

Transformations in Youth Political Participation in Morocco: From the Political Sphere to Civil Society

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Executive Summary

Since 2011, the Kingdom of Morocco has experienced significant shifts in the patterns of youth participation in political and developmental life. Despite constitutional and institutional reforms following the 2011 youth movement, a wide gap persists between young people and traditional political institutions. Official data indicate a decline in youth engagement in electoral processes and political parties, contrasted with a noticeable increase in non-traditional forms of civic mobilization, such as protests and digital campaigns. At the same time, young people face acute developmental challenges, including high unemployment rates and a substantial proportion of youth remaining outside the labor market and education system, which exacerbates their sense of marginalization.

This paper provides a historical and institutional background of youth political participation in Morocco, discusses the current challenges, and examines the policies implemented to address them. It then analyzes data from 2011–2025 on electoral participation, youth involvement in political parties, and civic mobilization, alongside youth-related development indicators (unemployment, education, and social integration). The analysis concludes that there is a persistent gap in trust and representation between young people and traditional political institutions, despite some reform efforts. Finally, practical and actionable recommendations are presented, based on digital data, aimed at enhancing youth integration into political and developmental life. These recommendations include activating dormant institutional frameworks (such as the Advisory Council for Youth) and rebuilding trust through inclusive policies that provide real opportunities for education, employment, and participation.

▪ Introduction: Historical and Institutional Context of Youth Participation in Morocco

Youth issues occupy a central place in Morocco's modern political and social history. Since the independence struggle in the 1950s, Moroccan youth have emerged as active agents of societal change. In subsequent decades, the newly independent Moroccan state established institutional

1_Economic, Social and Environmental Council, A New National Initiative for Moroccan Youth, Rabat, 2018, pp. 15–18

mechanisms dedicated to youth, such as the Ministry of Youth and Sports in the 1960s, alongside the emergence of organizations such as the youth wings of political parties and youth centers in various cities.

Nevertheless, the relationship between young people and political institutions has been characterized by fluctuations. Youth have often been viewed more as a protest force or an electoral reservoir than as genuine partners in decision-making. This perception has led to an accumulated sense of exclusion among successive generations of young people from formal political processes over the past decades.

At the beginning of the third millennium, official discourse increasingly emphasized the need to integrate youth. Youth issues became a “priority” in state rhetoric since the early 2000s, with King Mohammed VI repeatedly stressing the importance of youth representation in public affairs. This attention culminated in the 2011 Constitution, which included a dedicated article (Article 33) urging public authorities to expand and generalize youth participation in the country’s social, economic, cultural, and political development. The Constitution also provided for the establishment of the Advisory Council for Youth and Associative Action as a constitutional institution aimed at involving youth in shaping public policies.

These constitutional reforms occurred in the context of both regional momentum (the Arab Spring) and local mobilization (the February 20, 2011 movement), during which Moroccan youth led widespread demonstrations demanding greater freedom, dignity, and anti-corruption measures, prompting significant political reforms. Consequently, 2011 marked a historical turning point in which the Moroccan state sought to modernize the institutional framework for citizen participation in public life, particularly that of young people.

Despite these constitutional and institutional developments, challenges arose in translating these provisions into practical reality. Throughout the decade

2_ *Ibid*

3_ Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, 2011, Article 33, Publications of the General Secretariat of the Government, Rabat, 2011.

4_ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *National Human Development Observatory Report on Youth and Social Disparities*, Rabat, 2019, pp. 22–23.

5_ Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CESE), *A New National Initiative for Moroccan Youth*, Rabat, 2018, pp. 18–19.

6_ High Commission for Planning (HCP), *National Research on Moroccan Youth*, Rabat, 2019, pp. 45–47.

7_ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23.

8_ Prometheus Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, *Youth and Political Participation in Morocco: Attitudes and Representations*, Rabat, 2021, pp. 12–14.

following the 2011 Constitution, signs of a gap emerged between the ambitions of political and developmental youth inclusion and actual outcomes on the ground. Large segments of youth continued to abstain from voting or engaging in political parties, while their voices increasingly resonated in the streets and on social media platforms outside traditional frameworks. Between 2011 and 2025, Morocco witnessed a series of unconventional youth protests and campaigns, starting with the February 20 movement, followed by the Rif Movement of 2016/2017, the 2018 economic boycott campaigns, and online mobilizations around various issues. All of this raises urgent questions about the effectiveness of public policies targeting youth and about the relationship between weak institutional youth participation on one hand and rising civic mobilization on the other.

In 2025, new shifts were observed in protest mobilization, highlighted by a relatively young movement calling itself **Generation Z 212 (GEN Z)**. The movement carried slogans demanding improved health services, enhanced education quality, and reduced corruption. The movement's activities on platforms such as TikTok, Instagram, and Discord succeeded in spreading widespread demonstrations across major Moroccan cities. Initially, these protests were peaceful, with demands limited to addressing what participants considered misaligned national priorities, emphasizing that health, education, and anti-corruption efforts should take precedence over organizing global or international demonstrations. They argued that building hospitals and schools should come before sports stadiums.

These protests witnessed some arrests among demonstrators, who were investigated, posted bail, and released quickly. However, the demonstrations soon escalated into violence in the following days—a development that the Generation Z movement publicly disavowed. Many cities experienced severe rioting, clashes with security forces, burning of security buildings, and looting of commercial centers, shops, and banks, prompting a strong intervention by security authorities to contain the situation. This situation reflects the tense

9_ **World Bank**, *World Development Indicators: Morocco*, Washington, D.C., 2022, Youth and Employment Tables

10_ **Special Commission on the Development Model**, *The New Development Model: Ambitions for the Morocco of the Future*, Rabat, 2021, pp. 45–50

11_ **Economic, Social and Environmental Council**, *Previously cited reference*, pp. 19–21

12_ **High Commission for Planning**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 8

13_ **Special Commission on the Development Model**, *Previously cited reference*, pp. 49–50

14_ **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 26

15_ **Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco**, 2011, Articles 14 and 15

16_ **Economic, Social and Environmental Council**, *Previously cited reference*, pp. 21–22

17_ **High Commission for Planning**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 45

18_ **Prometheus Institute for Democracy and Human Rights**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 13

19_ **Ministry of Youth, Culture and Communication**, *National Integrated Youth Strategy 2015–2030*, Rabat, 2015, pp. 5–8

relationship between youth and security institutions in Morocco, which has long been overlooked. It reinforces youth distrust in state institutions and perpetuates political disengagement, pushing young people instead to take to the streets to make their voices heard directly.

This paper aims to address this issue through an in-depth analysis based on reliable official data. We will begin by presenting the current state of the problem and existing policies, then analyze youth participation data in elections and political parties versus forms of civic mobilization, linking these to relevant development indicators. We will highlight the gap between youth and traditional political institutions, before providing numerically supported conclusions and practical recommendations to bridge this gap in a way that serves Morocco's stability and development.

▪ **Presentation of the Problem and Current Policies**

The Current Problem: The core issue lies in the widespread Moroccan youth abstention from traditional political channels (such as elections, parties, and unions), in favor of either complete withdrawal from participation or expressing themselves through alternative means (protests, associative work, digital activism). This political disengagement has serious developmental implications, as it deprives decision-making processes of the voice of a large youth segment (estimated at around 30% of the population) and exacerbates young people's sense of economic and social exclusion. Simultaneously, youth face severe developmental challenges: high unemployment, education misaligned with the labor market, and weak economic and social integration. Consequently, the political crisis intertwines with developmental crises, making addressing youth participation essential for ensuring inclusive and sustainable development.

Existing Policies: In response to this issue, since 2011, the Moroccan state has adopted a range of policies and initiatives to address the youth participation gap. The main measures can be summarized as follows:

- **Constitutional and Legal Reforms:** As noted, the 2011 Constitution explicitly included provisions to enhance youth participation (Article 33), which led to the enactment of regulatory laws activating participatory democracy mechanisms, such as citizens' right to submit petitions and

20_ **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 24

21_ **Economic, Social and Environmental Council**, *Previously cited reference*, pp. 22–25

22_ **Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco**, 2011, Article 33, + **Organic Law No. 89.15** relating to the Advisory Council for Youth and Associative Work, Publications of the General Secretariat of the Government, Rabat, 2017

23_ **Ministry of Youth, Culture and Communication**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 9

24_ **Special Commission on the Development Model**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 48

legislative proposals. Additionally, a youth quota was introduced in parliament following the 2011 movement, with the 2011 electoral law reserving a national youth list that brought 30 parliamentarians under the age of 40 into the House of Representatives. This step doubled youth representation in parliament from 12% to approximately 22% after the 2011 elections. Despite debates over some beneficiaries being close to party leadership, the mechanism was considered a positive step for youth political empowerment. However, this national youth list was abolished before the 2021 elections, which youth activists viewed as a regression in a significant achievement.

- **National Bodies and Strategies:** The government developed the 2015–2030 Integrated National Youth Strategy as a comprehensive framework guiding all stakeholders' interventions in the youth field. This strategy received international recognition as an integrated plan including action programs and impact assessment indicators. Moreover, in 2018, the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (a formal advisory body) formulated a new national initiative for Moroccan youth with recommendations to strengthen youth participation in development and public life. Additionally, the 2017 law organizing the Advisory Council for Youth and Associative Action laid the groundwork for establishing this constitutional institution. However, many of these initiatives were not implemented as expected: the national youth strategy was frozen, and the Advisory Council still does not function in practice despite being constitutionally mandated, due to delays in approving its composition and disputes over representation. This institutional stagnation negatively affected youth trust, who perceived the non-implementation of promises as a sign of weak political will to involve them meaningfully.
- **Economic and Social Programs for Youth:** Beyond the political sphere, the state launched programs to address youth economic and social marginalization, aiming to enhance their integration and thereby encourage participation. Prominent programs include the "Força" initiative to stimulate youth entrepreneurship and the "Ourach" program to create temporary public works jobs, alongside continuing initiatives like youth centers in cities and villages fostering cultural and sports activities, and the Children's Parliament to instill a culture of participation from an early age. Despite their importance, observers note a lack of information and evaluation regarding their actual impact. While these programs improved access to some services and opportunities, they did not address the roots of political disengagement. Limited coordination

25_ **Government of Morocco**, Official statements on the *Forsa* and *Awrach* programs, Rabat, 2022

26_ **Ministry of Youth, Culture and Communication**, *Youth Activities and Institutions: Annual Report*, Rabat, 2022

and sustainability were criticized, as various plans succeeded one another without follow-up or continuity (e.g., the 2015–2030 youth strategy).

Overall, Morocco has officially adopted a policy and legislative framework considered theoretically advanced for youth engagement, but practical implementation has fallen short of achieving a real transformation in youth–political life relations. This explains why a broad sector of youth continues to feel disappointed with official promises, remaining outside traditional institutions, either withdrawing or innovating alternative forms of participation. In the following sections, this assessment will be reinforced through digital and statistical data from 2011–2025 to provide an accurate picture of youth participation patterns and link them to relevant development indicators.

▪ **Data Analysis (2011–2025) on Political Participation and Youth Development**

1. **Youth Electoral Participation and Party Engagement**

Voter turnout rates and youth involvement in political parties provide direct indicators of institutional political participation. Over the past decade, Moroccan elections and party membership data present a mixed picture, tending toward weak youth presence in formal politics:

- **Voting Rates and Electoral Participation:** Morocco held three significant legislative elections in 2011, 2016, and 2021. Overall participation remained low, not exceeding roughly half of registered voters. National participation in the 2011 legislative elections reached about 45% (improved compared to 2007’s historically low 37%). It declined to 43% in 2016, attributed to continued voter distrust, especially among youth. In 2021, despite merging legislative and local elections and amending electoral laws, participation rose to only around 50% of registered voters. These overall figures mask age disparities; surveys indicate that participation among the 18–30 age group is below the national average. A national institute report stated that 58% of youth surveyed registered to vote in 2021, meaning 42% did not register at all. While these figures indicate relative improvement in youth mobilization

27_ **Ministry of Interior**, *Report on Legislative, Regional, and Municipal Elections*, Rabat, 2021, p. 12

28_ **High Commission for Planning**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 47

29_ **Ministry of Interior**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 15

30_ **Arab Barometer Foundation**, *Opinion Survey – Youth and Political Participation in Morocco*, 2021, pp. 7–9

31_ **Prometheus Institute for Democracy and Human Rights**, *Previously cited reference*, pp. 11–12

32_ **Economic, Social and Environmental Council**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 20

33_ **High Commission for Planning**, *National Survey on Moroccan Youth*, Rabat, 2019, p. 52

34_ **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**, *Previously cited reference*, 2019, pp. 22–23

35_ **Arab Barometer Foundation**, *Previously cited reference*, 2021, p. 11

compared to the past, actual youth turnout remains low, as many registered voters may abstain on election day. Studies attribute youth disengagement to the widespread belief that “voting changes nothing” under the dominance of the same elites.

- **Political Party Membership and Engagement:** Moroccan parties suffer from organizational aging and weak elite renewal, evident in low youth membership. Official statistics from the High Commission for Planning show that only about 1% of Moroccan youth are members of political parties or unions. This low rate persisted after the Arab Spring; five years post-2011 reforms, youth engagement remained almost unchanged. Ninety-nine percent abstention implies that most of the new generation prefers staying outside traditional party frameworks. This coincides with low interest in party life: a recent survey found 86% of Moroccan youth dissatisfied with party performance, 47% reported no trust in parties, and 26% claimed to be “completely uninterested” in party politics. These negative attitudes reflect a disconnect between youth and parties, caused by the perception that parties do not represent their aspirations or address priorities like unemployment and education, in addition to reputational issues and internal conflicts reducing party appeal. While major parties have youth wings, these are often deemed formalistic or dominated by older leadership, limiting their role in internal decision-making. The youth quota implemented in parliament (2011–2016) did not extend effectively to internal party structures, leaving youth representation in executive committees weak. As a result, youth find no effective platform for change or voicing concerns within current parties, explaining their repeated withdrawal.

Trust is also a key factor in understanding youth political behavior. Data indicate that around 70% of youth do not believe institutional political work can achieve their demands, with only 5% believing in change through formal institutions. This trust crisis creates a vicious cycle: low trust leads to disengagement, which in turn further marginalizes youth demands in public agendas, reinforcing distrust. The petition mechanism post-2011 exemplifies this: despite constitutional recognition, most youth-submitted petitions were rejected for formal or bureaucratic reasons, strengthening the impression that youth voices do not reach official channels.

36_ **Prometheus Institute for Democracy and Human Rights**, *Previously cited reference*, pp. 13–14

37_ **High Commission for Planning**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 54

38_ **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 22

39_ **Arab Barometer Foundation**, *Previously cited reference*, pp. 14–15

40_ **Economic, Social and Environmental Council**, *Previously cited reference*, pp. 20–21

41_ **Special Committee on the Development Model**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 50

2. Non-Traditional Civic Mobilization and Youth Role

Faced with limited formal engagement, many Moroccan youth turned to non-traditional avenues for participation and expression. These include:

- **Protests and Social Movements:** The street became a primary venue for youth voices. The February 20, 2011 movement exemplifies this, with a loose coalition of youth leading peaceful demonstrations in dozens of cities demanding radical political reforms. The movement was youth-led, organized through social media (especially Facebook), and united under slogans against corruption and authoritarianism. Despite the decline of momentum post-constitutional reforms, it paved the way for a continuous youth protest culture. Subsequent waves include the 2016–2017 Rif Movement demanding development, the 2018 Jerada protests against economic conditions, and the 2019 contract teachers' sit-ins demanding job stabilization. These movements were relatively spontaneous, independent of parties, and relied on social networks for mobilization. Authorities' responses varied from partial concessions to repression and arrests. Nevertheless, these protests conveyed that the street became an effective tool for youth when traditional channels were closed.
- **Associative and Volunteer Work:** Many youth engage in NGOs and associations to effect tangible local change. Post-2011 Morocco saw a surge in associations, particularly in local development, culture, and human rights. Associative networks offer youth leadership skills and community service opportunities, independent of party politics. Innovative initiatives emerged, such as literacy campaigns, environmental projects, health awareness drives in underprivileged neighborhoods, and COVID-19 support campaigns. While not political in a narrow sense, these forms of civic engagement foster social responsibility and public involvement. Studies indicate many Moroccan youth prefer voluntary civic contributions to direct political engagement due to greater flexibility, independence, and tangible outcomes.
- **Digital Activity and Social Media:** Digital spaces are now the primary political platform for a large segment of Moroccan youth. With widespread internet and smartphone use, social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.) has become a forum for public debate, demands, and campaign organization. Hashtags adopted by thousands can pressure

42_ **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 24

43_ **Ministry of Youth, Culture and Communication**, *Youth Activities and Institutions: Annual Report*, Rabat, 2022, p. 12

44_ **Arab Barometer Foundation**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 16

45_ *Ibid.*, p. 17

46_ **Prometheus Institute for Democracy and Human Rights**, *Previously cited reference*, pp. 15–16

47_ **Hespress**, *Coverage and Reports on the 2018 Boycott Campaign*, Rabat, 2018

48_ **Special Committee on the Development Model**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 50

authorities or corporations. Digital media also mobilized the youth in previous protests and new forms of expression called "virtual activism," including digital campaigns reflecting political and civic awareness (e.g., the 2018 boycott of three companies over price hikes and lack of competition). Despite being informal, digital activism has proven effective in influencing consumer and government behavior. The rise of online petitions and statements also prompted some institutions to attempt youth engagement digitally, though initiatives remain limited.

Overall, non-traditional civic mobilization reflects Moroccan youth's creativity in finding alternative channels to make their voices heard. Rather than joining a party to enact gradual internal change—which has lost appeal—many youths choose direct action in the street, civic engagement, or digital activism to shape public opinion. These initiatives faced challenges, including government indifference or suppression and the absence of sustainable organization, often limiting their long-term impact. Nonetheless, these mobilizations exerted pressure, prompting the state to address previously neglected issues (e.g., education and healthcare in the Rif or employment for certificate holders), underscoring the need to channel youth energy into institutional frameworks.

3. Relevant Development Indicators: Unemployment, Education, and Integration

Youth political participation cannot be separated from their developmental context; unemployment, economic marginalization, and poor education directly affect youth engagement and trust in institutions. Key indicators for 2011–2025 include:

- **Youth Unemployment:** Youth unemployment rates have remained high regionally. Official data show youth unemployment (ages 15–24) peaked at around 26% during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, slightly declining to 23% in 2022. This is two to three times the general unemployment rate (9–12%) and up from 17–20% earlier in the decade.

49_ **World Bank**, *Previously cited reference*

50_ *Ibid*

51_ **High Commission for Planning**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 31

52_ **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 23

53_ **Economic, Social and Environmental Council**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 24

54_ *Ibid*

55_ **Moroccan Government Presidency**, *Official Statements on the "Força" and "Orach" Programs*, Rabat, 2022

56_ **Ministry of National Education, Early Education and Sports**, *Education Sector Statistics 2021–2022*, Rabat, 2022, p. 10

57_ **Special Committee on the Development Model**, *Previously cited reference*, pp. 44–46

58_ **High Commission for Planning**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 32

Urban youth, university graduates, and females are disproportionately affected; for instance, 26.5% of urban youth were unemployed in 2017, and graduates' unemployment sometimes exceeded 40%. Prolonged unemployment erodes trust in government policies and may lead youth to withdraw from participation or engage in protests. Programs such as "Moqawilati," "Força," and "Ourach" have had limited impact relative to demand.

- **Education and Skills:** Enrollment rates improved quantitatively, with near-universal primary education coverage and about 90% in secondary education. However, completion rates through higher education remain relatively low, and skill quality is poor. Overcrowding, insufficient resources, and outdated curricula lead to graduates without labor-market skills. University graduates face the highest unemployment, with some studies reporting 64% unemployment among youth aged 15–24 with higher degrees in 2018. Poor civic and political education reduces youth awareness of their rights and participation mechanisms, further diminishing trust.
- **Social and Economic Integration (NEETs and Exclusion):** Youth not in education, employment, or training (NEETs) remain a concerning segment. In 2010, about 32% of youth aged 15–29 were NEETs. Despite slight improvements, rates remained around 26–28% in the late 2010s, reaching 27% in 2020. Approximately one in four youth is disengaged from productive development, with higher prevalence among females (up to 50%). NEET youth often feel marginalized, potentially leading to social withdrawal, psychological issues, or risky behaviors (irregular migration, radicalization). This group also forms a base for spontaneous protests, being most affected by limited social mobility. Authorities have recognized the issue, advocating for programs to integrate youth into the economy to avoid "wasting an entire generation." Migration aspirations reflect disillusionment: over half of youth (55%) aged 18–29 have considered migrating abroad for better opportunities, versus 24% of older adults. This threatens both human capital retention and youth confidence in national capacity to meet aspirations.

In sum, youth face dual challenges: economic frustration and lack of skills and opportunities. This situation directly affects political participation, with

59_ **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 27

60_ *Ibid.*, p. 25

61_ **World Bank**, *World Development Indicators: Morocco*, 2022

62_ **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 24

63_ **Special Committee on the Development Model**, *Previously cited reference*, p. 52

64_ **Throne Speech**, July 2018, Rabat

65_ **Arab Barometer Foundation**, *Previously cited reference*, pp. 19–20

unemployment correlating with electoral abstention and protest escalation. Poor civic education further reduces understanding of decision-making importance, leaving older generations to dominate outcomes, creating a vicious cycle. Political and developmental policies must thus be addressed jointly.

▪ **The Gap Between Youth and Traditional Political Institutions**

The above data highlight a deep gap between Moroccan youth and official political institutions (government, parliament, parties, local authorities), manifesting in several dimensions:

- **Trust and Legitimacy Gap:** Many youth feel elected institutions do not represent them or address real concerns. Data show 70% of youth lack trust in institutional political work. Youth perceive parties as pursuing narrow interests rather than public service. Absence of perceived representational legitimacy leads to disengagement from parliamentary or local activities, deepening isolation. Institutions recognize their weak appeal but often lack effective strategies to earn youth trust.
- **Representation and Participation Gap:** Even within available formal channels, youth presence remains limited. Youth aged 18–35 constitute a significant share of the population and electorate, yet their parliamentary and local council representation is insufficient. While the 2011 quota brought several youth into parliament, only 6% of MPs were under 35 in 2016. Cabinet positions are rarely given to young people, and youth rarely head local councils. The 2021 abolition of the parliamentary youth list further narrowed official youth representation.
- **Communication and Messaging Gap:** Institutional language and discourse often diverge from youth expectations. Officials' formal, traditional communication contrasts with youth preference for direct, fast online interaction. Youth perceive issues such as unemployment, education quality, and digital freedoms as under-prioritized in agendas dominated by distant debates. Social media initiatives by the state remain limited.
- **Generational and Value Gap:** Youth often view traditional institutions as outdated, hierarchical, and unresponsive to new cultural values. Young people favor transparency, horizontal participation, and autonomous

66_ High Commission for Planning, *Previously cited reference*, p. 54

67_ Arab Barometer Foundation, *Public Opinion Survey – Youth and Political Participation in Morocco*, 2021, p. 13

68_ Economic, Social and Environmental Council, *Previously cited reference*, p. 20

69_ Prometheus Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, *Previously cited reference*, pp. 12–13

70_ Arab Barometer Foundation, *Previously cited reference*, p. 15

71_ Special Committee on the Development Model, *Previously cited reference*, p. 50

experience, while institutions operate slowly and hierarchically. Cultural clashes emerge, with digital-native youth expecting prompt responses, often met with bureaucratic inertia. Youth express opinions boldly online, sometimes provoking institutional defensiveness.

These gaps reinforce disengagement and marginalization. If persistent, they threaten Morocco's development and democratic model by silencing a third of the population, leading to unresponsive policies and potential social unrest. The 2021 New Development Model report warned against leaving youth in distrust and called for a new social contract integrating youth as a key development driver.

Nonetheless, bridging initiatives are emerging, such as modest increases in electoral participation influenced by family and tradition, and civil society campaigns encouraging informed voting ("Youth Vote" campaign before 2021 elections). The new generation is better informed and open, indicating potential for engagement if enabling conditions are met.

Recommendations

Based on the analysis, the following practical recommendations aim to enhance youth political participation and developmental integration, considering Morocco's context and constraints:

1. **Activate the Advisory Council for Youth and Associative Action immediately and independently:** Ensure broad, transparent representation and grant real powers to influence public policies and monitor youth-targeted programs.
2. **Rebuild trust through inclusive national youth dialogue:** Government, parliament, parties, independent youth organizations, and universities should negotiate a national youth charter committing to tangible measures (youth representation, policy integration, freedom of expression).
3. **Reform party systems to empower young leadership:** Introduce minimum youth quotas (<35) in executive bodies and nominations, establish internal digital platforms for youth input, adapt communication to youth preferences, and link public funding to youth integration.
4. **Strengthen local participation and establish youth councils:** Create advisory youth bodies at municipal and regional levels, and launch programs like "Local Youth Ambassador" to liaise between youth and councils.

72_ Prometheus Institute, *Previously cited reference*, p. 14

73_ Special Committee on the Development Model, *Same source*, p. 45

74_ Special Committee on the Development Model, *Same source*, p. 53

5. **Develop civic education in schools and media:** Update and revitalize civic education curricula, simulate student parliaments, support university clubs and debates, and use media to showcase successful youth role models.
6. **Provide integrated economic empowerment:** Link political engagement with economic solutions, including investment in youth-intensive sectors, microfinance for startups, mandatory internships, vocational and higher education reforms, and social protection networks.
7. **Support youth digital and community initiatives rather than resist them:** Establish official units for monitoring and responding to youth online discourse, create unified platforms for proposals, and facilitate voluntary and community projects with micro-grants.

Implementing these recommendations requires strong political will, cross-sector coordination, and patience. Gains include rejuvenating political life, instilling responsibility and optimism in a generation, and accelerating development with inclusive participation. Data from 2011–2025 clearly show where the problems lie; it is time to translate them into bold solutions placing youth at the heart of Morocco’s new development model.

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