and 2002, mass returns, totalling approximately 1,000,000 people, were notably correlated with the consistent presence of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) troops.[25] Any potential ethnic violence against returnees was discouraged by this strong international security presence, giving returnees a sense of safety. The multiethnic Brcko district, established and maintained under stringent international oversight through a binding arbitration decision in 1999, served as a prime example of successful reintegration in a diverse setting, underscoring the critical role that a safe environment and ongoing international oversight play.[26]On the other hand, a decrease in minority returns was closely associated with a noticeable reduction in security presence, highlighting the vulnerability of the return process in the absence of external assurances. Although SFOR-backed returns took place between 1998 and 2002, KFOR's (Kosovo Force) had some shortcomings and cases of ethnic retribution cycles, in which NATO forces occasionally failed to shield minority returnees from violence, with 2,400 incidents recorded between 1997 and 1999.[27]

Therefore, in the Bosnian context, the most effective methods were the strict enforcement of property restitution laws supported by international authority and mechanisms such as the OHR, and the continued existence of a strong international security force that, despite difficulties with complete protection and ethnic tensions, provided a safe and stable environment for returnees.

B. Case Study 3: Kosovo Albanian Refugee Return (1999-2001)

The Kosovo conflict (1998-1999), in which ethnic Albanians opposed ethnic Serbs and the government of Yugoslavia, led to a large-scale displacement, with close to one million Kosovo Albanian refugees fleeing the region.[28]This crisis escalated rapidly following the launch of NATO's 78-day bombing campaign on March 24, 1999. Within days, massive refugee flows poured into neighbouring countries. By the time NATO's intervention concluded in June 1999, Serbian forces had deliberately killed an estimated 11,000 people in what has been described as one of the most harrowing humanitarian crises of the late 20th century.[29]

The war was mainly driven by ethnic nationalism, territorial disputes, and political power struggles between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), supported by NATO and Albania. The war then became a fight against the prosecution of Kosovo Albanians by the Serbian army. Despite the scale of displacement, the refugee crisis saw an almost unprecedented reversal. Remarkably, within just three months, approximately 660,000 of the nearly 800,000 Kosovo Albanian refugees returned home, many of them spontaneously, to destroyed towns and villages amid post-conflict chaos. This rate of return was remarkable in both its speed and scale—an outcome shaped by unique circumstances, notably the swift improvement of security and proactive repatriation policies from host countries like Germany.

---

[25]NATO Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina," in Wikipedia, March 20, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=NATO_intervention_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina&oldid=1281521822.

[26]Senada Selo Sabic, State building under foreign supervision: intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996-2004, Study Group information (Wien: Landesverteidigungsakademie, 2005).

[27]Urtak Hamiti, "NATO IN KOSOVO-KFOR MISSION, INTENTIONS, SUCCESSES, FAILURES," European Journal of Research in Social Sciences 3, no. 6 (2015): 48–52, https://www.idpublications.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NATO-IN-KOSOVO-KFOR-MISSION-INTENTIONS-SUCCESSES-FAILURES.pdf.

[28]The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Kosovo conflict." Encyclopedia Britannica, March 17, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/event/Kosovo-conflict.

[29]Ray Wilkinson, ed., "Kosovo One Last Chance: The Race against Winter yet Another Exodus," Refugees Magazine 3, no. 116 (1999): 4–20, https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/3c6914bc5.pdf.

Therefore, it is safe to say that this rapid reversal was significantly influenced by three key factors:

i. Rapid Improvement in Security Conditions:

The foremost factor enabling mass returns was the immediate restoration of security in Kosovo. NATO's military intervention decisively ended hostilities and established a protective international presence, providing refugees with a sense of safety that encouraged voluntary return. As noted by the UNHCR, this was "perhaps the first time that so many people left and then returned in such a short time," underscoring the critical role perceived security plays in repatriation decisions.[30] Security was the primary concern for most displaced Kosovars, not material assistance. As the UN High Commissioner for Refugees highlighted during a 1998 mission, "Kosovo is a political problem, with devastating humanitarian consequences, for which there is only a political solution".[31]Once the threat of ethnic cleansing dissipated and NATO peacekeepers were deployed, most Albanian refugees made their way home without formal repatriation programs.

ii. Host Country Pressure and Facilitation:

i.Another crucial factor was the active role of host countries in initiating returns. Germany, which had granted temporary asylum to roughly 15,000 Kosovo Albanians, announced soon after the conflict's end that these individuals would be repatriated, and proceeded with both voluntary and enforced returns.[32] Reports from Hina note that the first group of returnees arrived in Pristina as early as July 1999, just weeks after the war had ended. Many of these returns were not entirely voluntary, as the German government had signaled that the temporary protection status granted during the war would be withdrawn, effectively mandating repatriation once conditions improved. This illustrates how host country policies, especially when coupled with logistical support and clear political messaging, can speed up the return process, even if voluntariness remains a contested issue. Additionally, organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) facilitated returns from not only Germany but also Canada, the U.S., Australia, and several European nations. Within just three weeks, more than 660,000 refugees returned from Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with organized convoys playing a substantial role.[33]

---

[30]Wilkinson, "Kosovo One Last Chance: The Race against Winter yet Another Exodus," 20-21.
[31]Nicholas Morris, "UNHCR and Kosovo: A Personal View from within UNHCR," Forced Migration Review (blog), June 1999, https://www.fmreview.org/morris-n/.
[32]"ALBANIAN REFUGEES RETURN FROM GERMANY TO KOSOVO," Hina, September 7, 1999, https://www.hina.hr/vijest/4193372.
[33]ALBANIAN REFUGEES RETURN FROM GERMANY TO KOSOVO."

iii. Emergency Coordination and Reintegration Support:

i.International coordination provided the foundation for reintegration, despite a large portion of the return being unplanned. Basic services were stabilized in Kosovo during the early post-conflict period thanks to the assistance of the European Union's Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), which facilitated the quick deployment of humanitarian aid and logistics.[34]To monitor and protect the rights of returnees, the UNHCR also upheld its protection mandate during returns. Later, initiatives like Germany's URA Project, which offered social counseling, assistance with finding a job, and funding for school supplies and business start-up costs to returnees, helped to encourage lasting reintegration. As stated in UNHCR's 2003 Framework for Durable Solutions, the "4Rs" approach—Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction—is reflected in this. [35]

As a result, in the Kosovo context, the stabilization of security conditions in the home country after NATO's military intervention, as well as proactive host country policies that either facilitated or, in certain cases, enforced repatriation—though the latter raises significant questions regarding the voluntariness of return—were the most effective drivers of return. Furthermore, by facilitating the quick distribution of humanitarian aid, the Emergency Response Coordination Centre helped establish the framework for the social and financial support systems necessary for long-term rehabilitation and reintegration.

3. Applying Lessons to Syrian Refugees in Germany

Germany has emerged as a significant host country for Syrian refugees since the onset of the conflict in 2011. By the end of 2024, approximately 974,136 people of Syrian origin were residing in Germany, with a substantial number holding either refugee status under the Geneva Convention or subsidiary protection.[36] Despite many having made commendable strides in integration, a growing discourse in Germany has emerged and intensified surrounding the potential return of Syrian refugees to Syria, especially after the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024.

Germany has been actively exploring various strategies, including the potential revocation of protection status if conditions in Syria become officially deemed as safe for return. Additionally, financial incentives are being offered to encourage voluntary return through programs such as REAG/GARP (Reintegration and Emigration Programme for Asylum-Seekers in Germany/Government-Assisted Repatriation Programme).[37] However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is maintaining a cautious stance on the matter, asserting that the current conditions in Syria do not yet guarantee a safe, dignified, and durable return for refugees, as outlined in their Operational Framework and Position on Returns to Syria.[38] Syrian refugees themselves express profound concerns regarding ongoing security risks, political instability, and the dire lack of viable economic opportunities in their homeland. According to a recent 2025 UNHCR Flash Intention Survey, most Syrian refugees express a long-term desire to return and have found new hope for such a return after the regime shift; however, they consistently emphasize that this can only occur when conditions are genuinely safe and stable.[39]

---

[34]"Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)," European Commission, 2022, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/emergency-response-coordination-centre-ercc_en.
[35] Amadou Tijan Jallow and Sajjad Malik, "Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities" (Geneva: UNHCR, May 2004), https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/411786694.pdf.
[36]"Germany Suspends Syrian Asylum Decisions Citing 'Unclear Situation,'" L'Orient Today, December 9, 2024, sec. Syrian refuges, https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1438986/germany-suspends-syrian-asylum-decisions-citing-unclear-situation.html.
[37] Emma Wallis, "Germany: Financial Incentives Offered to Syrians to Return Home," InfoMigrants, January 20, 2025, https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/62319/germany-financial-incentives-offered-to-syrians-to-return-home.
[38] UNHCR Lebanon, "General Guidance," UNHCR Lebanon, accessed June 14, 2025, https://help.unhcr.org/lebanon/en/welcome/return-to-syria/general-guidance/.
[39]Rachel Manning and Maxence Hayek, "Flash Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees' Perceptions and Intentions on Return to Syria (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon)" (UNHCR, February 2025), https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/UNHCR_Flash_Intention_Survey2025.pdf.

Drawing upon the critical lessons from the Vietnamese, Bosnian, and Kosovo Albanian case studies, Germany can adopt a more nuanced and effective approach to facilitating Syrian refugee return:

A. Prioritize Demonstrable and Sustainable Security and Stability:

In each of the three historical examples, a demonstrable increase in security was the most obvious catalyst for large-scale returns. The Kosovo case provides a case in point that verifiable and sustained improvements in security, coupled with tangible political stability in the home country, are the most powerful incentives for large-scale voluntary return. For Syrian refugees, this doesn't just mean the end of major hostilities, which has been the case for a while; rather, it requires a secure environment free from arbitrary detention, torture, political persecution, and the risk of renewed conflict. The recent events on the Syrian coast, where nearly 400 Syrian security personnel and dozens of civilians were killed on ethnic grounds, demonstrate that the overall situation in Syria remains hostile.[40] Without these fundamental changes, financial incentives offered by Germany, while helpful, will likely remain insufficient to drive widespread voluntary repatriation, as refugees prioritize safety above all else. Any efforts to encourage return must align with independent and credible assessments of safety and human rights conditions in Syria, ensuring protection from refoulement. Furthermore, the case of Bosnia demonstrates that legal guarantees, such as Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords, were insufficient when local conditions remained hostile. It was only when international forces backed the returns and monitored security that returns occurred; when they did not, local obstruction and interethnic tensions prevented reintegration. Therefore, without sustained international monitoring and a neutral security apparatus in Syria, any return process risks exposing refugees to retribution.[41]

B. Address Property Rights and Economic Reintegration:

Economic reintegration is not a secondary concern, but it is foundational to durable return. The Bosnian experience vividly illustrates the importance of robust property restitution mechanisms. For Syrian refugees, concerns about destroyed, seized, or illegally occupied property are significant barriers to return. Concerns over available housing and the status of their property were cited as the top barrier to return by refugees in the UNHCR 2025 survey, followed by safety and security concerns, economic challenges in Syria, and the availability of basic services in areas of return.[42]

---

[40]Mawadah Bahah, "Syria Clashes – What Happened?," Al Jazeera, March 10, 2025, sec. Syria's war, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/10/syria-clashes-what-happened.

[41]Die Rückkehr von Flüchtlingen verstehen: Wichtige Erkenntnisse, Lücken und zukünftige Forschung https://www.jointdatacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/JDC_digest_nov_2024.pdf

[42]Manning und Hayek, „Regionale Blitzumfrage zu den Wahrnehmungen und Absichten syrischer Flüchtlinge bei der Rückkehr nach Syrien (Ägypten, Irak, Jordanien, Libanon)", 7.

Manning and Hayek, "Flash Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees' Perceptions and Intentions on Return to Syria (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon)," 7.

Notably, 61% of surveyed refugees reported owning property in Syria, but over 80% of these properties are either fully destroyed or uninhabitable, highlighting the critical need for property restitution and reconstruction support.

Germany could advocate for and support international efforts to establish transparent, accessible, and legally sound mechanisms for property claims and restitution in Syria, should the political and security situation allow for their effective implementation. Furthermore, the creation of viable economic opportunities, including infrastructure reconstruction, job creation, and access to basic services (such as healthcare and education), is crucial to ensure that returnees can rebuild their livelihoods and sustain themselves. This requires comprehensive planning and, potentially, substantial international funding to support reintegration programs within Syria. As both the United States and the European Union recently moved to remove sanctions on Syria, its economic reintegration should be facilitated.

Additionally, targeted support could be extended and increased, for example the German programs REAG/GARP and StarthilfePlus need to be strengthened, expanded to include Syria and to improve the financial incentives for the families choosing to return, with support that could consist of microfinancing for starting small businesses or farming initiatives, and for reconstruction of destroyed home.

C. Uphold Voluntary and Dignified Return Principles:

While host country policies can influence return, as seen in the Kosovo example with German facilitation, international refugee law unequivocally mandates that repatriation must be voluntary, safe, and conducted with dignity and respect.[43] Germany's existing financial incentives through programs like REAG/GARP are a positive step towards encouraging voluntary return. Still, they must be implemented within a framework that rigorously adheres to the principle of non-refoulement, ensuring that no refugee is directly or indirectly compelled to return against their will or to a situation where their life or freedom would be at risk. The Bosnian case showed that legal coercion or pressure to return prematurely, especially to areas where returnees were minorities, undermined trust and, in many cases, led to secondary displacement. Close coordination with and deference to UNHCR's expert assessments on the safety of return to Syria are paramount, as the UNHCR's "Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation" emphasizes the importance of informed and uncoerced decision-making.[44]

---

[43]"Voluntary Repatriation and Return," UNHCR Georgia, accessed June 14, 2025, https://help.unhcr.org/georgia/voluntary-repatriation-and-return/.

[44]"Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection" (Geneva: UNHCR, January 1, 1996), https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/3bfe68d32.pdf.

D. Advocate for and Support International Oversight and Reintegration Programs:

The Bosnian experience underscores the importance of robust international supervision in ensuring the successful restoration of property and security during the early stages of return. This means that Syria urgently needs strong international oversight of human rights, reintegration program implementation, and returnee protection. By establishing confidence and guaranteeing the long-term viability of any returns, Germany could take the lead in promoting and supporting comprehensive international assistance for post-conflict recovery and reintegration initiatives within Syria. This includes lending support to programs that offer psychosocial support, legal aid, and help reestablishing documentation. The UNHCR survey revealed that over 60% of refugees consider "go and see" visits essential before making a final decision to return, suggesting that confidence-building measures and transparent information-sharing are vital. Germany's leadership in coordinating international actors and ensuring accountability could help establish the trust and infrastructure necessary for sustainable and voluntary returns.

E. Support and encourage circular migration

Indeed, Circular migration refers to migration systems that allow refugees or migrants to move temporarily between their host country and country of origin, rather than requiring a permanent, one-way return or resettlement. In the current German context, policymakers are considering proposals that would permit Syrian refugees to make short-term visits to Syria, such as for several weeks, without risking the loss of their protection status in Germany[45]. This approach recognizes that return is not always a linear or final process and instead enables refugees to assess conditions in their homeland, reconnect with family, and explore opportunities for reconstruction or investment, all while maintaining their legal and social ties to Germany. Circular migration can facilitate more informed and voluntary decisions about permanent return, support Syria's recovery through the transfer of skills, capital, and knowledge, and help sustain vital transnational networks. Such policies also reflect the reality that many Syrians in Germany have developed deep roots but retain a strong connection to their homeland, and that fostering mobility and dual engagement can benefit both societies, promoting integration in Germany while contributing to Syria's rebuilding efforts[46]

---

[45] Rebuilding Syria: A Win-Win for German-Trained Refugees and their Hosts https://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/rebuilding-syria-a-win-win-for-german-trained-refugees-and-their-hosts/
[46] Syrian Refugee Returns: What Policy Must Do, https://www.bicc.de/Publikationen/20250219_Syrian_Refugee_Returns_eng_online..pdf

4. Conclusion

The findings of this paper underscore that a complex interplay of security, economic, legal, and psychosocial factors shapes the decision for refugees to return. Historical case studies explored in this paper, such as those of Vietnam, Bosnia, and Kosovo, demonstrate that large-scale, sustainable returns are only possible when there are clear and credible improvements in security, robust legal guarantees (especially for property and civil rights), and substantial international oversight. In the absence of these conditions, as seen in post-war Vietnam and Bosnia, return rates remained low and often led to renewed cycles of displacement or marginalization. For Syrian refugees in Germany, the collapse of the Assad regime has shifted the outlook and generated new debates. Still, the persistent insecurity, unresolved property issues, and lack of economic opportunity in Syria continue to deter most from returning, despite policy incentives and shifting public discourse.

A particularly important finding is the role of integration in the host country, not only in supporting refugees' well-being and contributions to society but also as a key factor in preparing for their eventual return. Evidence suggests that refugees who are better integrated socially, economically, and psychologically are more likely to make informed decisions about returning and to contribute positively to reconstruction efforts if they choose to return. The German experience, with its relatively high employment rates among Syrians, underscores the potential for a "win-win" situation where integration and return readiness enhance each other. Additionally, policies that support circular migration, such as allowing temporary visits to Syria without losing protection status, can help refugees make informed decisions, strengthen transnational connections, and participate in rebuilding their homeland while maintaining the stability and security they have found in Germany.

Despite these advances, significant research gaps remain. There is a need for more nuanced, longitudinal studies on the dynamics of return from high-income countries, as most existing research focuses on returns from neighbouring states or low-income contexts. The heterogeneity of refugee experiences by age, gender, legal status, and integration level also requires deeper exploration to inform differentiated policy responses. Furthermore, future research should investigate the long-term effects of circular migration, the role of diaspora engagement in post-conflict reconstruction, and the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on displacement and return patterns.

In conclusion, while the return of Syrian refugees remains a complex and evolving challenge, the lessons from history and current research point to several clear priorities: ensuring security, economic opportunities, and legal guarantees in Syria, while investing in integration and circular migration pathways in Germany, and supporting international oversight and reintegration programs. Only through a balanced, evidence-based approach grounded in the lived realities of refugees and informed by rigorous research can policymakers effectively facilitate voluntary, safe, and sustainable returns that respect the rights and dignity of all parties involved.

5. Bibliography

- Bahah, Mawadah. "Syria Clashes – What Happened?" Al Jazeera, March 10, 2025, sec. Syria's war. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/10/syria-clashes-what-happened.

- BICC (Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies). "Syrian Refugee Returns: What Policy Must Do." BICC Policy Report, February 2025. https://www.bicc.de/Publikationen/20250219_Syrian_Refugee_Returns_eng_online..pdf

- BICC (Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies). "The Politics of Syrian Refugee Return in Germany: Balancing Rhetoric and Reality." BICC Peacebits, March 1, 2017. https://bicc.de/Cosmos/Peacebits/The Politics of Syrian Refugee Return in Germany

- Bosch Stiftung. "A Dangerous Distortion: The Debate on the Return of Syrian Refugees." December 19, 2024. https://www.bosch-stiftung.de/en/storys/debatte-rueckkehr-syrischer-gefluechteter

- Brücker, Herbert, Kosyakova, Yuliya, and Vallizadeh, Ehsan. "The Downfall of Assad: Syrian Refugees' Return Intentions after Regime Change." IAB Discussion Paper 09/2025. Institute for Employment Research, June 2025. https://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2025/dp0925.pdf

- Council of the EU. "Syria: EU Adopts Legal Acts to Lift Economic Sanctions on Syria, Enacting Recent Political Agreement." Consilium, May 28, 2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/28/syria-eu-adopts-legal-acts-to-lift-economic-sanctions-on-syria-enacting-recent-political-agreement/.

- Cutts, Mark. "The Humanitarian Operation in Bosnia, 1992-95: Dilemmas of Negotiating Humanitarian Access." Working Paper Series. Geneva, Switzerland: UNHCR, May 1999. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/3ae6a0c58.pdf.

- Dinçer, Osman Bahadır, Ruth Vollmer, Zeynep Şahin-Mencütek, and Selina Engelberth. "Research Dossier on Syrian Refugee Return Dynamics." GAPs/REMIG Policy Brief, February 28, 2025. https://www.returnmigration.eu/wp-series/research-dossier-on-syrian-refugee-return-dynamics

- Dinçer, Osman Bahadır. "Refugee Return, Reintegration, and Citizenship Practices in Syria." International Migration, 2025. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/imig.13379

- ECRE. "GERMANY: New Government Takes Office; Immediately Orders Police to Turn Away Most Undocumented People at Border." May 8, 2025. https://ecre.org/germany-new-government-takes-office-immediately-orders-police-to-turn-away-most-undocumented-people-at-border-—-far-right-party-labelled-extremist-by-intelligence-agency/

- Euractiv. “The 'Enormous Cost' of Returning Syrians from Germany.” January 10, 2025. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/german-plans-to-review-refugee-status-of-syrians-likely-to-come-at-a-price/

- European Commission. “Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC),” 2022. https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/emergency-response-coordination-centre-ercc_en.

- EWFRF. “Germany Considers Revoking Protection for Syrian Refugees Who Travel to Syria.” June 4, 2025. https://ewfrf.org/en/2025/06/04/5493/

- Ferris, Elizabeth. “Internal Displacement, Transitional Justice, and Peacebuilding: Lessons Learned.” Brookings (blog), November 11, 2008. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/internal-displacement-transitional-justice-and-peacebuilding-lessons-learned/.

- Frontiers in Sociology. “Syrian Refugees Arriving in Germany: Choice of Corridor and Integration Outcomes.” May 11, 2023. https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/sociology/articles/10.3389/fsoc.2023.1070065/full
- German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). “Rebuilding Syria: A Win-Win for German-Trained Refugees and Their Hosts.” IDOS Current Column, January 27, 2025. https://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/rebuilding-syria-a-win-win-for-german-trained-refugees-and-their-hosts/

- Hamiti, Urtak. “NATO IN KOSOVO-KFOR MISSION, INTENTIONS, SUCCESSES, FAILURES.” European Journal of Research in Social Sciences 3, no. 6 (2015): 48–52.
- Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection. Geneva: UNHCR, January 1, 1996. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/3bfe68d32.pdf.

- Hina. “ALBANIAN REFUGEES RETURN FROM GERMANY TO KOSOVO,” September 7, 1999. https://www.hina.hr/vijest/4193372.

- Interim Evaluation Of Reconstruction And Return Task Force (RRTF). Minority Return Programmes in 1999. Sarajevo: European Stability Initiative, September 14, 1999. https://www.esiweb.org/publications/interim-evaluation-reconstruction-and-return-task-force-rrtf.

- Jallow, Amadou Tijan, and Sajjad Malik. “Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities.” Geneva: UNHCR, May 2004. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/411786694.pdf.

- L’Orient Today. “Germany Suspends Syrian Asylum Decisions Citing ‘Unclear Situation.’” December 9, 2024, sec. Syrian refugees. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1438986/germany-suspends-syrian-asylum-decisions-citing-unclear-situation.html

- Le Monde. "In Germany, Syrians Still Do Not Feel Fully Assimilated after 10 Years." July 3, 2025. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/07/03/in-germany-syrians-still-do-not-feel-fully-assimilated-after-10-years_6742975_4.html

- Manning, Rachel, and Maxence Hayek. "Flash Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees' Perceptions and Intentions on Return to Syria (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon)." UNHCR, February 2025. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/UNHCR_Flash_Intention_Survey2025.pdf.

- Morris, Nicholas. "UNHCR and Kosovo: A Personal View from within UNHCR." Forced Migration Review (blog), June 1999. https://www.fmreview.org/morris-n/.

- NATO Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Wikipedia, March 20, 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=NATO_intervention_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina&oldid=1281521822.

- Nguyen, An Tuan. "More Than Just Refugees—A Historical Overview of Vietnamese Professional Immigration to the United States." Journal of Vietnamese Studies 10, no. 3 (November 1, 2015): 87–125. https://doi.org/10.1525/jvs.2015.10.3.87.

- Roos, Dave. "How the End of the Vietnam War Led to a Refugee Crisis." HISTORY, September 1, 2021. https://www.history.com/articles/vietnam-war-refugees.

- Sabic, Senada Selo. State Building under Foreign Supervision: Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1996-2004. Study Group information. Wien: Landesverteidigungsakademie, 2005.

- Sahadžić, Maja. "The Bonn Powers in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Between a Rock and a Hard Place." ConstitutionNet, November 29, 2022. https://constitutionnet.org/news/bonn-powers-bosnia-and-herzegovina-between-rock-and-hard-place.

- Shu Tri. "Chapter 4: Flight from Indochina." In The State of the World's Refugees: 50 Years of Humanitarian Action, 79–103. Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/443739.

- The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Kosovo conflict." Encyclopedia Britannica, March 17, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/event/Kosovo-conflict.

- UNHCR, ed. The State of the World's Refugees: 50 Years of Humanitarian Action. Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/443739.
- UNHCR Georgia. "Voluntary Repatriation and Return." Accessed June 14, 2025. https://help.unhcr.org/georgia/voluntary-repatriation-and-return/.

- UNHCR Lebanon. "General Guidance." UNHCR Lebanon. Accessed June 14, 2025. https://help.unhcr.org/lebanon/en/welcome/return-to-syria/general-guidance/.

- U.S. Department of the Treasury. "Treasury Issues Immediate Sanctions Relief for Syria," February 8, 2025. • UNHCR (Hrsg.): Die Lage der Flüchtlinge in der Welt: 50 Jahre humanitäre Hilfe. Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/443739 .

- UNHCR Georgien. „Freiwillige Repatriierung und Rückkehr." Abgerufen am 14. Juni 2025. https://help.unhcr.org/georgia/voluntary-repatriation-and-return/.

- UNHCR Libanon. „Allgemeine Hinweise." UNHCR Libanon. Abgerufen am 14. Juni 2025. https://help.unhcr.org/lebanon/en/welcome/return-to-syria/general-guidance/.

- US-Finanzministerium. „Finanzministerium erlässt sofortige Sanktionserleichterungen für Syrien", 8. Februar 2025. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0148.

- Wallis, Emma. „Deutschland: Finanzielle Anreize für Syrer zur Rückkehr in ihre Heimat." InfoMigrants, 20. Januar 2025. https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/62319/germany-financial-incentives-offered-to-syrians-to-return-home.

- Wilkinson, Ray (Hrsg.): „Kosovo – Eine letzte Chance: Der Wettlauf gegen den Winter, ein weiterer Exodus." Refugees Magazine 3, Nr. 116 (1999): 4–20..

- Wallis, Emma. "Germany: Financial Incentives Offered to Syrians to Return Home." InfoMigrants, January 20, 2025. • UNHCR (Hrsg.): Die Lage der Flüchtlinge in der Welt: 50 Jahre humanitäre Hilfe. Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/443739 .

- UNHCR Georgien. „Freiwillige Repatriierung und Rückkehr." Abgerufen am 14. Juni 2025. https://help.unhcr.org/georgia/voluntary-repatriation-and-return/.

- UNHCR Libanon. „Allgemeine Hinweise." UNHCR Libanon. Abgerufen am 14. Juni 2025. https://help.unhcr.org/lebanon/en/welcome/return-to-syria/general-guidance/.

- US-Finanzministerium. „Finanzministerium erlässt sofortige Sanktionserleichterungen für Syrien", 8. Februar 2025. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0148.

- Wallis, Emma. „Deutschland: Finanzielle Anreize für Syrer zur Rückkehr in ihre Heimat." InfoMigrants, 20. Januar 2025. https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/62319/germany-financial-incentives-offered-to-syrians-to-return-home.

- Wilkinson, Ray (Hrsg.): „Kosovo – Eine letzte Chance: Der Wettlauf gegen den Winter, ein weiterer Exodus." Refugees Magazine 3, Nr. 116 (1999): 4–20..

- Wilkinson, Ray, ed. "Kosovo One Last Chance: The Race against Winter, yet Another Exodus." Refugees Magazine 3, no. 116 (1999): 4–20.

Über das Regionalbüro

Naher Osten und Nordafrika

Von unseren sieben Büros aus fördern wir aktiv die politische Debatte, um innovative liberale Ansätze und Lösungen zu unterstützen. Unsere Projekte sind liberale Plattformen auf denen die Partner der Stiftung vom Golf bis zur Levante und der gesamten Südseite des Mittelmeeres kreative Impulse setzen und geopolitische Zusammenhänge erörtern können.